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This dissertation presents the first evaluation of a VCA in terms of its multi-scalar 
governance approach with reference to the principles of the ICCAs category and 
the CPR principles for institutional arrangements for sustainable natural resource 
management. The research techniques applied to develop this research included: 
(1) document revision on national legislation for protected establishment and 
management; (2) forty four semi-structured interviews with conservation 
practitioners at different administrative levels, as well as (3) direct observations, 
32 semi-structured and unstructured interviews to conform an in-depth case 
study of the VCA of El Reten, in San Miguel Chimalapa, Oaxaca, Mexico.  
Devolution processes in El Reten were analysed in terms of the bundles of rights 
or powers that local community holds for natural resource management after the 
certification of El Reten and during its early implementation. The issues examined 
by these dissertation have explored for the first time who is entitled to “give” 
which powers back to local communities; the actual procedures that allow these 
approaches to be called community-driven when ICCAs can only retain “power” by 
conforming to externally defined criteria, and finally, if devolution is happening, 
the way “bundles of rights” - or powers - (Ribot and Peluso 2003) interact with 
external criteria for conservation. The case study of El Reten provides clear 
examples of the implications of the formalisation of a VCA over local governance 
structures. These decentralised approaches for conservation are also subject to 
elite capture and the trade-offs between the availability of economic resources 
and local autonomy, as well as between administrative efficiency and equity and 
legitimacy. The VCA in El Reten represents the ideal scenario for the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin 1968), where the establishment of a VCA, the arrival of 
economic incentives and the overlooking of the local political context by 
conservation agencies is fuelling the tragedy instead of alleviating it. This 
dissertation shows this explicitly in the context of the newly developed VCA 




Section I: Introduction, Theoretical 
Background and Research Design 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
Since more than a hundred years ago and to the present day, the most common 
form of conservation is the establishment of protected areas (Adams et al. 2004). 
From that point on, biodiversity conservation has been related to “pristine nature” 
(Adams and Hutton 2007) free from human influence, and multiple efforts and 
resources have been invested by states and numerous agencies to keep it that 
way. Even though this model was originally applied in landscapes where human 
populations were overseen by colonisation processes, this conception does not fit 
the reality of the majority of protected areas around the world. As a result, 
centralised, top-down conservation has provided short-lived results and have 
further marginalised rural people through exclusion and coercion (Adams and 
Hutton 2007; Armitage et al. 2012; Colchester 2004; Pimbert and Pretty 1995).  
Hence, despite of their importance in maintaining forests cover and numerous 
species around the world, protected areas face a number of challenges and 
criticisms due to their negative effects on local people and livelihoods. 
Since the 1980s, it has been increasingly recognised that most forested areas in 
the world that are now considered priorities for conservation have been inhabited 
and managed by local people through centuries (Adams and Hulme 2001; 
Andrew-Eissen and Bisong 2009; Boege 2008; Lele et al. 2010; Nagendra et al. 
2009; Toledo 2003). Today, after numerous examples of how both the state and 
the private companies have not achieved to reduce forest cover loss nor to 
manage natural resources sustainably (Andam et al. 2008; Barber et al. 2011; Ellis 
and Porter-Bolland 2008), the link between local institutions and the achievement 
of conservation and social justice is increasingly acknowledged (Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999; Dietz et al. 2003). Along with the increasing understanding of social-
ecological systems, a copious literature and conservation practitioners have called 
for a change and transformation in science, philosophy and ecology itself in order 
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to pursue environmental justice (Pimbert and Pretty 1995; Andrew-Essien and 
Bisong 2009; Bishop et al. 1995; Brockington and Igoe 2006; Brockington et al. 
2008: 93; Colchester 2004; Dowie 2005; Duffy 2005; Fairhead and Leach 1996; 
Pujadas and Castillo 2007; West et al. 2006). This has opened the door to the 
recognition of the importance of local people for conservation and the 
development of rights-based approaches that aim to make biodiversity 
conservation compatible with local livelihoods, cultural practices and self-
determination. Nowadays, policy-makers and practitioners acknowledge that the 
design, establishment and implementation of protected areas’ networks should 
consider the local cultural practices for natural resources management as well as 
local peoples’ rights to be involved in the decisions that directly affect their 
livelihoods.  
Human and indigenous rights concerns have been some of the main drivers for the 
development of policy that acknowledges indigenous peoples and local 
communities as key actors for biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development. This is reflected in international policy instruments such as article 
8j of the CBD and the COP after Río (CBD/COP 1992), which states that every 
signatory country is obliged to integrate, to respect and to preserve the 
knowledge, innovation and practices as well as the lifestyles relevant to 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use into national legislation. Similarly, 
the IUCN’s Fifth World Parks Congress in Durban (2003) and the CBD CoP7 in 
Kuala Lumpur (2004) have been two milestones in the current typology of 
protected areas governance arrangements, based on who acts as the recipient of 
authority and responsibility and who is held accountable (Berkes 2009, Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004, IUCN/CEESP 2012). The new IUCN typology enhances the 
acknowledgement of local community’s rights (e.g. human rights) to meet their 
socio-economic and cultural needs as well as their role in protecting ecosystems 
around the globe (Pujadas and Castillo 2007).  Hence, the latest policy initiative on 
this regard is that of the formal recognition of Indigenous and Community 
Conserved Areas (ICCAs), which are defined as: 
“natural and/or modified ecosystems containing significant biodiversity 
values, ecological services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by 
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indigenous peoples and local communities, both sedentary and mobile, 
through customary laws or other effective means.”  (IUCN 2011)  
Although they are the oldest conservation practice, ICCAs are also the least 
understood. Currently, governance arrangements for ICCAs are facing several 
challenges since legal, institutional and procedural frameworks are not adapted to 
effectively support them (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010). As a new form of 
governance, ICCAs are argued to rely on increasingly self-regulating social 
systems. Hence, the power distribution tends to be less direct and based on 
incentives as well as on more informal institutional control than state-managed 
protected areas. Although multi-scale governance arrangements, such as ICCAs, 
seem to be less hierarchical, they pose new complexities as well. 
Therefore, this thesis examines issues of multi-scalar governance in relation to 
ICCAs. ICCAs are distinguished principally by the role of the local community as 
the main power-holder – the “major player” in decision-making and 
implementation – and the category is intended to provide a mechanism for 
external recognition of and support for local community contributions to the 
global conservation project. In the context of developing countries, this often 
includes a return of powers to indigenous and traditional communities over their 
lands and resources. However this raises a number of unexamined theoretical and 
practical questions in relation to concepts of power and governance. For example, 
who is entitled to “give” which powers back to local communities? In what sense 
can local communities be said to remain the main power-holders in ICCAs if they 
can only retain “power” by conforming to externally defined criteria?  
Furthermore, if such a process is possible, how can devolution of a “bundle of 
rights” - or powers - (Ribot and Peluso 2003) be reconciled with external criteria 
specifically related to conservation outcomes?  
These issues will be examined in detail for the first time using an in-depth case 
study of an ICCA in the Southern Isthmus region of Mexico known as El Cordon del 
Reten. Mexico was chosen as the site for the case study because it is considered 
one of the countries with the most developed legal frameworks to formally 
acknowledge ICCAs and has an extensive inventory of them (Martin et al. 2010; 
8 
 
2011). The theoretical framework relevant for this analysis is concerned with the 
very nature of power, exploring the actual possibilities for power devolution from 
the state to local communities through participatory efforts. This thesis draws on 
the critiques that the development and political ecology literature have developed 
about the issue of participation, starting from the different interpretations of what 
participation actually means, what purposes it serves to, and its implications in 
terms of equity and legitimacy. As it is often the case, without a careful reflection, 
it could be that participatory approaches to conservation are replicating 
hierarchical schemes and legitimizing official discourses, ways to know and 
realities with new facades. In this sense, it is relevant to analyse how the legal 
frameworks for protected areas governance, with emphasis on the notions of 
devolution and scale are inclusive or not of other worldviews and the actual role 
that local structures for natural resources management play in the overall process, 
as well as the dangers for new forms of elite capture. Finally, all these 
arrangements and the “messiness of policy in practice” (Leach et al. 2007) happen 
over territories and natural resources managed by indigenous or rural 
communities. Therefore, the caveats when working at the community level and 
the common-pool resource theory are helpful to explain the simplifications made 
by policy-makers and practitioners and their relation to the principles that are 
likely to define the outcomes of such efforts in terms of legitimacy, equity and 
sustainability in the Mexican interpretation of ICCAs.  
The Southern Isthmus region of Mexico provides the empirical background for 
this research. The diverse land tenure arrangements of indigenous communities, 
ejidos, private owners and state managed protected areas have created a mosaic of 
governance arrangements with different outcomes in social and biodiversity 
conservation terms. In order to return decision-making powers to communities 
and private owners, national and regional policies have been developed to 
support the creation of voluntary conserved areas at national and regional level. 
These policies also aim to enhance multi-scalar conservation initiatives within 
biological corridors. The trend has been reflected in the on-going establishment of 
non-state managed Indigenous Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) and private 
reserves through voluntary conservation certifications provided by the 
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government; by ecological easements (civil contracts) between landowners and 
NGOs, and other legal mechanisms available. These certifications and ecological 
easements can help the landowners to gain social recognition and economic 
benefits such as those from ecotourism and Payments for Environmental Services 
(PES), as well as access to development programmes. However, in the local 
context, power over land and access to natural resources, decision-making and its 
enforcement are highly contested.  
 
1.2 Thesis aims and structure 
The aim of this research is to explore in depth for the first time, issues of power 
and governance in relation to the recent policy concept of ICCAs and the practical 
implications for multi-scalar governance arrangements.  Through an in-depth case 
study of El Cordon del Reten, in the Southern Isthmus region of Mexico, and 
attending to the multi-scalar governance nature of the subject, the research was 
divided in three parts, representing different scales of governance, namely: 
(1) The national level: A review of Mexican national protected areas 
legislation.  
(2) The regional level: an exploration of the perspectives of conservation 
professionals working in the Southern Isthmus region of Mexico 
concerning community participation and governance. 
(3) The local level: an in-depth local case study of the implementation of 
one ICCA through a multi-scalar governance arrangement. 
The structure of the thesis has been framed according to these three different 
levels. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework that informed the data 
collection and analysis; it also justifies the focus of the research on the Southern 
Isthmus region of Mexico, the most bio-culturally diverse of the country. Then, 
Chapter 3 describes the research design, the study area and briefly presents some 
methodological reflections from the fieldwork and their likely effect on the 
research itself.  The following sections disentangle the different scales involved in 
protected areas management in the region. In Section II, Chapter 4 explores the 
10 
 
national and regional aspects of conservation governance, defining the legal 
frameworks relevant for conservation governance in the region. Chapter 5 
explores the organisational frameworks for conservation governance through the 
experiences of conservation practitioners in the region. 
Section III (Chapters 6 and 7) analyses the implementation of a multi-scalar 
governance arrangement and the implications for relevant governance aspects of 
conservation processes. It does so through an in-depth case study of the ICCA El 
Cordon del Reten (El Reten, hereafter), in the South-Isthmus region. Chapter 6 
defines the history and background of El Reten, while exploring the formal 
governance structures and issues of scale and decision-making in the community 
of San Miguel Chimalapa, where El Reten is located. Chapter 7 analyses the issues 
and challenges found in El Reten in relation to multi-scalar governance 
arrangements in conservation practice for benefit-sharing, accountability, 
transparency, equity and legitimacy. Finally, Section IV presents the discussion 
and conclusions of this research in terms of: (1) the issues encountered in terms of 
multi-scalar governance structures, decision-making, benefit-sharing; (2) the 
implications of this so-called devolution (Ribot and Peluso 2003) in terms of the 
equity, legitimacy and sustainability in community-managed landscapes, 
according to the CPR literature, and (3) the implimications of formalisation of 





Chapter 2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Protected areas governance and multi-scalar arrangements: 
complex arrangements to fit reality 
2.1.1 Bittersweet effects and shifting paradigms in protected areas 
 
Almost every human society identifies areas subject to protection or limited 
access, either for the public good or for the benefit of the elite (Bishop et al. 1995). 
The importance of protected areas is recognised for safeguarding biological 
diversity and ecological processes, as well as providing shelter to ecological 
systems. Furthermore, protected areas allow the development of activities to fulfil 
scientific, educational, recreational and spiritual needs (Brandon et al. 2005).  The 
protected areas approach widespread since the late 19th century is based on the 
division between “natural” and “human”, and emerged from Western thought, 
which places nature as something pristine and apart from humans (Adams and 
Hutton 2007). Ecology, also as a result of Western thought, has long provided the 
arguments for exclusionary approaches for conservation. Therefore, on an 
ecological basis, some conservation practitioners still call for the creation, when 
possible, of areas subject to state protection with few or no people inside 
(Wilshusen et al. 2002). The argument is that these areas are more desirable for 
long-term species conservation and the maintenance of ecological and 
evolutionary processes (Terborgh 1999).  
Despite their ecological importance, protected areas are a much questioned 
approach to biodiversity conservation and face a number of challenges. The 
pressures of human population growth and the constant expansion of economic 
activities that enhance land use change makes protected areas increasingly 
isolated and confined to the most inaccessible lands (Nagendra 2009; Naughton-
Treves et al. 2005; Oldfield et al. 2004; Robson 2007). In ecological terms, by 
overlooking the wider landscape dynamics, many protected areas are affected by 
the fact that ecosystem processes and environmental degradation cannot be 
limited by artificial boundaries. In management terms, protected areas can cover 
multiple ecological and administrative scales and have overlapping designations, 
making planning, implementation and adaptation difficult for the agencies in 
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charge. Furthermore, park managers and staff often lack capacities, resources and 
legal faculties to carry out management and enforcement duties (Wells and 
McShane 2004). Also politically, protected areas represent use restrictions and 
require bureaucratic and often lengthy negotiation processes for their 
designation. During this process, when economic and political interests are 
considered, levels of protection tend to be minimised (Bishop et al. 1995).  
Therefore, protected areas agencies and managers around the world face constant 
ecological, management, and political challenges to achieve conservation targets. 
Protected area effectiveness is another source of debate. In a constant effort to 
identify the “best” and “most cost-effective” approaches for biodiversity 
conservation, numerous researchers are engaged in measuring protected areas 
effectiveness (Andam et al. 2008; Naughton-Treves et al. 2005; Nagendra 2009; 
Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). Yet, consistent evaluations are elusive due to the 
multiplicity of factors that affect conservation outcomes as well as the selection of 
parameters and indicators evaluated. Thus, whether a particular category of 
protected area is considered effective or not greatly depends on the scale, 
parameters and indicators selected by researchers. In terms of halting 
deforestation for example, Andam et al. (2008) argue that protected areas globally 
have reduced deforestation by 10%. This estimation was made after considering 
the different covariates that have an effect on the impact of conservation efforts 
and allowed researchers to refute previous estimates that calculated protected 
areas avoided deforestation by 65%. Despite the lack of consensus about their 
effectiveness, even the most conservative measures acknowledge that the poor 
performance of state-managed protected areas is often explained by the mismatch 
between conservation objectives and development policies, agricultural 
expansion, infrastructure and population growth (Bathari and Hammig 1998; 
Porter-Bolland et al. 2012; Wells and McShane 2004; Wilshusen et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, as “[i]ncreasingly powerful economic and political forces shape 
conservation knowledge, discourses, funding and practices” (Pimbert and Pretty 
1995), the establishment of protected areas remains the main conservation 
strategy at the international policy level. This is reflected in the current CBD target 
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for global conservation in which signatory countries have committed to have a 
17% cover of their land surface set as protected areas by 2020 (CBD, Aichi 2010).  
Notwithstanding the importance of the limitations mentioned above, the biggest 
criticism that top-down, centralised conservation faces is that which emerges 
from its effects on local people and livelihoods. The transition from total exclusion 
to grass-roots conservation efforts has a trajectory that started more than a 
hundred years ago in the United States (Adams and Hutton 2007). Since then, the 
establishment of protected areas around the world followed a model that has 
invested efforts and resources to maintain human-free and “pristine” landscapes 
(Andrade and Rhodes 2012). As a result of this perspective, the design and 
establishment of protected areas have not traditionally considered social issues 
such as land tenure, access to natural resources or conflicts about them (Adams 
and Hutton 2007; Cowling et al. 2003). Protected areas’ policies and practices 
have long neglected local knowledge, value and management systems, local 
institutions as well as discouraged any active local participation. They have also 
made use of expropriation, displacement, exclusion and restriction of traditional 
and vital natural resource uses, leading to disempowerment, cultural erosion, 
human rights infringements and contravention of international laws (Andrew-
Essien and Bisong 2009; Armitage et al. 2012; Bishop et al. 1995; Brockington and 
Igoe 2006; Brockington et al. 2008: 93; Colchester 2004; Dowie 2005; Duffy 2005; 
Fairhead and Leach 1996; Pimbert and Pretty 1995; Pujadas and Castillo 2007; 
West et al. 2006). Therefore, even though protected areas offer benefits at the 
global level, centralised, top-down conservation governance has often succeeded 
to supply partial and short-term results by disrupting local livelihoods and 
creating conflicts between managers and the people living within and around 
protected areas (Andrade and Rhodes 2012; Armitage et al. 2012; Brandon et al. 
2005).  
2.1.2 Acknowledging the roles of local and indigenous peoples in 
protected areas governance 
 
Since 1962, when the United Nations began the standardisation of protected 
areas, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has been 
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continuously developing a categorisation of protected areas according to their 
management approach (Adams and Hutton 2007). Current IUCN categories range 
from I. Strict protected areas and II. National Parks (completely exclusionary), to 
VI. Managed Resource Protected Areas that allow human societies to make use of 
resources or services that ecosystems provide (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010). 
Additionally to these protected areas categories, since 1970s, UNESCO developed 
the concept of Biosphere Reserve, which combines different management 
categories from strict conservation areas, called core zones, to influence areas 
where human settlements and natural resources use are allowed but regulated, 
generally by the state (Adams and Hutton 2007).  
By 1980s, as a result of the widespread criticism towards exclusionary categories 
and the need to embrace wider landscape dynamics, the discourse of protected 
areas had changed to inclusive approaches (Adams and Hulme 2001). Since then, 
conservation and natural resources management initiatives have gradually shifted 
accordingly towards decentralised natural resources management (Blom et al. 
2010; Ribot et al. 2006). As draconian approaches for conservation are no-longer 
openly accepted, there is also a wide agreement about the fact that performance of 
protected areas management is the result of the interplay between international 
and national policies, local institutional arrangements and the networks 
developed for implementation (Adger 2001; Armitage et al. 2012; Berkes 2007, 
2009; Ostrom et al. 1999). Furthermore, local community participation in the 
decision-making process is the only variable that significantly relates to 
compliance with the regulations in protected areas (Andrade and Rhodes 2012). 
According to this understanding, the current IUCN categorisation has included 
governance as another dimension in the management matrix explained before. 
The governance dimension acknowledges that other actors than the state, such as 
private owners and local communities, can establish and interact with each other 
to run protected areas. The term “governance” has been defined as:  
“…the interactions among institutions, processes [social, ecological and 
technological] and traditions that determine how power is exercised, 
how decisions are taken on issues of public and often private concern, 
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and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Abrams et al. 
2003). 
Since the late 1980’s, when the concept of governance was carved, until today, 
new governance arrangements have been applied in different subjects such as 
public administration, social policy, economics, development and, relevant for 
this research, biodiversity conservation and protected areas management. 
Conservation management and governance are different; the former refers to 
operational decisions targeting specific conservation results, while the latter 
implies broad processes, institutions and decision-making affecting the 
environment (Armitage et al. 2012). Governance is present wherever there are 
self-organised people – formally and informally– pursuing their goals through the 
development of rules and relationships with each other (Abrams et al. 2003). The 
term emerged within the development disciplines after the classical model of 
government/civil society proved to be inefficient when implementing plans and 
programmes. It was also a response to social movements campaigning for the 
devolution of decision-making power (Abrams et al. 2003). Governance is 
relevant at different aspects of the social-ecological systems. The definition of 
common goals, how the environment is perceived; which perception prevails, and 
what features of the system are maintained, are all subjective issues related to 
governance (Fischer et al. 2007; Leach et al. 2007). 
 The increasing recognition of the importance of such interactions has enhanced a 
transition from centralized governance to the emergence of governance 
arrangements with diversified networks for the different stages of protected areas 
management through institutional collaboration, implying delegation of authority 
and devolutionary processes (Lockwood 2010). Hence, in order to define who 
holds the decision-making power as well as who is accountable, protected areas 
governance has been clustered into four main categories (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al. 2002; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010):  
A. Governance led by government. State agencies are the principal 
recipient of authority, responsibility and accountability. The level of 
government may vary and the state may or not have the legal 
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obligation to consult management decisions. 
B. Shared governance, where formal authority, responsibility and 
accountability still rest principally in one agency but there is 
substantial collaboration among two different “agencies” that 
recognize each other as legitimate to share the decision-making 
process. 
C. Private governance. Authority, responsibility and accountability rest 
primarily in corporations, private owners or are delegated by the 
legal owner to one or more organisations.  
D. Governance by indigenous peoples and local communities where 
these groups or their representatives hold the principal authority, 
responsibility and accountability of the areas and resources that 
they have usually inhabited and co-evolved with. It is the customs 
around the area that define its conservation management objective 
(categories I to VI, see Fig. 2.1). 
 
Current conservation policies and practitioners tend to embrace a vision where 
the diversity of land uses, local livelihoods, human rights and access capacities 
should be acknowledged and considered in management decisions at a landscape 
level (Bray et al. 2008; Naughton-Treves et al. 2005; Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). 
Accordingly, the categorisation of protected areas governance clearly 
acknowledges the role that local communities and indigenous peoples have as 
well as the multi-stake holders’ arrangements that can take place in natural 
resources management (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2002; Kothari et al. 2012), but 
these categories fall into the trap of viewing governance as a single entity rather 
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Ia- Strict Nature Reserve 
           
Ib-Wilderness area 
           
II- National Park 
           
III- Natural Monument 
           
IV- Habitat / Species 
Management            
V- Protected Landscape 
           
VI- Managed Resource 
Protected Area            
Figure 2.1. Governance and Management IUCN Categories from IUCN/CEESP (2010). 
 
 The process of implementation has been and still is a learning curve leading to the 
emergence of a number of inclusive and participatory approaches aimed to 
conciliate conservation goals with local rights, needs and aspirations (Blom et al. 
2010; Pujadas and Castillo 2007). As a result, a wide range of policy and sited-
based initiatives has emerged under different names such as integrated 
conservation and development projects, community-based natural resources 
management, community-managed forests, community-based conservation, eco-
development, eco-tourism, communal areas management programme for natural 
resources (CAMPFIRE) among others (Wells and McShane 2004). These 
approaches have emerged on the founding assumption that people whose 
livelihoods directly depend on the natural resources have more interest in 
sustainable use than state authorities and corporations (Li 2002). For example, 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects are one approach that 
departed from the assumption that poor forest dependent people were the biggest 
pressure to forests. Hence, through adaptive management, vertical integration and 
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site-level work these efforts have aimed to provide alternatives for income and to 
build local support to protected areas by sharing social and economic benefits 
(Blom et al. 2010; Wells and McShane 2004). Simultaneously, these efforts aim 
also to contribute to national and international conservation goals, increasing the 
land surface under some kind of protection or management but with 
consideration of their local contexts. Nevertheless, the link between poverty and 
conservation is not as straightforward as the approach originally suggested 
(Adams et al. 2004), leading to ambiguous results, disappointment and criticism of 
ICDPs. Yet, the search for alternatives to top-down, centralised conservation has 
enhanced a constant exploration to more locally appropriate approaches. 
 
2.1.3 Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs): multi-
scalar governance arrangements for conservation 
 
Many priority areas for conservation are located within lands managed by 
indigenous and traditional peoples, which in many circumstances have 
contributed meaningfully to the sustainable use and conservation of ecosystems 
globally (Andrew-Eissen and Bisong 2009; Boege 2008; Toledo 2003). It has been 
estimated that the forested area conserved by communities may cover as much as 
that covered by state protected areas around the globe (12% of terrestrial surface, 
Molnar et al. 2004). After IUCN’s Fifth World Parks Congress in Durban (2003), 
IUCN adopted the new governance typology that acknowledges the importance of 
Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs), defined as: 
 “...natural and modified ecosystems including significant biodiversity, 
geological diversity, ecological services and cultural values voluntarily 
conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities, both sedentary 
and mobile, through customary laws or other effective means.” (IUCN 
2011) 
Despite the broad of the term, ICCAs have three key features that characterise 
them (adapted from Kothari et al. 2012): 
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(1) “A well-defined people or community possesses a close and profound 
relation with an equally well-defined site and/or species; this is a 
relation rooted in culture, sense of identity and/or dependence for 
livelihood and well-being.  
(2) The people or community is the major player in decision-making 
and implementation regarding the governance and management of 
the site and/or species, implying that local institutions have the de 
facto and/or the de jure capacity to develop and enforce decisions. 
Other right-holders and stakeholders may collaborate as partners—
especially when the land is owned by the state—but the local 
decisions and management efforts are predominant. 
(3) The people’s or community’s management decisions and efforts lead 
to the conservation of habitats, species, genetic diversity, ecological 
functions/benefits and associated cultural values, even when the 
conscious objectives of management are not conservation alone or 
per se.” 
As a rights-based approach, ICCAs are interlinked with local livelihoods and the 
spiritual and material values of local cultures, as well as satisfying the needs of 
many peoples around the world for water, nutrition, medicine, shelter, livelihoods, 
recreation and spiritual needs. These values, perceptions and practices developed 
through time in a wide range of specific social and ecological situations, and such 
diversity constitutes the main asset of ICCAs (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010). 
Besides, ICCAs are argued to protect wildlife; to sustain ecosystems and 
connectivity between ecosystem services and users, and to provide shelter for 
agro-biodiversity and the cultural practices associated to it in areas outside of the 
official protected area systems (Abrams et al. 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2010).  
The ICCA concept implies the devolution of decision-making power to local 
communities in natural resource management and conservation efforts. The 
decentralisation of protected areas and natural resource management from the 
state to local actors is being supported by literature and practitioners that 
emphasise the importance of community-based conservation. The supporting 
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literature is mainly focused on the local institutional arrangements for natural 
resource management that sometimes evolved before the term “protected area” 
was carved (Berkes 2009; Bray et al. 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Cooke 
and Kothari 2001; Merino-Perez 2001; Ostrom 2002; Papp and Alcorn 2013; 
Porter-Bolland et al. 2012; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Furthermore, recent 
research argues that community-based management can be as effective as 
protected areas on the long-term conservation of forest cover in the tropics 
(Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). Their results show that community managed forests, 
as a cluster, have lower deforestation rates and respond better to development 
and other pressures thanks to local institutional arrangements for natural 
resource management (Ellis and Porter-Bolland 2008).  
ICCAs are, thus, the oldest conservation practice but also the least understood. As 
previously mentioned, mainstream conservation and development policies have 
largely neglected and undermined local arrangements for natural resource access 
and management over the past two centuries. Furthermore, ideal governance 
types can be so general and contain so little detailed and meaningful content 
(Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom and Cox 2010). Nowadays, legal, institutional and 
procedural frameworks are not adapted to effectively support the devolution of 
decision-making power to local and indigenous communities (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2004; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010). Moreover, customary rules and 
organisations managing natural resources often possess no statutory legal 
recognition or sanctioning power (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). In many cases, 
customary institutions have been replaced or transformed, affecting the 
governance systems and the community’s capacity to manage their resources 
sustainably, making genuine ICCAs increasingly threatened (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2004; ICCA forum 2010). Furthermore, as indigenous peoples, communities, 
knowledge and practices increasingly blend with different and external 
knowledge, values, practices and technologies, ICCAs face the challenge to cope 
with the changes and rhythms that multi-scalar arrangements promote (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2010).  Finally, the effects that land struggles, the pressure of 
large-scale industries and infrastructure such as mono-cultures (McCarthy and 
Cramb 2009), mining and hydro-electrical dams have over indigenous and local 
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territories (UN, Anaya 2013) further complicate the survival of ICCAs. Thus, the 
integration of ICCAs to protected areas systems requires a shift at all 
administrative scales to have an enhanced appreciation towards local capacities, 
knowledge and institutions and the multiple faces ICCAs can display (Berkes 
2009). 
In other cases, however, ICCAs have been able to make use of the new conditions, 
to establish new alliances to adapt and to continue existing (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2010).  Therefore, ICCAs management can also involve diverse agents and 
institutions in multi-scalar arrangements but with the distinctive fact that 
indigenous and local communities are the main decision–makers in the process 
(Berkes 2009). In fact, most ICCAs could be classified as shared-management, 
since there is always some degree of involvement of the nation-state and others, 
such as academics and CSOs (Berkes 2009). Hence, the multiple scales, objectives 
and practices involved in ICCAs governance require administrative and 
operational structures to be responsive at the appropriate scales for the allocation 
of rights, access, benefits, responsibilities, impacts and reinforcement (Adger 
2001; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Despite an increasing relevance in governance on 
international policy and research realms, the analysis of multi-scalar governance 
arrangements required for ICCAs’ operation has yet to develop.  
2.1.4 Issues of scale and power devolution in protected areas 
governance 
 
The notions of governance and scale have evolved with a number of parallels with 
the increasing importance of multi-scalar relations. However, scaling has a longer 
history within research than governance (Neuman 2007). Cash et al. (2006) 
defined scale as “the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimension used to 
measure and study any phenomena”. Accordingly, levels are defined as “the units of 
analysis that are located at different positions on a scale” (Cash et al. 2006). The 
notion of scale is based on Hierarchy Theory that considers that the lower the 
level, the faster and smaller structures are, and that these levels are constrained 
by higher levels, with slower and broader structures (Buizer et al. 2011). Cash et 
al. (2006) acknowledged a diversity of scales beyond the spatial and the temporal, 
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namely: jurisdictional, institutional, management, network and knowledge scales. 
Thus, Hierarchy Theory has influenced various disciplines, such as management, 
where dynamic realities, politics and power struggles within complex systems 
have been artificially represented into discrete scales and levels (Armitage 2008; 
Buizer et al. 2011). Accordingly, in management terms, scaling is usually related to 
the distribution of responsibilities and functions in appropriate institutional 
levels, relating to processes of coordination, decentralization, devolution and 
subsidiarity (Neuman 2007).  
Protected areas management has not been an exception to this approach, and 
policy efforts have focused on a better understanding of protected areas 
management and the challenges they face at multiple scales as new actors, roles 
and dimensions emerge (Armitage et al. 2012; Chapin III et al. 2010).  
Considerations of scale have been considered essential in the implementation of 
any protected area category and on-site projects in order to evaluate the trade-
offs between conservation and development, the impacts of human use over 
ecological processes and to identify the critical combination of scales and actions 
to achieve the desired management outcomes (Wells and McShane 2004). 
However, despite their wide use, the implicit assumptions and applications of the 
terms “scale” and “level”, have been subject to extensive debates (Armitage 2008; 
Buizer et al. 2011).  
Critics of hierarchical approaches argue that notions of “scale” and “level” have 
assumed that phenomena occupy discrete temporal and spatial scales which are 
considered real entities when, in fact, they are social constructions, constantly re-
defined by scientists, society, politicians and nature itself (Buizer et al. 2011). On 
the other hand, the Panarchy theory provides an alternative explanation to the 
Hierarchy one. It considers that while there are levels and scales, all levels have an 
influence on each other and that these dynamics produce a less hierarchical 
system, where cross-scale and multi-level dynamics are possible (Buizer et al. 
2011). Thus, although the notions of scale and level have proved to be useful to 
establish points of reference, allowing for relative comparisons (Neuman 2007), 
the nested hierarchy on which the terms are based is increasingly considered as 
part of the “politics of scale” (Buizer et al. 2011). Thus, common metaphors to 
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describe the relationship between scales such as “Russian dolls” are no longer 
sufficient. The consideration of a broad range of scales constantly influencing each 
other moves away from more hierarchical and simplistic explanations of the 
structure of systems, allowing for better understanding of the processes. This is 
particularly relevant for the analysis of environmental governance arrangements.  
A multi-scalar governance perspective observes government and governance as a 
range of systems of governing in which each non-state actor has its own role and 
influence over the structure (Buizer et al. 2011; Bulkeley 2005). Even though 
these approaches can have their own limitations –such as lack of clear boundaries 
and extensive procedure times-, governance analyses and approaches have 
benefitted from a re-consideration of the politics of scale and the role of the state 
and other actors into wider networks.  The importance of scale increases as multi-
scalar governance arrangements, from global to local, are now acknowledged as 
defining the design, implementation and outcomes of conservation discourses, 
practices and funding around the world (Pimbert and Pretty 1995).  
Research has often focused on particular levels, setting aside the interactions 
between levels of phenomena (Cash et al. 2006). Different disciplines such as 
development, anthropology, geography and conservation science have recently 
turned their attention towards the interactions of the multiple factors and scales 
determining the motivations, development and consequences of public policy and 
implementation around the globe (Adger et al. 2005; Buizer et al. 2011; Cash et al. 
2006; Gibbs et al. 2002; Neuman 2007; Wyborn and Bixler 2013).  In order to 
capture the complex relations of multiple networks at multiple scales with a 
growing distance from notions of hierarchy, new perspectives portray 
arrangements as networks with nodes and centres with flows between them 
(Neuman 2007). These new scopes have enhanced a broad literature that relates 
to the multiple dimensions of complex systems such as those involved in 
protected areas governance (Abrams et al. 2003; Armitage et al. 2012; Lockwood 
2010; Papp and Alcorn 2013). Research in governance and conservation requires 
an accurate focus to understand the processes that involve not only the state but 
multiple actors, levels and power relations, as well as their implications for 
marginalised people “acknowledging the messiness of politics-in-practice” for 
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public policy-making (Leach et al. 2007). The insights achieved through this 
research point out the way processes of scaling are entwined with struggles for 
control and dominance (Bulkeley 2005). These power interactions are often 
asymmetric and are linked to political issues in which markets and the state are 
two strong agents (Adams and Hutton 2007; Adger et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006; 
Rhodes 1997).   
Currently, along with the emergence of multi-scalar governance arrangements for 
conservation, there is also an increased understanding about the challenges that 
the interactions between the different scales of a system represent. The problems 
that multi-scalar interactions and arrangements face are mostly related to 
ignorance, mismatch and plurality (Buizer et al. 2011). Ignorance alludes to the 
limited understanding about the unintended effects that actions at a particular 
scale may have in other scales or levels. According to Cash et al. (2006), mismatch 
refers to the lack of consistency between ecological processes and the coverage of 
institutions and apparatus to tackle ecological problems. Managerial mismatches 
in plans and strategies are also related to scale, not to do with spatial scale but 
with the scale of management. The challenge regarding plurality means that not a 
single scale or level can be representative of the entire system, hence, there is not 
a best level or scale to focus on, but managers should focus on the appropriate 
combination of scales to deliver the desired outcomes (Buizer et al. 2011; Wells 
and McShane 2004). To this challenge, power asymmetries add another 
dimension to be considered when analysing multi-scalar governance 
arrangements. Such approach is particularly relevant for the research on ICCAs, 
where the potentials and policy implications have just started to be documented 
(Berkes 2009; Martin et al. 2010; 2011). 
2.1.5 Participatory governance and political ecology: decentralization, 
notions of power and critiques of participatory approaches 
 
Multi-scalar governance approaches for protected areas and the implied decision-
making power devolution to local institutions for natural resources management 
hold a great potential for environmental justice. Nevertheless, multi-scalar 
governance and devolution processes also have a number of caveats in terms of 
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legitimacy, transparency and equity. The formal recognition of governance 
approaches that portray devolution of power to local communities by 
international policy does imply a shift in the discourse from a state-led 
conservation to community-led conservation. Yet, despite all the efforts, 
democratic decentralisation is rarely achieved (Ribot et al. 2010), since local 
people have little effect on management decision through local authorities that do 
not represent them.  Like with development, the use of the term of conservation 
can be translated in a tremendous loss of diversity (Sachs 2010) of management 
practices and traditional knowledge in order to give way to homogenized 
dominant discourses and management practices legitimised by the dominant 
“ways of knowing”. The ICCA term is thus related first of all to the meaning of 
community, then to democratic decentralization or devolution, participation, 
legitimacy, equity, and ultimately, to power. All these subjects have been 
thoroughly addressed within the development and political ecology literature and, 
therefore, the critiques to such approaches are explored in this section. 
2.1.5.1 Decentralization and the obstacles of central governments 
 
Advocates for decentralization of natural resources management argue that 
decentralized management is as effective in attaining forest cover as the state 
management, but a much lower cost (Somanathan et al. 2009). While the promise 
of lower transaction costs, improved efficiency and increased incentives for local 
populations to protect local resources have been powerful incentives for states to 
launch decentralization initiatives around the world, the fundamental goal of 
decentralization remains elusive (Ribot et al. 2006). The aim of decentralization is 
the transfer of “power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of 
power” (Ribot et al. 2006: 1866). Nevertheless, despite the rhetorical claims of 
decentralization, its effects on the ground remain limited due to inappropriate 
institutional arrangements and a lack of faith in local capacities from central 
government officials. Central governments slow decentralization by limiting the 
kinds of powers to be transferred and choosing local institutions that are likely to 
serve central interests (Ribot et al. 2006). Furthermore, although effective 
decentralization requires accountable institutions at all levels (Ribot et al. 2006), 
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accountability of natural resources management remains flowing from bottom to 
top while “downwardly” accountability is practically non-existent (Ribot et al. 
2010).  
 
2.1.5.2 Policy simplifications 
 
The term community conservation is both conceptually and practically a 
challenge. Having communities as the unit of participation has important 
assumptions that define to a great extent the outcomes of such efforts. 
Community-based approaches, out of which ICCAs are the most recent policy 
development, rely on simplified definitions of community. Such simplifications 
have the strategic value of reducing complex realities to a few, clear axioms that 
help to get messages through the policy arena (Li 1996). As a result, nowadays, 
complex terms such as community, participation, empowerment and 
sustainability are common language for conservation, donor and government 
agencies (Li 1996; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Notwithstanding the importance of 
such achievements, community-based approaches have been criticized since 
realities are more complex than the models on which policies are based. In 
practice, the allocation of local natural resource access is negotiated in processes 
where particular images and values of “community” define the rules and their 
legitimacy (Li 1996). Therefore, the policy simplifications of the term 
“community” have meant that interventions often portray communities as an 
equivalent of harmony, tradition and balance, undermining the attention towards 
local heterogeneity and inequities (Colchester 2004; Li 1996, 2001; Mosse 2004). 
Community conservation is often linked to decentralization processes where 
whole communities are the target, which tend to homogenise inequities and 
differences within such communities (McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009). In 
order to overcome this simplification, as Li (2001:9) pointed out: “The use of the 
concept of community needs to be seen as a political association shaped through 
politics, culture and the generation of meanings”. Hence, perceptions towards 
communities need to remain aware of the fact that communities are 
representations in policy, ethnographies and struggles within particular historical 
27 
 
and discursive contexts (Li 1996). These community images also have 
implications for representation, since it cannot be assumed that communities are 
homogeneous and often representatives will not speak for every minority group 
within a community, holding the potential to reproduce and to strengthen socio-
political inequalities if internal community dynamics are ignored (Hayward et al. 
2004). 
The next problematic term is that of participation. According to Abrams et al. 
(2003), participatory governance arrangements for protected areas have been 
increasingly applied due to the current acknowledgement that decision-making 
processes should involve those stakeholders that are directly involved or affected 
by the process.  It is argued that as more stakeholders are increasingly and 
directly involved in the processes affecting their livelihoods, the more likely they 
are to engage, trust, support and legitimate the implementing organisations and 
their aims. Participatory approaches are also portrayed to help stakeholders to 
become more aware of the rights and responsibilities of each of the actors 
involved (Abrams et al. 2003). Therefore, participation in mainstream 
conservation, as well as in the development disciplines, has been seen as a process 
of empowerment that implies a shift in power and development of management 
skills of local relevant actors in order to make decisions to pursue a common goal 
(Hayward et al. 2004; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Participation models imply that 
people’s knowledge and involvement can transform top-down bureaucratic 
systems (Cooke and Kothari 2001), and argue that sustainable conservation 
requires functional participation, that is when people's ideas and knowledge are 
valued, and power is given to them to make decisions independently of external 
agencies (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Still, despite the use of participatory rhetoric, 
the general concern in protected areas governance literature is for effectiveness in 
management, naïvely overlooking the power relations implied (Cooke and Kothari 
2001), as true participation often requires taking positions that go against the 
interest of powerful groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004).  
Participation processes (sharing knowledge, negotiating power relationships, 
political activism) “can both conceal and reinforce oppressions and injustices in 
their various manifestations” (Cooke and Kothari 2001: 13). The realm of rural 
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development has a long history implementing participatory approaches, and there 
have been numerous attempts to incorporate local people in planning and 
implementation, leading to two schools of thought. One school sees participation 
as a means to get local support and increase efficiency; while for the second, 
community participation is a right and a process for empowerment and capacity 
building (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). In consequence, a 
common interpretation of the term participation has led to the creation of 
dependency through the exchange of local labour for cash, food or materials. This 
exchange creates the image that locals are supportive of external interventions, 
and once paternalism is in place, the sustainability of the project will be limited to 
the availability of funds (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Similarly, in protected areas 
management, participation has often been applied as a “tool” and a discourse to 
achieve the voluntary submission of people to protected areas schemes and 
achieve externally designed goals (Pimbert and Pretty 1995; Walker et al. 2007). 
In other instances, a participatory process can be seen merely as a consultation, 
which does not require a shift in power relationships. Projects still influence the 
way “local needs” are constructed and legitimised, and if teams spend too much 
time in the process, their performance is questioned by both project and 
communities. Thus, the needs expressed by local people and those registered by 
the teams aim to match the administrative constraints, i.e. people ask what can be 
easily delivered (Cooke and Kothari 2001: 24). 
Participatory approaches tend to remain structured by project models, rather 
than transforming them (Cooke and Kothari 2001). However, the popularity of the 
term participation and its adoption in international policy are based on three main 
assumptions: “that participation is intrinsically a “good thing” (especially for the 
participants); that a focus on “getting the techniques right” is the principal way of 
ensuring the success of such approaches, and that considerations of power and 
politics on whole should be avoided as being divisive and obstructive” (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001:26). In practice, this means that local people are often asked or 
persuaded to participate in processes in which they have no interest or where 
their claims will find little if any room, “in the very name of participation” 
(Rahnema, 1992). Also, the constant demands of projects for participation that do 
not consider the commitments and constraints of the members of the community 
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often lead to a “consultation fatigue” (Hayward et al. 2004). Therefore, while non-
participation can be an indicator for social exclusion, it can be also a question of 
personal choice, the driver of which is not always obvious, making participation a 
potentially misleading indicator for social inclusion (Hayward et al. 2004). Finally, 
once communities have been made readable for the state and other actors (Li 
1996), the data can be used to inform, legitimise agendas and to negotiate the 
terms of the processes with other stakeholders (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mosse 
2001). The naivety about the motivations and power struggles and their effect on 
how decisions are made and whose values prevail in conservation efforts tend to 
sustain inequalities and injustices, both local and global (Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009).  
Currently, in many community-based conservation approaches, local communities 
may set resource allocation (primarily but not exclusively), while the 
sustainability is evaluated and enforced by standards set by the state (Li 2002). 
Such standards do not usually represent supportive elements for culture and local 
capacity-building, limiting the capacities of government officers to become real 
partners to local communities (McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009). 
Furthermore, community-conservation has been conceived as a means of re-
negotiation of the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Communities may want to 
be an active part of the administrative structures and be effectively considered as 
citizens and clients, instead of being inclined to oppose the state. This also 
empowers them to contest projects in ways they could not previously (Li 2002; 
Agrawal 2001). Nevertheless, the recognition of the needs of marginalised people 
does not mean that inequalities regarding natural resources allocation and other 
underlying issues have actually changed (McDermott 2001). Indeed, community-
based approaches have often helped to the process of definition, regularisation 
and control according to state-defined regulations and procedures through the 
extension of institutions and bureaucratic procedures “...enmeshing them 
[communities] more firmly as state clients” (Li 2002:9). Thus, despite the labels and 
contrary to the original objectives, community-based natural resources 
management and conservation have tended to intensify the control that states 
have over not only resources but lives and livelihoods as well (Li 2002). 
Furthermore, the participatory rhetoric, popular as it is, has been found to impose 
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environmental agendas increasing the economic and political vulnerability of 
rural populations and with little concern over rights (Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Li 
2002).  Thus, the potential for radical social transformation of the term has been 
simplified as a means to achieve cost-effective objectives (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
A third subject is that of devolution and scales. Analyses on governance have 
typically had assumptions of space and scale that implicitly involve notions of 
hierarchy (Bulkeley 2005).  Such approaches have often overseen the fact that 
analyses themselves are part of political processes, where the state has largely 
remained as the “container” of social and economic life, undermining bottom-up 
initiatives (Bulkeley 2005). Consequently, there is a growing body of research 
aiming to overcome previous limitations and focusing on the role of the diversity 
of agents across scales for natural resources and protected areas management. 
Current research and theory on natural resource management is moving forward 
from the analyses focused mainly on the state towards embracing and analysing 
the multiplicity of actors, institutions, values, capacities and landscape features 
that have an influence on current governance arrangements (Bulkeley 2005; Papp 
and Alcorn 2013; Wyborn and Bixler 2013). In such perspective, sovereignty, 
authority, command and control are not exclusive to a certain agent in the 
governance arrangement (Karkkainen 2004). For the protected areas 
management literature, the key problems rely on identifying and analysing the 
different levels involved in the appropriate assemblages of scales (Adger 2001; 
Buizer et al. 2011; Ostrom 2009: 420; Papp and Alcorn 2013).  Nevertheless, the 
problem seems to be deeper and more complex as effective power devolution 
from the state to local and indigenous communities has proved to be elusive. 
Furthermore, it remains as a question whether the devolution of a “bundle of 
rights” (Ribot and Peluso 2003) is enough to support communities in recovering 
the local-level governance arrangements that evolved in stable and isolated 
communities, sustaining natural resource use, but undermined through leading 
conservation and development policies over the last two centuries (Borrini-




2.1.5.3 Power and its devolution for protected areas management 
 
The notion of power devolution embedded in Indigenous Community Conserved 
Areas implies that power is an entity to be displayed and delivered by an actor to 
another through a conscious decision and intention. According to this perception 
of power, management and governance specialists focus on deliberating about the 
kinds of power that can be devolved (Abrams et al. 2003), the multiple scales 
involved (Bulkeley 2005), and the many ways in which such devolution can take 
place. The terms participatory approaches, co-management and democratic 
decentralisation are popular terms in the policy arena (Ribot et al. 2010) and the 
fields of study are many and yet, democratic decentralisation is rarely achieved 
since the state has great discretion in the allocation of access while policies and 
laws often fail to clearly define powers and rights, enhancing conflicts (Ribot 
1999; Ribot and Peluso 2003; McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009; Ribot et al. 
2010; Worah 2002). The amount and kinds of power to be allocated to whom 
remains, the political and legislative frameworks, the implementation agencies 
and the diversity of local outcomes remain a discussion (McDermott and 
Schreckenberg 2009; Ribot et al. 2010). It has been argued there are little 
incentives for true power devolution (Ribot et al. 2010), however, a deeper look 
into the very concept of power and the work of philosophers and sociologists 
about it, gives another light to the explanation of why power devolution is so 
elusive, though. “[P]ower is everywhere” (Foucault 1980: 188), and processes for 
natural resources management and biodiversity conservation are not an 
exemption. Since the argument of this thesis is based on the actual possibilities 
and implications of power devolution to local and indigenous communities for 
biodiversity conservation, clarity about what is meant by power becomes of most 
relevance for this research. The literature on power has been developed mainly in 
the fields of sociology, anthropology and development studies. Renowned authors 
including Karl Marx, Max Weber, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault and Anthony 
Giddens have all dedicated a significant proportion of their work defining power 
and its manifestations in society from different perspectives. Thus, albeit each of 
these authors would deserve entire volumes to make justice to their works, this 
section refers to the notions of power these authors have developed to make 
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emphasis on those elements, which I consider, are the most appropriate for a 
better understanding of power interactions in protected areas and natural 
resource management. 
One of the most influential works on power is that of Karl Marx. From a Marxist 
perspective, power is embedded in values and beliefs that define the positions in 
the reproduction of class relations (Lukes 1974). Power relations, consequently, 
are expressed in terms of domination and subordination of social classes through, 
mainly but not only, relations of production. Marx recognized that economic 
exploitation was only one of the manifestations of these struggles, which are re-
enforced through class ideas and values. These elaborations are the root for the 
“invisible power” or “false consciousness” theory that argues that the false 
consciousness reproduced through class values and ideas prevents members of 
the working class from recognizing and rejecting their oppression (Eyben 2004). 
For Weber, on the other hand, power is the capacity to control individuals, 
circumstances or resources through different forms of domination or means to get 
legitimacy and to establish discipline, understood as routine obedience (Weber 
2005: 43). According to Weber, there are three categories of domination, namely: 
legal-rational domination, based on the legitimacy of the formal authority; 
traditional domination, based on the legitimacy of the moral or traditional 
authority, and charismatic domination, where leaders gain legitimacy through 
leadership or heroism (Weber 2007:65).  For Weber, culture is a place for social 
consolidation, where individuals can also find partners and solidarity on which 
alternatives can be generated (Weber 2007:172).  
Gramsci builds upon Weber’s contributions on the role of violence in domination 
and culture. For Gramsci, the state is also a compound of social relations that 
represents the domination of a social group over others. He developed a model 
where dominant groups sustain their position through a combination of coercion 
and hegemony. Coercion is executed by what he calls the “political society” (police, 
taxation offices, social security, etc.), or the state apparatus in charge of enforcing 
“discipline” when efforts to get consent fail (Gramsci, 2003:12). Hegemony is the 
complement to coercion in Gramsci’s arrangement of power. It is the consent of 
subordinate groups (civil society) to domination actively constructed by 
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institutions, cultural practices, social interactions and different processes leading 
society to develop the ideologies consequent to what the dominant classes want 
(Kenway 1990). For Gramsci, civil society is a versatile space where hegemony is 
created, reproduced and contested. Culture and ideologies constitute the field 
where hegemony is reproduced by encouraging certain accepted behaviours 
through mechanisms for the voluntary adoption of values and norms, and 
discouraging behaviours that do not correspond to the goals of the dominant class 
or challenge them. However, ideology is also the space where hegemony can be 
resisted through the identification of social problems related to the hegemonic 
system of values as well as the mechanisms in which the hegemonic system of 
values are reinforced. Therefore, power is not located in a central apparatus; 
instead, there is a relationship between all the points of the social totality 
(Kenway 1990). This understanding opens the possibility for the generation of a 
radical change in values that generate alternative institutions and ways of 
thinking, constituting the counter-hegemony (Gramsci 2007:168).  
Each of these authors places emphasis on different aspects, Marx on relations of 
production, Weber on domination and Gramsci on the means through which 
hegemony is created, sustained, adapted and embraced (Kenway 1990). However, 
all of them share the notion that power is something to be held, aspired, taken or 
given, while power relations involve the conflict between the social class or 
individuals who hold the power and those who lack it. Michel Foucault, on the 
other hand, proposed a different perspective on power. For Foucault, power 
“comes from everywhere” and it is not an institution, structure or possession. 
Power is diffused instead of concentrated and it is manifested or “embodied” in 
discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, constituting agents rather than being 
possessed, merely coercive and deployed by agents (Foucault 1980; Rabinow 
1991). Power is beyond politics and it is a phenomenon embodied and socialised 
in everyday life, being the reason why often, power struggles do not lead to a 
change in social order (Gaventa 2003). According to Foucault, the production of 
knowledge requires a “system of communication, records, accumulation and 
displacement which is in itself a form of power” linked to other forms of power. 
Simultaneously, power requires the “appropriation, distribution or retention of 
knowledge” in order to be exercised (Foucault 1980: 283). Power is manifested in 
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each society through regimes of truth, which are the discourses that are accepted 
and functioning as the legitimate truth (Rabinow 1991). “Regimes of truth” are a 
result of scientific discourse and institutions and are reinforced, negotiated and 
redefined through the educational system, the media and the interactions of 
economic and political ideologies, constituting a source of discipline and 
conformity (Gaventa 2003). The “metapower” or “regime of truth” is constantly 
flowing and being negotiated in society through the accepted forms of knowledge 
constituting the term “power-knowledge”. Another relevant term is “Archaeology of 
knowledge”, which refers to the rules that define what can and can’t be said within 
a specific discourse. The organisation of a discourse, controlling what can be said 
and the right to speak becomes the exercise of power, building objects and social 
meanings, producing and maintaining subjectivity (Foucault 1980). Thus, 
discourses can be both an instrument and an effect of power, producing and 
reinforcing it. Nevertheless, discourses can also expose power, undermine it, find 
its fragility and ways to counteract it (Foucault 1998: 100-101). 
One of Foucault’s key contributions was that he used the mechanisms for 
surveillance in prisons, hospitals and schools to point out a “disciplinary power” 
that no longer needed to be coercive as people learned to discipline themselves 
and behave according to the system’s expectations. This way, even bodies are 
subjugated through what he called “bio-power” which is a discourse or regime of 
truth that separates what is normal and acceptable from what is not, although 
these definitions are in constant flux (Rabinow 1991). Therefore, norms can be 
embedded beyond our perception making us behave as expected without the need 
of coercion from outside agents (Gaventa 2003). Foucault also used the term 
“dispositive” referring to the group of institutions, discourses, agents, etc. that 
serve the overall objective of normalisation, even though the individual elements 
seem contradictory. Thus, “power is not intentional” as even when individuals “fail 
in their own stated intentions, they may still be part of a wider, successful strategy” 
for control (Gaventa 2003). The Foucauldian conception of power creating and 
being created through knowledge introduced a new perspective on power not 
only as something negative, coercive or repressive, it also acknowledges its 
positive potential and productive force in society, producing rituals of truth, 
domains and reality itself (Foucault 1980:194). The exercise of power creates and 
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accumulates new information and knowledge that induce the effect of power 
providing a basis for action and intervention (Townley 1993, Foucault 1980: 52). 
For Foucault, power is a complex strategic situation exercised from a myriad of 
perspectives within dynamic and non-egalitarian relationships (Kenway 1990: 
188). Challenging power, thus, derives from our capacity of reflection and 
detachment of the power of truth from the social, economic and cultural 
hegemonies with which it operates (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 74-75).  
Giddens, the last main author considered in this review, focuses on actors and 
agency, merging a microsociology approach, actors and the relationships between 
them. For Giddens, power appears through action within social systems, it 
“presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or 
collectivities... But all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who 
are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors” (Giddens 1984:16). 
Hence, agents have the freedom to act but replicate structures of power through 
their actions, since the social rules determining our actions are not equally 
distributed. Still, the notion of agency and the practical knowledge that people 
have about power and social realities opens the possibility of changes or 
resistance towards rules, power, structures and institutions. Although Giddens 
recognises deeper structures of power, he does not go beyond theorizing about 
them, attributing power to agents without further consideration of the role of the 
structure (Gaventa 2003).  
The theoretical contributions of the authors above represent the multiple angles 
available to look at power. Some of them have been the basis to explain power 
interactions on natural resource and protected areas management. As a point of 
departure, power could be defined as an outcome of collective actions and 
associations, a construction of realities where different “actor worlds (or 
situations) are not independent but are tied together in associations which may 
result in the domination of some by other” (Gaventa 2003).  Power is embodied, 
reproduced and validated in many aspects of human and social life and is present 
in every social interaction. These power interactions can be analysed at different 
scales, from the micro-sociological to the macro in a wide range of fields such as 
health, education, management, geography and law. These analyses help us to 
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reflect and to gain perspective about the deeper structures behind our 
motivations, actions and stakes as individuals, professionals and members of 
society. Amongst the fields researching power, development studies have 
produced copious material analysing power interactions in development 
interventions. Foucauldian theories have been the basis to develop academic 
critiques of development discourses and practices. Due to the resemblance 
between approaches, for development and conservation, these critiques provide 
useful insights about how power relations unfold within the 
development/conservation arena. 
Even though the analysis of power within biodiversity conservation is not as 
abundant as within development, some of the critiques of development could be 
applied to the sphere of conservation and constitute the arguments of critical 
Political Ecology. Foucault’s body of theory has been used to sustain critiques of 
development discourses and practices by “depoliticising interventions and 
extending the reach of the state, being part of a wider strategy” (Gaventa 2003). 
Critiques also conceive development as a “neo-colonisation” or a method for the 
global north to retain agency on the global south. Briggs used the case of the 
World Bank and its actions through the development dispositif to exemplify how 
“while pyramidal organisation of relations of power gives a dispositif a “head”, it is 
the apparatus as a whole that produces power” (2002: 432-433). Before 
government or management can happen, the subjects must first be known 
(Townley 1993) and, therefore, global entities such as the World Bank and its 
planners position themselves as the experts who know how people should live, 
collecting data, simplifying, diagnosing and devising interventions for 
improvement (Scott, 1998). When a group of people (A) considers that others (B) 
need to be empowered, the first assume that the second have no power at all and 
also that A have the power to be delivered to B. This vision has helped to create 
the perception that states hold the “real” power while only those who are ready to 
fully participate with it can reach it. The current participation ideology could be 
called “fear-power”, but local populations are far from powerless, as a matter of 
fact their power is not   perceived most of the times (Rahnema 2010). This is the 
exercise of power where experts define without a democratic consent what is 
considered to be development and the means to achieve it.  If the target groups 
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want to get access to the institutional presence or the funds, they must conform to 
prescribed behaviours, while officials, politicians and others remain “unexamined 
and unimproved” (Li 2005). Just like the example of the World Bank, states have 
similar ways to build simplified models for control and improvement, and even 
though they often fail in improving people’s lives, they can be very effective in 
controlling and preventing people from applying their quotidian knowledge (Scott 
1998; Li 2005). Development operates translating “essentially political situations 
into technical problems to be solved... furthering a particular form of state power” 
(Gaventa 2003). Scott provides great insights about the means through which 
states make populations readable and governable, but his dichotomy between 
power-resistance falls short to analyse deeper effects since power is beyond states 
and global agencies.  In fact, scientists, missionaries, social reformers, donor 
agencies, ethnographers and even the misnamed non-governmental organisations 
are part of the range of parties contributing to measure, to govern and to improve 
societies around the globe (Li 2005).  
Foucault’s term of “divisory practices” is also relevant to this argument. Divisory 
practices are totalising procedures where governments take responsibility for the 
economy, order and people’s lives in every aspect.  These practices lead to 
centralised management apparatuses and to the collection of statistical data on 
individuals, constituting a means for vigilance and regulation of the daily life of 
some for the privilege of others (Rabinow, 1991: 104-108). As Neoliberalism gains 
terrain, it becomes more the case of many realms such as natural resources and 
land, where through discursive monopoly, dominant groups constitute a 
heterogeneous mixture that develops a rhetoric that blends ideas about keeping 
environmental quality, traditional values, institutions and authority, with all the 
allowances that the free market provides emphasising privatisation and 
individualism (Kenway 1990). The work of Foucault and Scott allow us to see that 
there are schemes aimed to improve the human condition at different ranges and 
scales of coercion (Li 2002; 2005). Authors like Li (2005) and Gaventa (2003) 
make a call to go beyond “the concept of an “up there” state with stored powers” 
and for a decentring of power geometries at the dynamic process where power 
constitutes different spaces and how the arrangement of spaces affects power. 
Approaches in political ecology, just like in political economy, conceive “power as 
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the ability to command control over resources” (Gaventa 2003). Within this context, 
the power of stakeholders is the ability of stakeholders to persuade and coerce 
other into decisions and actions. A further element within natural resources and 
biodiversity conservation is that often, “experts” impose their ideas over 
territories that are also social constructions, subject to power relations.  Local and 
indigenous communities have their own notions of territory, just as natural 
resources and environmental services are also conceived in their own ways and 
values. It is often the case that notions of territory are based on use, and 
communities organise themselves around that use and access. In this sense, 
“material, cultural and political-economic strands” constitute “bundles” and “webs” 
of power that play a role in the dynamics that enable actors to hold, maintain and 
control the ability to benefit from things, or access to land and, therefore, to 
natural resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003).  
Political ecology pays particular attention to the ways in which the state directs, 
legitimizes and exercises power and control in the name of conservation, as well 
as the role of other actors claiming legitimate power to enforce socially desirable 
outcomes (Adams and Hutton 2007; Li 2005; Peluso 1993). The naivety with 
which many of the schemes are applied has place not only “on the ground” 
between “facilitators” and “participants”, between “donors” and “beneficiaries”, 
but also historically and discursively in the construction of what constitutes 
knowledge and legitimacy (Cooke and Kothari 2001:14). Consequently, people in 
and around many protected areas have been classified as poor because they are 
not completely immersed in the market economy nor consume market 
commodities, even though they may be satisfying their fundamental needs 
through self-provisioning mechanisms. “This neglect of human ingenuity and 
diversity ultimately reinforces the dominant model of development based on 
uniformity, centralisation and control” (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). In the case of 
formal recognition of previously informal social organisation arrangements, their 
institutionalisation can be seen as a means for the state to legitimise the presence 
of the state and its discourse across the nation (Harvey 2001).  This could be a 
perspective towards the official recognition of Indigenous Community Conserved 
Areas as yet another way of the state and hegemonic discourse to extend their 
bureaucratic powers (Brockington et al. 2008: 73) and to get some control or 
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power over previously more autonomous communities. Therefore, power is more 
complex than an “up there” panopticum state that promulgates rules and a “down 
there” population that resists them “[...] we cannot separate power and resistance: 
They are intertwined” (Li 2005). Also, there are many other actors trying to 
govern, devising practices and fighting for continuity of funds translating poor 
results or failed projects into different versions of success (Li 2005). Until today, 
conservation science and protected areas management are based on perspectives 
and understandings that reproduce the same rhetoric, where “experts” are the 
legitimate source of information for decision-making and if local communities 
want to remain part of the game, need to intertwine the dominant discourse and 
their own particular ways of resistance (Li 2002). “Power is not something that is 
acquired, seized or shared, some-thing one holds on to or allows to slip away” 
(Foucault, 1980: 94). Instead, power becomes apparent within the relationships 
between, institutions, practices, techniques, discourses and procedures through 
levels and dimensions (Townley 1993). Their power is constituted by networks 
and quiet actions that put up against the prevailing power apparatuses in what 
has been called by Scott as “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985). 
 
2.1.5.4 The role of NGOs 
 
The so-called non-governmental organisations have been important in the 
involvement of local people into participatory approaches (Rahnema 2010). 
Project implementers are extremely important to the effectiveness of projects, 
replacing bureaucratic state entities as “experts”. As implementers, NGOs often 
“are expected to mobilize communities, build the capacity for collective action, 
ensure adequate representation and participation, and, where necessary, break 
through elite domination” (Mansuri and Rao 2004).  NGOs and donors hold the 
potential to enhance the establishment of local democratic institutions, which are 
the basis of decentralization (Ribot et al. 2006). There is little surprise that most 
NGOs fall rather short form these expectations. However, NGOs do have a role 
legitimising dominant discourses defining the local needs and strategies of action 
in societies that tend to internalise dominant perceptions and values due to the 
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marginalisation they have been subject to (Rahnema 2010). Moreover, NGOs often 
avoid working in communities where fast and evident results can be difficult to 
achieve (Mansuri and Rao 2004). The same counts for strong enough communities 
that oppose or challenge external agendas, competing with the state (Rahnema 
2010), where support is quickly withdrawn in a classic “take it or leave it” 
approach. 
 
Despite the potential that organised civil society holds, once they become 
implementators, routinization of procedures and the prioritization of fast results 
become the generality (Rahnema 2010). Facilitators are often poorly trained, and 
complex concepts such as participation, empowerment and social capital are 
poorly designed and implemented (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Furthermore, the 
proliferation of NGOs is more a consequence of opportunism since funds are being 
channeled through NGOs, than an increasing political weight of the civil society 
(Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Rahnema 2010). 
 
 
2.1.6 Governance and Common pool resource theory 
 
“The "tragedy of the commons" will occur in highly valued, open-access 
commons where those involved and/or external authorities do not 
establish an effective governance regime.” (Hardin 1968) 
The way human beings organise in societies determines the ways in which they 
transform the structures, dynamic and natural resources and vice versa (Toledo 
1999b). Since ICCAs are located within communally-managed territories, the last 
substantial body of theory explored by this review is related to governance and 
common-pool resource theory.  After Hardin (1968) described the tragedy of de 
commons, it was argued that either private enterprises or the state could 
represent the only effective way to achieve environmental sustainability (Mansuri 
and Rao 2004; Ostrom and Cox 2010). But as Dietz et al. (2003) pointed out, 
Hardin did not consider that many social groups have managed to overcome the 
threats of natural resources degradation through the development and continuity 
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of self-governed institutions.  Local-level governance evolved in stable and 
isolated communities has in many cases sustained natural resource use for 
centuries. Yet, in times of rapid change, the ability of these governance systems to 
adapt quickly tends to fail (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). As Ostrom et al. 
(1999) observed, local governance solutions cannot simply be scaled up. In their 
governance analysis of the forestry sector of an Asian country Fischer et al. (2007) 
found that overexploitation of natural resources is the result of a combination of 
incentives such as lack of “rule of law”, accountability, education, and trust of 
people within developing or existing networks, which act as motivations of 
individualism and therefore combine to further environmental degradation 
(Fischer et al. 2007; Terry 2008). In their case study, interventions ignored the 
existing patterns leading to over-exploitation, neglecting the incentive structures. 
In their analysis of the multiple interactions between public authorities, 
governments, NGOs and local users Fischer et al. (2007) found that when 
interventions focus at the organisational and operational levels (i.e. capacity 
building, training, legal advice) whilst ignoring the system of incentives 
underneath, such as conflicting or contradictory rules, they help to consolidate the 
pattern of over-exploitation of natural resources rather than providing a solution.  
Governance regimes regulate appropriation, maintenance, monitoring, conflict 
resolution and changes in regulations themselves (Ostrom 2002). “Rules and their 
effectiveness at the local level are critical to the sustainability of complex biological 
resources” (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Governance is now recognised as one of the 
main features shaping and being shaped by natural resource management (Dietz 
et al. 2003; Fischer et al. 2007). Common-pool resources are defined as a class of 
resources from which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves substractability 
(Berkes and Folke 1998). From this notion, common-property theory has shown 
why institutions and property rights are important considerations for resource 
management (McCay 1995 in Berkes and Folke 1998). Within the realm of 
common-pool resource theory, Elinor Ostrom is a key reference. Her contributions 
in this field made her the winner of the 2009’s Economy Nobel Prize. Ostrom and 
her research team explored the notions of game theory and applied them to the 
natural resource management arena. They emphasise the role of property and 
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access as key factors defining the conditions leading or not to the “tragedy of the 
commons”, the “Prisoners” Dilemma” and collective action (Becker and Ostrom 
1995).  Where natural resources are left open access, conflicts, overuse and 
eventual destruction are expected. Thus, property rights are the most common 
way to maintain exclusion over natural resources. Furthermore, access is also 
important; those who have access to resources without being owners of the 
resources and do not follow the use regulations are known as “free riders”.  
Ostrom and her colleagues also formulated eight design principles for successful 
common-property regimes, most of which fall into two clusters:  
(1) those dealing with access, group and resource boundary issues and, 
(2) those dealing with decision making for joint use, including issues of 
representation, monitoring, sanctions, conflict resolution and legal 
recognition, consistent with the definition of common property 
resources. 
The principles for successful institutional arrangements are: (1) Clearly defined 
boundaries; (2) Proportional equivalence between the benefits and costs 
“[b]enefits are important because people, institutions, and societies live on and for 
them and clash and cooperate over them.” (Ribot and Peluso 2003); (3) Collective-
choice arrangements; (4) Monitoring; (5) Graduated sanctions; (6) Conflict 
resolution mechanisms; (7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize, and (8) 
Nested enterprises (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Through laboratory and empirical 
experiments, they have also defined a list of variables that have an effect on the 
rules and property regimes that enhance sustainable use, such as: accurate 
information about the state of the resource as well as the costs and benefits; 
homogeneity amongst participants; shared understanding about the risks and 
benefits of changes in regulations or the continuity of the status quo; reciprocity 
and trust; the resource users group is relatively small and stable; the future does 
not have a high discount rate; autonomy to elaborate and operate rules, supported 
and enforced by external authorities; collective choice rules are used; monitoring 
and sanctioning at low cost (Becker and Ostrom 1995). 
Ostrom’s work has also emphasised the role of communication in three key points, 
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namely: 1) coordination amongst those involved, 2) distribution of 
responsibilities and building trust, and 3) Enforcement and sanctioning (Ostrom 
2002). It has also been suggested that the rules should match the characteristics of 
the resource system in order to achieve long-term sustainability. The attributes of 
the resources also have an effect on the plausibility of development of self-
governing entities. Ostrom (1992) as well as Baland and Platteau (1996) identified 
the following key resource attributes: 1) the resource is used but can still be 
subject to improvement, 2) there are valid, reliable and affordable indicators of 
the state of the resource system, 3) the flow of resources is predictable, 4) the 
resource system is small enough to clearly define boundaries and internal 
particularities.  
Ostrom and Cox (2010) argue that a lack of ownership results in there being no 
long-term interest in the sustainability of a resource system by a given user. 
However, it is not only property rights but also how governance arrangements 
adapt over time to local social and ecological contexts that set rules that 
participants consider legitimate and equitable, and that reduce uncertainty 
enhancing trust and collective action (Ostrom and Cox 2010).Property is just one 
of many factors that shape institutional arrangements and strategies (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). Natural resources management is defined by access understood as a 
“bundle of powers” embodied in and exercised through various means, relations 
and processes that give users the ability to benefit from natural resources (Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). Hence, in resource systems, some hold control and others only 
keep the access though social relations more than rights, and thus, benefits are 
allocated through relations of production and discursive manipulations within 
complex webs of power (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
 
2.1.6.1 Issues on equity, legitimacy and elite capture 
 
“To treat people justly may require treating them differently; on the 
other hand, to treat them as if they were the same is not necessarily to 
treat them justly.” (Lummis 2010) 
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The effects of decentralisation, when it does take place, have shown that 
environment, democracy and livelihoods are hard to balance. Environmental 
decisions reveal the interconnection and trade-offs between economic efficiency 
(maximisation of benefits within the system), environmental effectiveness (to 
achieve expressed objectives), equity (further explored below), and political 
legitimacy (decisions are accepted according to who makes them and implements 
them) within dynamic and heterogeneous institutional contexts (Agder et al. 
2003; Corbera et al. 2007). It is especially difficult to achieve equity in terms of the 
cost-benefit distribution of improved natural resource management, and local 
livelihoods tend to be undermined (Ribot et al. 2010). Moreover, community-
based conservation, just as project development and participation, are strongly 
influenced by rights of access to natural resources and land as well as the 
organisational networks of the context (Corbera et al. 2007). Therefore, this last 
section of the conceptual framework looks at issues of equity, legitimacy and the 
dangers of elite capture on community-based conservation efforts. 
All humans share the same task, we must live a life and that makes us equal, but 
this does not mean that we have to be homogeneous (Lummis 2010). There are 
two sorts of equity, the first is related to the idea of relative justice and the 
distribution of assets amongst different groups of people; the second refers to 
absolute justice for human dignity (Sachs 2010). Related to decentralization in 
natural resources and protected areas management, equity and effectiveness often 
depend on the institutional choices that are influenced by national elites and 
donors (Ribot et al. 2008). Brown and Corbera (2003) propose equity to by 
sectioned in three elements: access, decision-making and outcome: 1) Equity in 
access refers to the way local actors can participate depending on access to land, 
resources, information and networks. For example, in Mexico, better-off 
households tend to be the ones that are able to let vegetation regenerate or to 
participate in reforestation, while these activities are not possible for poorer 
households, resulting in further marginalisation (Corbera et al. 2007). 
Socioeconomics and cultural norms can determine the distribution of information 
even when procedural norms aimed to avoid elite capture are complied with 
(Fritzen 2007). 2) Equity in decision-making concerns issues of legitimacy and 
inclusion in management decisions, these tend to be accumulated by project 
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brokers (often NGOs) rather than on local people (Corbera et al. 2007).  Finally, 3) 
equity in outcomes refers to cost-benefit sharing and its perceived fairness, which 
is also related to access and elite capture. Some authors have drawn attention to 
the mistake of giving too much attention to the rights holders or units as 
community instead of focusing on the forest users, or those who in any way have 
access to the forest resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003; McDermott and 
Schreckenberg 2009).  
Legitimacy is closely related to the way decision-making is performed and the 
regulations over participation. Local and cultural context and political power 
define whether or not something is legitimate (Adger et al. 2003). The question of 
control of access and maintaining access becomes essential when we consider that 
those with relative power controlling access over resources tend to use that 
power to benefit their interests before others (McDermott and Schreckenberg 
2009:7). Community processes are dynamic and the practices and objectives 
evolve constantly in response to the local and regional experiences (McDermott 
and Schreckenberg 2009:9). Community-driven projects can function in ways that 
reduce the likelihood of local elite capture (Fritzen 2007), but these projects are 
still rather vulnerable to it (Platteau and Gaspart 2003). Even when marginalised 
groups are formally included, without the appropriate facilitation, their voices can 
easily be overheard, such is the case of women and youths whose bargaining 
power is low (Lummis 2010). Access to benefits is subject to rules of eligibility 
and compliance with a range of regulations that define the legitimacy to 
participate. In such arrangements, there is ample room for elite capture of 
revenues (Adams and Hutton 2007). Wealth, social networks, literacy, ability to 
communicate with outsiders, education and gender are some of the factors 
determining the groups that tend to constitute local elites (Mansuri and Rao 
2004). Some degree of elite domination may be inevitable, but outcomes depend 
on how well this heterogeneity is managed. Mansuri and Rao (2004) make a 
distinction between “benevolent forms of elite domination” and elite capture when 
evaluating project dynamics and outcomes. This, in order to distinguish between 
elite control of project funds and elite capture of project benefits (Fritzen 2007). 
 
All these issues are relevant to natural resources management and conservation 
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since it is those relationships that determine who gets access to and exercises 
control over land and resources that ultimately determine the outcomes (Corbera 
et al. 2011). Land tenure and access are two interlinked factors associated to 
natural resources degradation. Such factors are constituted by “bundles of powers” 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003), which include rights of access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation (Corbera et al. 2011).  Thus, property requites legitimate 
institutions to define it while access and benefits from natural resources rely on 
different forms of authority and institutions (Corbera et al. 2011). In current 
protected areas governance arrangements, peoples and communities that have 
been marginalised are now expected to actively participate in spaces that have 
largely remained the domain of local elites (McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009). 
The greater pluralism of multi-scalar approaches means that rights are 
continuously negotiated; it can also be the case that equality of opportunity can be 
a legitimising device for economic inequality (Fritzen 2007). Thus, on the grounds 
of ecological concerns, the state retains discretion about the management 
requirements that condition local people’s rights of access to forest resources. 
Within this context abuses are common since information, decision-making 
power, and ecological criteria remain limited to certain circles, and ambiguous to 
local people (Ribot et al. 2010). Hence, community-based and –driven projects 
tend to be dominated by local and external elites, and if care is not paid in this 
sense, projects can worsen the inequality in communities (Mansuri and Rao 
2004). In a context where the ability to get access to external funds is limited to 
educated or better connected people, a disproportionate share of benefits can be 
considered legitimate if the poor benefit from his/her leadership efforts in a “take 
it or leave it” situation (Platteau and Gaspart 2003). In fact, poor people expect the 
elites to serve their personal interest better than the public interest in a sort of 
remuneration for their leadership (Platteau et al. 2014). Thus, Fritzen 2007 calls 
for accountability mechanisms and pro-accountability as relevant factors for 





2.2 Mexico: Biodiversity, land tenure, governance and 
conservation 
 
“... [C]onservation is by itself a social and political process, not a 
biological one. An evaluation of conservation, thus, also requires the 
evaluation of social institutions, economic mechanisms and political 
factors contributing to threatening conservation” (Alcorn 1994: 21) 
2.2.1 Biodiversity, indigenous and rural populations 
 
Mexico is the merging point of two major biogeographic regions that add to a 
varied topography resulting in a high species diversity and endemism (Ceballos et 
al. 2002). The South and Southeast of Mexico hold more than the 70% of the 
biodiversity of North America (Vera-Castillo 2003). Mexico is also home to one of 
the biggest populations of indigenous peoples in the Americas (10.5-12 million 
people, almost 20 million when including the mestizo population), with 50 main 
ethnic groups speaking up to 230 different languages (Toledo 1999). Eighteen out 
of the twenty-four million hectares that are populated by indigenous peoples in 
Mexico are covered by primary and secondary vegetation. Half of the tropical 
rainforests and cloud forests and a quarter of the temperate forests in the country 
are located within indigenous territories (Boege 2008). Almost 22 per cent of the 
water of the country is captured in highlands inhabited and owned by indigenous 
communities (Boege 2008). In Southern Mexico, 70% of the most biodiverse 
regions are inhabited by indigenous communities and rural communities called 
ejidos (Toledo 1999). Along with the Central American countries, they have not 
only one of the most diverse flora and fauna of the world, but are also home of up 
to a hundred of original cultures, making it one of the most bio-culturally diverse 
regions in the planet, called the Meso-American Biological Corridor (Toledo 1999; 
Vera-Castillo 2003).  These are some studies that highlight the correlation 
between indigenous communities and areas of high biodiversity, natural 
resources and ecosystem services in Mexico. The states of Oaxaca, Chiapas, 
Veracruz, Guerrero and Michoacan contain the highest levels of both biological 
and indigenous cultural diversities. The indigenous peoples and rural 
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communities that inhabit these states and their local institutions for governance 
are key factors for conservation and development at the national level (Boege 
2008; Martin et al. 2010; Toledo 2003). 
2.2.2 Land tenure and institutional frameworks 
 
Mexico’s land tenure structure constitutes a different case to other megadiverse 
countries, the recognition of communal and ejidal land tenure was possible after 
the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917), when the Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution (1917) prescribed an Agrarian Reform. This resulted in the re-
distribution of large estates and recognised social forms of land-tenure in the 
country in the form of ejidos and agrarian communities, including indigenous 
communities and communal lands (Toledo 1999). Agrarian communities were 
recognised by the Spanish Crown to the original settlers and are usually inhabited 
by indigenous peoples established long before the colony (Corbera et al. 2011). 
Agrarian communities hold forested and grazing lands in common while rights 
holders –or comuneros- have individual farming plots which cannot be sold or 
transferred outside the community (Corbera et al. 2011). Ejidos, on the other 
hand, are the result of the Agrarian Reform and were constituted by groups of 
people that claimed lands from large states of national lands to work on. These 
groups received access to parcels, which are managed individually and usually 
have an area that is communally managed for grazing, firewood collection and 
harvesting (Corbera et al. 2011). Even though agrarian communities are often 
related to the term community, it is worth clarifying that at times agrarian 
communities, as land tenure, do not have local statutes to behave as community 
and that sometimes ejidos can have those structures even when private owners of 
land can participate as part of the ejido (de Gortari, 1997). 
The Agrarian Reform was not evenly implemented in all of the country and large 
private properties remained throughout the 20th century, mostly in Southern 
Mexico. In these regions the lack of land distribution and/or the distribution of 
lands with poor soils for agriculture enhanced poverty and marginalisation in 
peasant communities (Klooster and Masera 2000). Nevertheless, the Agrarian 
Reform has allowed land ownership to be distributed in such a way that agrarian 
49 
 
communities and ejidos cover 52% of the land and own most of the forested areas 
in the country (70%); private lands cover 37% of the landscape and 26% of the 
forested lands, while federal and public lands cover 8% of the landscape and only 
4% of the forested areas in the country (Alix-Garcia and Harris 2014; Corbera et 
al. 2011; FAO 2010). However, this ownership is ambiguous and thus, land use 
and natural resource access have been largely controlled by the central state 
(Merino-Perez 2001; Corbera et al. 2011). Even the cases that place Mexico as a 
reference in community forest management have evolved through processes that 
involved local communities claiming back their access to the forestry resources 
that the central government gave to private and parastatal enterprises in the early 
20th century (Merino-Perez 2001). 
Indigenous communities and ejidos are ruled through customary law (usos y 
costumbres). The Bienes Comunales or general assembly is today the principal 
space for consensus and decision-making. These governing bodies are “historically 
constructed forms that have been forged in relationships with the state and other 
social actors in the context of specific relations of power” (Speed 2008: 88). In the 
Bienes Comunales, men become comuneros, where they are assigned a portion of 
the communal land and have a responsibility to participate in the community 
assembly, where decisions concerning every aspect of community life are made. 
According to the Agrarian Law, the ejidal/communal decision-making organs are: 
(1) the assembly;  
(2) the communal committee and  
(3) the vigilance committee (Art. 21).  
The assembly is the main decision-making organ in the community where all the 
rights holders in the community or comuneros participate (Art. 22). Assemblies 
are the spaces where entitled comuneros and ejidatarios discuss issues or 
problems, accountability issues are reported, and community agreements are 
achieved and enforced. In general, comuneros and ejidatarios meet and debate 
decisions that must be made, until reaching a consensus point (Bray and Merino-
Perez 2004: 136). In most cases, women do not participate in the assembly unless 
invited. Assemblies serve diverse purposes, they are a forum to share information, 
to make decisions about potential participation in external projects, coordination 
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about common resources management, community investments, etc. (Alix-Garcia 
and Harris 2014). The themes that are in the jurisdiction of the assembly include 
the formulation and modification of the local regulations; the incorporation and 
separation of members from the community/ejido; reports from the communal 
and the vigilance committees, the election and removal of the members of the 
committees; account of the investments made with communal economic 
resources; granting of powers and orders; leasing rights over communal land to 
third parties; benefit-sharing from the community’s activities, and distribution of 
the different land uses. The assembly can be called by the communal committee, 
the vigilance committee or a group of community members of at least 20 or the 
equivalent to the 20% of the community/ejido members (Art.24). The general 
assembly should congregate at least once every six months or more often if the 
local regulations or needs require it to do so (Art. 23). For the assembly to be 
valid, at least half of the community/ejido’s rights holders need to be present. 
Assembly resolutions are valid when voted for by the majority (50%+1) of the 
attending comuneros/ejidatarios, with exception of situations where changes in 
the land tenure structure are being voted. In this case, at least three quarters of 
the comuneros need to be present and two thirds of the votes are needed to 
support the resolution (Art. 26 and 27).  
The communal and vigilance committees are both accountable to the general 
assembly. The communal committee is an executive committee in charge of the 
implementation of the assembly‘s agreements as well as the representation and  
administration of the ejido/community. This committee is constituted mainly by a 
president (or comisariado), a secretary and a treasurer. Additionally, it can have 
specific people in charge of particular commissions as well as auxiliary secretaries 
according to the internal regulations which define the form and extension of the 
functions of each of the members of the committee (Art. 32). The vigilance 
committee, constituted by a president and two secretaries, is the principal 
monitoring body, in charge of verifying that the main communal committee 
complies with the law, the internal regulations and the assembly agreements (Art. 
35 and 36). It is also in charge of accountability and responsible for reporting any 
irregularity which the communal committee incurs. Although there is significant 
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variation throughout the states, this is the predominant mode of decision-making 
in indigenous communities in Mexico (Bray and Merino-Perez 2004: 136). 
In agrarian communities and ejidos access rights to natural resources and land use 
are also defined through local forms of organization. Decision-making in ejidos 
and communities in Mexico is regulated by the Agrarian Law (1992), which 
establishes that communities have the right to define their own regulations 
according to their uses and customs as long as they are coherent with national law 
(Art. 10). Communities can determine the collective use of communally-owned 
lands and the equitable benefit-sharing of those activities (Art. 11), which is 
regulated through a communal statute. This communal statute is defined and 
validated by members of the assembly and then, certified by the Agrarian 
authority. It regulates all the matters related to life in the community: who is 
entitled to be a community member; who gets access to land and natural 
resources, and how; who can participate in community decision-making; the 
distribution of responsibilities and rights of community members and authorities, 
and the regulation of co-existence within the community in general, are all matters 
regulated by communal statutes. 
Additionally to customary governing bodies and decision-making through Bienes 
Comunales and the assembly, communities in Mexico also have constitutionally 
elected municipal governments. Often, decisions are made in the assembly and 
then implemented through the municipal government (Presidencia Municipal) 
(Speed 2008: 89). Municipal governments are the minimal political units and act 
as the link between the federal governments and local communities. However, the 
coordination between federal, state and municipal governments and local 
communities varies widely throughout the country and there is often a mismatch 





2.2.2.1 PROCEDE  
One of the conditions of the incorporation of Mexico to the free market economy 
and the implementation of NAFTA1 was that the agrarian structure of Mexico had 
to change. Consequently, in 1992 there were a series of reforms in order for the 
Article 27 of the National Constitution to allow the privatization and sell of 
previously communally-managed and inalienable lands (de Grammont 1996).  The 
Programme for the Certification of Ejido and Land Ownership Titles (PROCEDE) 
formalized the fragmentation of land tenure within ejidos that has been possible 
through commercial transactions and through heritage (de Grammont 1996). 
Officially, PROCEDE was portrayed as a long needed response to peasant demands 
for land tenure certainty and to get hold of alienable rights over the land, 
enhancing social justice in rural Mexico (Procuraduria Agraria). The National 
Agrarian Registry was the agency in charge of implementing PROCEDE, 
distributing certificated of parcel rights and communal rights. The PROCEDE 
certified 86% of all the social property in the country, while 6% of the agrarian 
nuclei refused to get parcel certificates (Corbera et al. 2011).   
Despite the promise of land tenure certainty that PROCEDE offered, it is worth to 
mention that two million hectares remain involved in land tenure conflicts that 
have not reached a solution (Corbera et al. 2011). Furthermore, even if peasants 
obtained more autonomy, such autonomy is ambiguous as well. State 
environmental bureaucracies (SEMARNAT, Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources; CONANP, National Commission for Natural Protected Areas and 
PROFEPA, Federal Environmental Protection Agency) and their regulations now 
reach deeper into the Mexican rural space. Such bureaucracies clash constantly 
with the effects of infrastructure and agriculture policies such as Procampo. The 
Procampo programme, also created after NAFTA was in place, was conceived to 
give equal opportunities to the production of corn in front of that from USA. 
However, the design of the programme gives subsidies for surface of land 
cultivated rather than for net production; this design enhanced the deforestation 
of primary and secondary forests to expand the surface receiving subsidies as well 
as the consumption of processed food and imported corn amongst peasant 
families (Merino-Perez 2001). The effects of these policies have had dramatic 
                                                          
1 North America Free Trade Agreement, between USA, Canada and Mexico. 
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impacts at a landscape level, on local food security, rural unemployment and 
increased food imports in rural areas of Mexico (Merino-Perez 2001). 
 
2.2.3 Mexico, ambiguity between conservation and exploitation, 
capitalism and grassroots. 
 
Mexico has been at the vanguard of biodiversity conservation in many ways 
(Haenn et al. 2014). Currently, there are 174 federal protected areas in the 
country covering 25 million ha (13% of the national surface) and inhabited by 
more than 2.5 million people, representing 2.5% of the country’s population 
(Bezaury-Creel and Gutierrez-Carbonell 2009; Haenn et al. 2014). The 
establishment of protected areas has been the main strategy for environmental 
protection (Graf et al. 2003). However, until 2000, the inventory of natural 
protected areas was the only indicator of the effectiveness of conservation policies 
in Mexico, where most of these protected areas lacked regulations, vigilance and 
human resources to promote their objectives (Pujadas and Castillo 2007). 
Furthermore, the management of such areas constantly faces challenges caused by 
the ambiguity of the federal policy regarding economic development and 
environmental protection, where rural peasants and indigenous people are caught 
in the middle (Merino-Perez 2001).  
For a long time, indigenous peoples and peasants in Mexico have been made 
disproportionally responsible of deforestation in the country (Merino-Perez 
2001). In fact, a contradictory policy between production and conservation, 
centralized forest management, rural marginalization and corruption have been 
the main causes of the loss of 80% of the tropical rainforests of the country 
(Merino-Perez 2001).  In Mexico, ambiguity on land tenure and access to natural 
resources policies have meant that even though agrarian nuclei are recognised as 
legitimate owners of the land, their access to natural resources and the benefits 
derived from them have been restricted and over regulated by governmental 
policies and agencies (Corbera et al. 2011; Haenn et al. 2014; Merino-Perez 2001). 
Within this context, land-use change became a necessary step for landless 
peasants to get hold of property rights (Merino-Perez 2001).  As part of this 
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ambiguity, state and federal governments created numerous protected areas 
during the 20th century over the top of municipal and agrarian nuclei, with little if 
any communication across scales. This lack of consultation and coordination 
resulted in social challenges for protected areas establishment and 
implementation in Mexico and particularly in the South-Isthmus region of the 
country. 
National Parks were the first protected areas promoted by the Mexican 
government. These were based on expropriation and have had dramatic social and 
environmental effects in the lands where they were implemented (Merino-Perez 
2001). Through time, new categories have been developed to define the current 
protected areas classification in the country, namely: Biosphere Reserves, 
National Parks, Areas for Flora and Fauna Protection, Sanctuaries, Areas for 
Natural Resources Protection, Natural Monuments and, the most recent, 
Voluntarily Conserved Areas (CONANP 2012). Out of these categories, the 
implementation of Biosphere Reserves aimed to overcome the negative social 
effects by avoiding (at least in principle) the expropriation of communal lands, but 
remained ambiguous by restricting the land-use within the limits of the reserves. 
This has been perceived by local people as a covered expropriation (Merino-Perez 
2001). Furthermore, these restrictive figures contrast with the long history of 
deforestation incentives promoted by the national government through policies 
enhancing the colonisation and deforestation of primary forests in the 1970-
1980s (Merino-Perez 2001).  
Nowadays, regulating bodies and a wide range of professionals related to 
conservation recognise that protected areas in Mexico face many obstacles for 
their development and full consolidation (Personal observation). A major issue is 
that in Mexico, as in many other regions of the world, the notion of protected areas 
is related to “dispossession” (Berkes 2009). Protected areas’ establishment and 
implementation in Mexico have been constrained by social discontent, since 
protected areas in the country generally have represented an imposition and a 
restriction on other forms of land use (Senado 2009; Durand and Jimenez 2010). 
The Southern Isthmus region of Mexico, where Chiapas and Oaxaca are located, is 
far from being the exception. During the 20th century, federal government policies 
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promoted the colonisation of uninhabited regions of forest and rainforest, 
enhancing rapid ecosystem degradation (Merino-Perez 2001). Consequently, local 
and federal governments rushed the establishment of protected areas but without 
the prior informed consent of local people (Durand and Jimenez 2010). The 
implementation of protected areas and the subsequent restrictions of use, 
allocated generally over rural and indigenous peoples who have struggled to get 
access and titles to cultivation lands, continue to be a major task for conservation 
practitioners. Top-down conservation processes in the Southern Isthmus region 
are another example of the limited capacity of the state to coerce limits on 
resource users (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Durand et al. 2014). Instead, these 
processes have engrained negative attitudes from rural and indigenous 
populations towards the establishment and operation of protected areas (Reyes-
Garcia et al. 2013). 
The interaction of inhabitants whose lands are located within the perimeter of 
protected areas and conservation practitioners in charge of operating reserves is 
riddled with tension (Durand et al. 2014; Trench 2008). Land tenure is the feature 
that structurates conservation and local groups’ interactions (Trench 2008). This 
is particularly so in some core areas of Biosphere Reserves and National Parks, 
which are the protected area categories that imply expropriation of lands for 
conservation in Mexico. Hence, managers have to handle the difficulties of 
explaining to peasants, whose livelihoods are natural resources dependent, that 
the uses they can make of the land are subject to restrictions (Merino-Perez 2001). 
In the worst cases, managers have enforced involuntary relocations to respond to 
management plans. For instance, in Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, Chiapas, 
the relocation of the settlement Nuevo Montes Azules has had negative 
implications for local livelihoods and culture of the families relocated (Fenner-
Sanchez 2011; Trench 2008). In Montes Azules, there have been constant human 
rights violations and the loss of innocent lives emerging from social and political 
conflicts about the definition of the indigenous groups recognised as legitimate 
inhabitants of the region (Haenn et al. 2014). Although the details of these 
struggles go beyond the scope of this section, it is worth mentioning that 
conservation matters in Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve are entwined with 
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economic interests, land tenure conflicts, bio-prospection, elite capture and wider 
counter-insurgency politics in the region, since many of the communities 
threatened and/or forced to relocation in Montes Azules are sympathetic to the 
“Zapatista” movement (Trench 2008; Calleros-Rodriguez 2014). 
National Parks are another example where processes of expropriation for the 
establishment of strict protected areas have led to conflict. In Chiapas, for 
example, the establishment of the National Parks Cañon del Sumidero, Palenque 
and Lagos de Montebello implied expropriations that were not fully accomplished. 
The federal government purchased some lands while many landowners did not 
receive any compensation, some others refused to sell or even to move out after 
purchase (Vargas-Marquez 1997). Up to today, problems emerge when protected 
area authorities try to implement National Park’s management plans but are not 
legally allowed to work with the inhabitants, because according to the law, they 
should not be there. Adding to the already complex situation, there are organised 
groups who make use of landless indigenous people to their advantage, promoting 
land invasions and claiming property rights for profit. The directions these 
processes can take are numerous; however, many of the cases imply long 
negotiation processes and, occasionally, the use of public force for relocation 
(Jimenez 2014).  
Since 1996, the Mexican legal framework recognises participation as an element 
that needs to be promoted through the establishment, and implementation 
process of protected areas (LGEEPA, 1996). This recognition attended to different 
motives; on the one hand, it was enhanced by social circumstances prevailing in 
Mexico during the 1990’s. The rise of EZLN2 in 1994, an indigenous movement in 
Chiapas claiming their right to self-determination among others, gave a louder 
voice to a number of indigenous and peasant movements around the country. One 
of the common claims was the right of indigenous and rural peoples to have a say 
on the policies and state actions that were affecting their lives. At the same time, 
rural and indigenous peoples in different regions of Oaxaca and Chiapas rejected 
the establishment and challenged the operation of protected areas in lands they 
inhabited. The two most striking examples are in the Chimalapas region, where 
                                                          
2 Zapatista Army for National Liberation (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional). 
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people organized and mobilized to refuse the establishment of a Biosphere 
Reserve (Gomez-Martinez 2009: 14), and around Montes Azules where rebel 
communities, sympathetic to the EZLN, were classified as invaders to the reserve 
and threatened with forced relocations (Bellinghausen 2005). In the name of 
conservation, military and paramilitary groups established their presence and 
intimidated local populations through threats and practices that undermined the 
human rights of local people. Within this atmosphere, people inhabiting protected 
areas or priority areas for conservation grew suspicious of the real motives for the 
presence of government agencies in their lands. The establishment and 
management of protected areas became even more difficult for conservation 
practitioners. Thus conservation agencies representatives working in the region 
were prompted to develop new strategies to achieve land cover for conservation 
targets through different means (SG pers. comm., Sept 20th, 2010).  
Simultaneously, the international community, academic researchers and 
conservation professionals were calling for more socially inclusive approaches to 
conservation. These calls were also compatible with the recent introduction in 
Mexico of the neoliberal economy in 1992. This implied a process of reforms 
towards decentralization inside government agencies, and devolution of the 
nation state’s responsibilities towards civil society. Likewise, the government 
developed “social liberal” programmes that combined public concerns with 
policies promoting the market (Fox 1995). The reforms and the social conditions 
described above allowed and promoted the incorporation of private and 
community initiatives to achieve conservation objectives.  Thus, since 1996 
LGEEPA has incorporated participation into the conservation discourse to 
legitimise conservation practices and programs, as well as to promote the 
delegation of responsibilities to different stakeholders. This shift has enhanced the 
creation of joint management boards for protected areas management, involving a 
multiplicity of actors across scales, including NGOs.  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that current national policy and many of CONANP’s 
agents are indeed promoting inclusive processes to move beyond the imposition 
of government decisions over local people, conservation policies and practices still 
face several issues regarding local participation and representation. Even though 
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participation is acknowledged as crucial for conservation efforts at a discourse 
level, participation and representation of local communities (usually indigenous) 
in the management of protected areas remains as an aspiration in many cases 
(Pujadas and Castillo 2007).  Pujadas and Castillo (2007) argue that in Mexico, the 
implementation of protected areas is another example of the top-down 
development politics developed in the country. Moreover, according to her, the 
creation and management of protected areas are still developed from a 
perspective that considers participation through the underlying assumption that 
people are  
“... empty recipients who should be filled with conservation ideas so that 
they stop destroying ecosystems and advocate the conservation cause” 
(Pujadas and Castillo 2007). 
 Thus, participation in protected areas is seen as an instrument to achieve 
conservation goals and even though efforts are put into create participatory 
processes, exclusion is rather common (Durand et al. 2014). As a result, 
conservation efforts in protected areas provide little or no contribution to local 
surroundings and fail to incorporate local views and knowledge into the decision-
making process (Durand et al. 2014). This ultimately, undermines the 
maintenance of ecosystems services and the possibilities for more sustainable and 
dignified livelihoods (Pujadas and Castillo 2007).  
The paragraphs above illustrate that protected areas establishment and 
implementation are similar regardless of the management category.  Protected 
areas, just like development projects, may struggle to be fully implemented and to 
achieve their management plans (Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). However, empirical 
cases show that they have been effective in enhancing the expansion of both the 
state and the free-market economy through conservation (Haenn et al. 2014). 
Mainstream conservation and economic development have been the means to 
develop discourses that have allowed a fractured state apparatus to reach areas 
and people where it could not before (Haenn et al. 2014). Local and enduring 
resistance as well as failures are usually tackled applying subsidy programs 
promoted as conservation programs (Haenn et al. 2014). The role of NGOs and 
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private consultants has extended conservation beyond the state and are including 
other social actors, filling the vacuum left by the “shrinking state” and putting a 
green cover to market-based environmental protection measures (Haenn et al. 
2014). 
 Within the local context, protected areas’ conservation programs perpetuate the 
clientelistic relations between the state and peasants and indigenous people, 
increasing the contact between the state and formerly remote areas in a 
“scientifically-based meritocracy” (Haenn 2014:7; Trench 2008). Feasibility 
studies, formats and complex paperwork are required to access aid programmes, 
perpetuating patron-client relationships, meritocracy and local dependence on 
state officials, NGOs or private consultancies (Durand et al. 2014). The one size-
fits-all approach that Federal protected areas has had mixed social and 
environmental results that offer several lessons to the design of more viable and 
just conservation initiatives (Haenn et al. 2014; Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). As an 
alternative, there are a number of grassroots efforts that include ejido members, 
small-scale resources users among others, who have a deep effect on biodiversity 
conservation within and outside federal protected areas (Haenn et al. 2014).  
In this chapter we have reviewed the original notions on which the establishment 
of protected areas has been based, where humans and natural resource use have 
been detached from “pristine nature”, causing social conflicts and human rights 
violations in many cases. Social unrest and rejection towards protected areas as 
well as neoliberalism have enhanced the discourse in protected areas 
management. In the last two decades there has been an increased recognition of 
the role of local people in the achievement of conservation and management 
objectives in protected areas as well as the multiple actors involved in 
management. The emergence of multi-scalar approaches to conservation and the 
understanding of governance as a process rather than as a series of categories 
have allowed the formal recognition of areas conserved by indigenous peoples 
and other social actors. Such achievement holds great potential to enhance the will 
and capacities for natural resource management by landowners, including 
indigenous people in ICCAs. However, in practice, participatory governance and 
the implicit decentralization and power devolution remain a challenge. The 
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question about why it is so difficult for central governments to devolve enough 
powers to local communities possibly remains to the nature of power itself, as 
present everywhere, continuously reproduced through discourses and ways of 
knowing that define legitimacy and behaviours. Thus, without a careful reflection, 
power structures tend to get reproduced under different names but with similar 
practices. Such is the case between the discourse of development and its insertion 
within the conservation arena. Conservation, just as development projects, has 
helped to extend the reach of states to places where it was not possible before 
while participation remains as a means for legitimation and achievement of 
conservation targets. Yet, the allocation of rights and responsibilities for natural 
resource use and access remain unclear and states keep the discretionary powers 
to allocate them. The role of NGOs has replaced government agents, but mainly, 
they have placed themselves as the experts who can define how people should 
live. From this perspective, the Mexican conservation arena provides a clear 
illustration of these processes. Voluntarily Conserved Areas aim to be the Mexican 
version of ICCAs, holding the potential of grassroots approaches for conservation 
but limited by the ambiguity that characterizes other forms of protected areas. 









Chapter 3: Research design and study site 
3.1 Research design and scope 
The aim of this dissertation was to explore in depth for the first time, issues of 
power and governance in relation to the recent policy concept of ICCAs and the 
practical implications for multi-scalar governance arrangements.  The empirical 
research was developed in the Southern Isthmus region of Mexico, which 
comprises the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas and, therefore, has the highest bio-
cultural diversity in the country (Toledo 2003). Consequently, the region has a 
high concentration of federal protected areas (13), and has been pioneer in the 
implementation in Voluntary Conservation Areas (Martin et al. 2010). The data 
collection and the structure of the thesis reflect the multiple scales involved in 
protected area management. The overall research was divided in three parts, at 
the national, regional and local scales, as an approach to capture the multi-scalar 
nature of governance as follows: 
(1) A review of Mexican national protected areas legislation. 
(2) An exploration of the perspectives of conservation professionals 
working in the Southern Isthmus region of Mexico concerning community 
participation and governance.  
(3) An in-depth local case study of the implementation of an ICCA through a 
multi-scalar governance arrangement. 
At an early stage of this research, the aim was to focus in Chiapas exclusively. The 
state presents a complex enough arena that has been an experimentation field for 
numerous conservation approaches with multiple outcomes through time (Haenn 
et al. 2014; Trench 2008). Oaxaca, on the other hand, is now widely known for its 
local community governance structures for natural resource management (Bray et 
al. 2012; Corbera et al. 2007; Merino-Perez 2001). Even though both states 
represent contrasting cases in terms of conservation governance, Chiapas and 
Oaxaca now share an administrative region (the Southern Isthmus region) in 
relation to the National Protected Areas Agency (CONANP) and it is difficult to 
separate them. Therefore, while most of the interviews have been carried out with 
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conservation practitioners based in Chiapas, some of the relevant actors involved 
in processes in Oaxaca were also included in order to cover this region adequately.  
One of the main links in the field was an NGO, called Pronatura-Sur (Chiapas), 
which introduced me to other relevant actors and, at the time, was starting a 
highly relevant project in San Miguel Chimalapa, just over the state border, in 
Oaxaca. The characteristics of the case made it a highly illustrative case for the 
topic of this research and thus, the in-depth case study was developed in Oaxaca. 
Therefore in this thesis, the geographical scope will be referred to as the Southern 
Isthmus region, which contains both states Chiapas and Oaxaca, but the local scale 
places emphasis on the eastern part of Oaxaca within a Conservation Priority 
Region, where San Miguel Chimalapa is located.  
 
3.2 Methods 
The point of departure of this research consisted on a literature review and a 
preliminary fieldwork season in Chiapas and Oaxaca between May 4th and June 
30th, 2009. During the preliminary fieldwork, data was collected through direct 
observation of a community-conservation experience exchange organised by the 
Global Diversity Foundation in Santa Cruz Tepetotutla, Oaxaca, and informal 
interviews with people working on NGOs like TNC and Pronatura Sur. The 
conversations of protected areas and conservation professionals discussed the 
voluntary conservation and community-conservation movements. These 
movements had just started to gain major attention from the state since the 
reforms to LGEEPA in May 18th, 2008, that acknowledged Voluntarily Conserved 
Areas as another official protected area category. The challenges that the 
implementation of the new policies represented as well as those of federal 
protected areas were also explored. 
The characteristics of qualitative methods from the social sciences and the 
potential advantages of their application while researching protected areas 
governance made them the most suitable approach to take. The fieldwork stage of 
this research was carried out between June 2010 and May 2011. During this 
period, various research tools were applied according to the multi-scalar nature of 
governance arrangements for conservation and the characteristics of the 
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informants. Data collection was divided in three stages that included the following 
research techniques, which are described in more detail below: 
(1) Document revision of the “Diario Oficial de la Nacion”, national laws and 
regulations, scientific articles and relevant publications regarding 
different governance arrangements for biodiversity conservation in 
Mexico.  
(2) Semi-structured interviews and workshop observations with agents 
involved in different governance arrangements for biodiversity 
conservation at regional, executive and operational levels.  
(3) Semi-structured and unstructured interviews as well as participatory 
observation were carried out in the community of San Miguel Chimalapa 
(San Miguel hereafter), Oaxaca in order to inform an in-depth case study. 
San Miguel is located within a Conservation Priority Region, fieldwork 
involved close interaction with the external agencies working in the 
region but with emphasis on the two settlements of the community that 
are more related to a community conserved area called El Cordon del 
Reten. These settlements are called San Antonio and Benito Juarez and are 
located in the eastern region of San Miguel. 
(1) Document revision 
A revision was carried out of official documents, academic literature and other 
relevant publications related to governance arrangements in biodiversity 
conservation in Mexico. The legal framework and mechanisms for different 
categories of governance arrangements were searched through search engines 
and obtained through the conservation agencies. Mexican Official Norms, LGEEPA 
regulations and policy briefs were downloaded from internet. The documents 
were analysed through a coding system based on Ribot and Peluso (2003: 154) in 
order to identify who and who does not get access to participation in protected 




(2) Semi-structured interviews and observation of NGO workshops with 
different social actors. 
Forty four semi-structured interviews were carried out with the following actors 
in order to explore different conservation practitioners’ perspectives (see 
Appendix II):  
(1) Four senior staff in regional offices of CONANP at the Southern Isthmus 
region, including the Regional director, the Technical Secretary, the 
person in charge of fire management and the agent in charge of 
Voluntary Conserved Areas Certification regionally. 
(2) One senior staff at the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR), who 
was involved in the reforms for the recognition of Voluntarily Conserved 
Areas. 
(3) Three members of the staff of the Chiapas’ environmental agency in 
charge of establishing and implementing state protected areas 
(4) Eleven directors and sub-directors of the Biosphere Reserves and 
National Parks of Chiapas of state managed protected areas in Chiapas 
and the director of Yagul National Park, Oaxaca.  
(5) One staff from CONANP with specific responsibility for Priority Region 
for Conservation in the Chimalapas region. 
(6) Twelve operative members of Biosphere Reserves (La Encrucijada and 
Montes Azules). 
(7) Nine representatives of different NGOs involved in conservation 
governance arrangements in Chiapas and San Miguel Chimalapa, Oaxaca 
(Pronatura Mexico, Pronatura Sur, Maderas del Pueblo, Support Group 
for Sustainable Development, Global Diversity Foundation and The 
Nature Conservancy). 
(8) Three owners of private reserves in Chiapas. 
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The use of semi-structured interviews (SSI) allowed room to explore a broad 
range of topics regarding the management of protected areas, while assuring that 
the central questions were covered during the conversation. This research method 
proved to be useful to enhance a more natural conversation with informants 
allowing them to go beyond their official statements if they wished to do so. 
Through triangulation with the official reports and documents I could register 
when the experiences and statements of the interviewees did not match the 
official versions. The sets of interviews focused on perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of the current conservation mechanisms in terms of (1) establishment 
and (2) implementation of the different arrangements for conservation 
governance in the region (see Appendix 1 for the SSI interview guide). The 
questions in the first stage of the interviews referred to the perceptions of 
conservation practitioners about the advantages and disadvantages of the legal 
mechanisms available for conservation. A second aspect explored the bureaucratic 
procedures and the process of centralisation/decentralization of conservation 
agencies as well as the trade-offs that protected area managers and conservation 
practitioners perceived between bureaucratic procedures (i.e. accountability 
formats, reports, planning and funding applications, etc.) and the time available to 
design and implement participatory processes in protected areas. Conservation 
practitioners were also asked about the ways local management practices were 
included in the protected area management plan. Targeted and snowball sampling 
were used for the semi-structured interviews and the sample size was determined 
by saturation during the coding stage.  
In addition, data were collected through direct and participant observation of four 
events related to community conservation and protected areas management. The 
first workshop was a voluntary conservation experience exchange in the 
community of Santa Maria Guienagati, Oaxaca, one of the first certified Voluntary 
Conserved Areas in the country. This workshop, run by Pronatura-Sur A.C, brought 
together people from Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas and Guatemala. The second 
workshop, also run by Pronatura Sur, was another experience exchange but with 
members of different networks from Chiapas, Guatemala and Costa Rica regarding 
the experiences of constituting networks for voluntary conservation. The third 
66 
 
event was a meeting between protected area managers, both federal and 
voluntary, about the challenges that protected areas in Chiapas face in order to 
control environmental offences (e.g. land invasion, illegal logging and mining 
concessions). Finally, I took part in a Community Conservation Forum organised 
by the research consortium ConservCom, in May 6th, 2011, in Campeche. In this 
forum, ejidos and communities from Campeche, Yucatan, Chetumal and Quintana 
Roo presented their experiences of community conservation and, along with 
environmental agencies and NGOs working in the region, analysed the policy gaps 
as well as the needs for inter-institutional coordination in order to support 
community conservation efforts.   
Data was collected through note-taking, I participated taking the memoirs of all 
but the last event on which I used a digital recorder and took notes. These data 
were transcribed and coded with the software QSR NVivo software in order to 
identify the opportunities and challenges perceived by protected area managers 
and by the different local communities and collectives engaged in voluntary 
conservation.  
(3) Qualitative data from in-depth case study 
Once all the relevant actors related to conservation governance in the region were 
identified, an in-depth case study was developed in San Miguel Chimalapa, Oaxaca 
(San Miguel, hereafter), a municipality and indigenous community located within a 
Conservation Priority Region. The case study looked at the implementation of a 
recently established Voluntarily Conserved Area (VCA) through a multi-scale 
governance arrangement by analysing the dynamics and interactions between the 
multiple actors involved in the decision-making process related to the VCA.  
My stay in the different settlements of San Miguel (the head municipality and the 
settlements San Antonio and Benito Juarez) had place between November 2010 
and May 2011. Data collection for the case study included participant and direct 
observation as well as interviews ranging from semi-structured to unstructured 
using targeted sampling.  Target sampling allowed me to identify those members 
of the community most engaged in the decision-making within the community and 
hence more informed about how the establishment and implementation of the 
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VCA was developing. I could also identify those willing to talk to me and leave 
alone those who were not interested. This sampling has the disadvantage of the 
high possibility of not including the views of those who tend to be marginalised 
within the community and who might not have felt confident enough to talk to me. 
Truth be told, targeted sampling allowed me to feel safer, being by myself and a 
woman in a region known by social unrest, illegal logging, drug cultivation and 
animosity towards environmentalists I did not want to risk too much questioning 
people randomly about community regulations for natural resource management. 
Still, I tried to compensate this bias by constantly walking through the settlements, 
talking to women, youth and teachers informally. When issues about the 
conserved area, natural resource management or community organisation and 
regulation came up during the conversation, I would write it down afterwards in 
my fieldwork diary. Field notes were transcribed and coded with NVivo. 
Data were also collected from direct observations of formal and informal meetings 
between different stakeholders. Note taking was used during meetings between 
the inter-institutional committee members, meetings between both committees 
the communal and the interinstitutional as well as in the assemblies within the 
community. Participant observation was carried out while accompanying local 
people and NGOs to activities related to fire prevention and patrolling, as 
appropriate. Twenty-three semi-structured interviews were carried out in both 
settlements adjacent to the VCA (10 in San Antonio and 11 in Benito Juarez) and 
five in the municipal seat of San Miguel (Appendix II presents an anonimised list of 
the interviewees and the coding system). The topics of the interview included oral 
histories of the site, in order to document how the current governance 
arrangements developed and the interactions among different actors through 
time.  The information from these oral histories was supported by triangulation 
with archival documents and information from key informants. Participatory 
methods such as time-lines and Venn diagrams were used with key-informants in 
order to explore (a) the history of the site and (b) the interactions between 
different stakeholders.   
Finally, I participated as an observant in the process to develop a new VCA in the 
settlement of 5 de Noviembre (known as La Cristalina, also in San Miguel). As part 
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of this process I attended to three land-use planning workshops and a fieldtrip for 
biological characterisation where all the male members of the settlement 
participated. This was an opportunity to talk to some of the people who founded 
the settlements of San Antonio and Benito Juarez and who have been actively 
involved in the land–tenure conflicts in San Miguel. I carried out four semi-
structured interviews with members of La Cristalina to add a total 32 interviews 
in San Miguel. 
The different topics covered by the in-depth case study in San Miguel Chimalapa 
are listed below: 
a. Description of the diversity of agencies from the government, diversity of 
NGOs and funders, ejidos, community members as well as official and 
traditional authorities.  
b. Detailed historical account of the development of the current governance 
arrangement. 
c. Documentation of the decision-making process in El Reten with emphasis 
on the following aspects: 
(1) Different actors’ roles and their participation on decision-
making, negotiation and advocacy during the official starting 
point and currently. 
(2) Interactions between social actors at different scales: 
 Between different settlements and local authorities in 
San Miguel Chimalapa. 
 Between these local actors and external stakeholders 
(government agencies, NGOs). 
 The implications of such interactions for decision-
making and implementation of the agreements made 




The selection of the case study was based on an opportunity developed through 
the contact with the NGO Pronatura-Sur A.C. who had been involved in the 
biological studies for the formal recognition of the VCA in San Miguel. Through 
Pronatura-Sur, I could contact WWF, whose representative introduced me to a 
representative of the Supporting Groups for Sustainable Development (GADES), a 
consultancy working in the implementation of the conservation and development 
strategies as a result of the conservation plans developed. The first meeting I 
attended was one of the inter-institutional group for sustainable development of 
Chimalapas (operational committee), in the city of Juchitan, Oaxaca in July 2010. 
At the local offices of CONANP in Juchitan I also met the representatives of 
CONANP, WWF, the funding body of the project called FONDO Oaxaqueño para la 
Conservacion (FONDO A.C.). Through this meeting I had an introduction about the 
relevant institutions, the different plans and projects that would take place that 
year (2010-2011), as well as the budgets invested by the different actors. Later, in 
the same meeting I was introduced to the local communal authorities of San 
Miguel Chimalapa, who immediately showed their disposition to participate in the 
project. The same day, I was introduced to the people from the settlement of La 
Cristalina, and the next week GADES introduced me to the people in San Antonio 
and Benito Juarez.  
 
3.3 Methodological considerations and challenges 
This research process has allowed me to become aware of the different shades of 
grey that are in what I once, naively, considered as black and white within 
governance processes. The development of this thesis has been a personal and 
academic journey where many of my preconceptions about conservation in 
practice and community dynamics have been challenged and, at times, put down. 
My personal aim for this research was to inform the development of rights-based 
approaches for conservation, as well as advocating for policies that promote bio-
cultural diversity instead of homogenisation. Although these objectives are still 




Through the development of this research, I have been able to observe how the 
figure of the state and the programs and policies it promotes often work to 
legitimise private interests, promote paternalism and exclusion towards local 
people behind the mask of conservation or development projects. Nevertheless, I 
have been also able to meet conservation practitioners that (often naively) give 
the best of their efforts with limited human and economic resources available to 
develop conservation processes that are coherent with their social contexts. Many 
conservation practitioners in the field, beyond all the plans and strategies, are 
usually overwhelmed by the needs, responsibilities and bureaucracy required to 
perform their tasks. On the other hand, in the academic field, our task is to 
critically think about conservation policies and practices, and to draw theoretical 
lessons to improve them. However, literature on this regard often shows little or 
no empathy for those who have to deliver results with limited funds, personnel 
and capacities. Thus, before pointing out all the issues that, according to my 
perception, need to be done differently, I want start by expressing my respect to 
the people who work every day to achieve biological conservation and who invest 
their efforts to do a good job with the resources, mechanisms and time available, 
in spite it often does not give the most desirable outcomes. 
The conservation arena in Chiapas has been subject to constant critiques from 
human rights defenders since 1990’s. Social conflicts and private economic 
interests in conjunction with the use of military forces and violence in protected 
areas in Chiapas have enhanced conservation’s reputation of repression and 
marginalisation, especially in the Lacandonian Rainforest (Haenn et al. 2014; 
Speed 2008; Trench 2008). Because conservation is such a political issue, 
informants at state and NGOs agencies are generally very cautious about their 
statements. The political weight that they have to bear makes them very strategic 
and thus, only a few of them really opened up about the problems of protected 
areas operation during the interviews. The fact that the interviews took place in 
their working space also limited the freedom with which the informants spoke. 
Hence, regardless of the efforts invested to move beyond official statements, this 
was only possible with some of the informants. Nevertheless, there were a couple 
of officials and NGO members who became key informants and with whom I 
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developed more than one interview and who kindly provided feedback on various 
chapters of this thesis.  
The current focus on multi-scalar approaches was developed largely through the 
fieldwork stage, when the plan was to have two case studies, one in an Indigenous 
Community Conserved Area and another in a Biosphere Reserve. The events on 
the ground had a strong effect on the order and the extent to which the objectives 
could be accomplished, as not everything was successful in this process. 
Additionally to the difficulties for access to the Biosphere Reserve, the 
development of a comparative study showed the mismatch between the scales of 
the cases selected. The size of the Biosphere Reserve, the number of governmental 
and non-governmental agencies involved and the number of communities 
embedded within it did not allow developing an in-depth case study to establish a 
comparison with a single Indigenous Community Conserved Area during the time 
available. Still, some lessons could be drawn from this experience, beginning with 
the fact that the ICCA is geographically and administratively confined within the 
boundaries of a certain community/municipality, making it easier to define the 
stakeholders involved and the interactions between each other. In terms of 
research, getting access to a particular case-study with clearly identified 
authorities and boundaries made research more logistically feasible.  Nonetheless, 
a short stay in Agua Fria, the only community I could visit in El Triunfo Biosphere 
Reserve, provided some useful insights about the size and institutional scales of 
Biosphere Reserves, the difficulties of managing remote areas for reserve 
authorities and the resulting local population’s feeling of being neglected by 
institutions.  
That is how ICCAs became the primary focus on this research through an in-depth-
case study. Biosphere reserves have been, however, explored at the regional 
management level, informing the argument towards the importance of community 
conservation. Furthermore, even though ICCAs imply a different governance 
structure, Biosphere Reserves in Mexico themselves are not only populated, often 
by indigenous communities, but also rely heavily on the inhabitants for 
operational purposes. As will be further explained during this thesis, recent 
developments on protected areas legislation enhance the relevance of the 
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contributions of this research for both governance structures: ICCAs and 
Biosphere Reserves. 
3.4 Study site: The Southern Isthmus region of Mexico 
Oaxaca and Chiapas are the two most bio-cultural diverse states in Mexico (Toledo 
1999). Located in the Southern region of the country, in the convergence point of 
the Palaearctic and the Neo-tropical bio-geographical regions, both states share a 
rich topography and an outstanding variety of climates and biodiversity. The 
correlation between biological and cultural diversity in this case means that, 
despite being neighbouring states, Oaxaca and Chiapas also represent rather 
different contexts in cultural and social terms (Fernandez-Osorio 1999; Vera-
Castillo 2003). Titled indigenous communities constitute the main form of land 
tenure of Oaxaca covering 5, 399 883 has (De Gortari 1997; Robson 2007), while 
ejidos prevail in Chiapas with 3 mil 021 ejidos and 91 communities, covering 4.3 
million has (Fernandez-Osorio 1999; SEDATU 2012). Although there has not been 
a systematic comparison between both states, local experts acknowledge that the 
difference in land tenure patterns and social processes between Oaxaca and 
Chiapas have resulted in different organisational arrangements. Consequently, 
both states have developed different processes, struggles and natural resource use 
patterns. Despite their different backgrounds, Oaxaca and Chiapas share a 
common prestige for the fierce resistance of their indigenous peoples to western 
ways of natural resource extraction (Merino-Perez 2001) development (Speed 
2008; Toledo 1992) and even top-down conservation (Doane 2007; Walker et al. 
2007). Such resistance has meant in many cases for them to remain in 
marginalisation by the state and international funding agencies and social unrest 
due to conflicts regarding land tenure and access to natural resources (Martin et 
al. 2010). These conditions have wider implications for the conservation of the 
landscapes where these wealthy social-natural systems are located.  
Despite their natural and cultural diversity, in 2009, the federal Protected Areas 
Commission (CONANP) decided that Chiapas and Oaxaca would constitute a single 
administrative region: the Southern Isthmus (Fig. 3.1). Thus, this research focuses 
on this administrative regionalisation in order to analyse the governance 
structures and mechanisms for biodiversity conservation. In order to clearly set 
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the differences between both states and underline the local characteristics of 
relevance for participatory conservation governance, this section will describe 
each state separately. 
 





Bio-cultural diversity. Bio-cultural diversity finds a major expression in Oaxaca, 
an outstanding land where biodiversity and indigenous cultures have co-evolved 
since pre-historic times, creating multiple and diverse landscapes. Oaxaca 
represents 4.8 % of the national area with 9,379,300 ha, bordering with Chiapas 
(E), Guerrero (W), Veracruz (NE), Puebla (NW), and the Pacific Ocean (S). Oaxaca’s 
hydrological systems include thirty major streams that run through its four main 
mountainous systems: the Neo-volcanic axis, the Southern Sierra Madre, the Plain 
lands from the South of the Gulf and the Central American mountain range (INEGI 
2005). This intricate topography allows Oaxaca to have the highest climate and 
biological diversity of the country. Biologically, Oaxaca holds the highest number 
of vertebrate species (1,431) and vascular plant species (8,431) in Mexico.  
Biological inventories for the state are still incomplete, but it is calculated that 
Oaxaca is home for 8.3% of the endemic species of Mexico. It is also the origin and 
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domestication centre for corn, squash and several species of beans by some of the 
multiple indigenous peoples that inhabit the state (Boege 2008).  
Oaxaca is divided into 570 municipalities (INEGI 2010) and up to 80% of the area 
of the state belongs to indigenous communities. There are sixteen ethnic groups in 
the state, making Oaxaca the state with the biggest indigenous population in 
Mexico with more than one million indigenous people out of a total population of 
3.1 million inhabitants (INEGI 2005). 
Economic activities. Indigenous and rural ejidos and communities from Oaxaca 
supply agricultural products to the local, regional and even international markets. 
The economic activities in the state include forestry, cattle farming and agave 
cultivation and processing to obtain products like mezcal, syrup, fibres and food 
(Carrasco 1999). Locally, indigenous agriculture provides products to the market 
such as: coffee, agave, fruit trees, vegetables, sugar cane, rubber, vanilla and chilli 
among many others that are complemented by herbs for medicine and food, 
flowers, wild seasonal food and seeds, animal leather, pottery products, pigs, 
poultry and insects. Nevertheless, indigenous and rural production does not seem 
profitable when compared to the notion of productivity by economists (Carrasco 
1999). This disparagement of the rural livelihoods has led to the development of 
policies for agricultural production that have been acknowledged for enhancing 
poverty, unequal conditions for the local peasants and environmental degradation 
(Merino-Perez 2001). Thus, despite the lack of growth in agricultural areas, there 
is a constant environmental degradation process in the state and by 1994, 84% of 
Oaxaca’s land was suffering different levels of erosion (Carrasco 1999). 
Demographic pressure, deforestation, overgrazing, loss of vegetation cover in 
areas of high biodiversity due to the clearing of vegetation for cattle farming, the 
use of agrochemical products, and the traditional slash and burn systems have 
been acknowledged as the causes for soil erosion. Even though the proportions of 
the negative environmental impacts by activity have not been studied, Carrasco 
(1999) argues that these problems have increased since the 1990s agrarian 
reforms. The agricultural policies, especially to rural and indigenous communities, 
are ambiguous and further marginalise rural areas of Oaxaca (Carrasco 1999). 
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Structures for natural resources use and conservation. In Oaxaca 91% of the 
totality of the land tenure is communal or ejidal (Lopez-Arzola 2007), where 30 
priority regions for biological conservation have been defined by CONANP. These 
areas include indigenous territories belonging to the following ethnic groups: 
mixes, zoques, zapotecos, chinantecos, cuicatecos, mazatecos and chontales from 
the coast. These groups are acknowledged by holding strong communal 
institutions for natural resource management  (Bray et al. 2003; Martin et al. 
2010; Merino-Perez 2001). Throughout the 20th century, transnational and state 
companies for timber extraction were granted access to forests owned by local 
communities in exchange for a tiny proportion of the profits and access to the 
roads built to transport the timber. This precedent enhanced in Oaxaca‘s 
communities the organisation of structures that allowed them to claim back their 
access rights, as well as the development of capacities to manage their own forest 
resources (Merino-Perez 2001). Oaxaca has a potential for timber extraction that 
has been calculated in two million cubic meters, mostly made by communities 
(Lopez-Arzola 2007). Since the 1990s Oaxaca has attracted research regarding the 
management and conservation of community forest resources (Anta-Fonseca et al. 
2000; Chapela 1999; Anta-Fonseca et al. 2000; Ventura-Aquino et al. 2008).  With 
only four federal protected areas in the state, Oaxaca is considered to be a model 
for community conservation efforts and a successful example of local 
empowerment for natural resource management (Martin et al. 2010). 
Surprisingly, only 5.2% of its area is under some form of federal protection in four 
different protected areas (Garcia-Mendoza et al. 2004, See Figure 3.2). 
Contrastingly, Oaxaca has become one of the world’s leaders on community 
resources management and establishment of Indigenous Community Conserved 
Areas under the category of Voluntary Conserved areas (Martin et al. 2010). 
Martin et al. (2011) found 126 sites of community conservation, 43 of them were 
certified by CONANP in Oaxaca, which represents the 69 percent of the cover 
under the category of VCA at the national level. These conditions of cultural, 
ecological diversity as well as the historical background make of Oaxaca the ideal 
place to study the dynamics of local governance structures for natural resources 





Bio-cultural diversity. Located in South-eastern Mexico (17o 59' and 14°32' N; 
and 90o 22' and 94o 14' W), Chiapas borders with Tabasco (N), Pacific Ocean (S), 
Guatemala (E), Oaxaca (SW) and Veracruz (NW). It represents 3.8% of the national 
area with 7,441,500 ha. (Gov. of Chiapas 2005). Precipitation in the state ranges 
from 300 to 5,000 mm per year and the river systems represent 30% of the 
hydrological resources of the country with two main watersheds: the Gulf 
Watershed (formed by the Usumacinta and the Grijalva rivers), and the Pacific 
Watershed (Cahoacan, Coatan and Suchiate rivers). Although biodiversity listings 
are still incomplete in Chiapas, it has been calculated that there are up to 49,000 
species of fungus; 51 species of algae; 70% of the national richness of ferns with 
798 species; 1,173 registered species of epiphytic vascular plants, with 568 orchid 
species and 101 species of bromeliads. In total, the vascular plant richness is 
calculated in 10,000 species, placing Chiapas in the second place of national 
diversity, after Oaxaca (Rubio-Delgado 2013). The ecosystem and species diversity 
of Chiapas result from the topographic and consequent climatic diversity, as well 
as the fact that Chiapas is located in a convergence point for two bio-geographical 
regions: the Palaearctic region and the Neo-tropical region. Chiapas holds 20% of 
Mexico’s biodiversity with up to 8,500 plant species, 100 species of amphibians, 
181 of reptiles, 340 of birds, 130 of mammals and over 1,200 species of butterflies 
(Gov. of Chiapas 2005).  The ecosystems present in the different regions of the 
state include tropical rainforest, subtropical deciduous rainforest, montane moist 
forest, pine forest, pine-oak forest, low deciduous forest, riparian forest, swamp 
forest, mangrove, reed beds, lagoon systems, jimbales (Communities dominated by 
Bambusa longifolia), savannah, tropical moorland, chusqueal (Communities of the 
genus Chusquea) (CONANP 2009). 
Chiapas is the second most culturally diverse state of the country with eleven 
indigenous groups (INEGI 2010). By, 2010, the population in Chiapas reached 
4,796,580 inhabitants distributed in 119 municipalities; 37.7% of them are 
considered indigenous (INEGI 2010).  
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Economic activities. The state can be divided in micro-regions delimited by 
cultural identity and economy as follows: Cintalapa-Jiquipilas, Chol, Zoque-Tzotzil, 
Chiapas’ Highlands, Lacandonian, Comitan and Soconusco. Productive activities 
across the regions display a mosaic, which includes cattle farming and cultivation 
of grains, cacao, banana, and recently African palm and Jatropha for food and 
cosmetic production as well as biofuels. Corn is a crop traditionally used for home 
consumption while coffee production is used for commercialisation.  
Structures for natural resources use and conservation. Chiapas is a place 
where there is local and regional diversity (Speed 2008: 82).  A process of internal 
colonialism in the last 200 years has its biggest expression in Chiapas, 
characterised by hegemony and avoiding a more inclusive process of development 
(Nahmad-Sitton 1999). In Chiapas 17% of the land is collective property and it is 
the second state at the national level in terms of the number of ejidos with 1.887 
(Rice 1997). Agriculture and land tenure patterns display a significant variety due 
to the fact that many colonists settled and received “ejido” lands. Colonists are 
either private producers or “ejidatarios” from many parts of the country and 
Chiapas itself, and have played a central role in shaping the land use patterns.  
The dramatic effect of extensive logging of precious timbers and cattle grazing on 
Chiapas’ ecosystems created a conservation crisis that resulted in the creation of 
numerous state managed protected areas (Parra et al. 1994). Since the late 1970s, 
the conservation of Chiapas’ biodiversity was promoted Miguel Alvarez del Toro, 
the icon of conservation in the state. It was his early efforts that set the basis for 
the current protected areas system of Chiapas. Nowadays, Chiapas has the largest 
number (18) of Biosphere reserves and other categories of Federal Protected 
Areas in the country. According to the National Institute of Ecology, there are up to 
90 municipal and state protected areas although the actual management of these 
is uncertain (CONANP 2013).  
Chiapas is well defined by the word contrast. Known for its impressive amount of 
natural resources and landscapes, the state has had a very dynamic history with 
inequality towards its indigenous and rural populations as a constant feature 
(Speed 2008). The indigenous population and rural peasants have had to face 
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discrimination, abuses, food deficit, lack of education, health problems, 
deforestation and erosion through time. This situation enhanced migration and 
colonisation within the state; this led to numerous conflicts over the land (Cruz-
Burguete 2008).  The establishment of protected areas without the prior informed 
consent of the people living within them have created some of these conflicts. 
Additionally, in places like Montes Azules, political forces acting in the name of 
conservation have worked for protected areas to be perceived as a threat by the 
rural population in this region of the country (Haenn et al. 2014). 
Development in Chiapas has been scattered, gradual and a slow process (Harvey 
1998).  Since 1970s several international agencies, governments and many others 
have promoted poverty alleviation alternatives with elusive results. The 1990s 
agrarian reforms have had a devastating effect on the peasantry, and particularly 
on small grain producers (Escalona 2007; Harvey 1998). Combined struggles 
resulting from the discrimination against indigenous peoples, the new economic 
scheme, and the starting point for the implementation of the NAFTA3, led to a 
social uprising in January 1994 by the EZLN (Zapatista Army for National 
Liberation). This event marked the beginning of an increased interaction between 
members of indigenous communities, various state agents, and national and 
international human-rights activists.  This movement led in 1996 to the 
agreements of San Andres4. Even though the governments have not respected 
them, San Andres agreements could be the starting point to recognise indigenous 
rights regarding territories, self-determination and autonomies, as well as the 
defence of indigenous languages and cultures, collective access and stewardship of 
the natural resources (Boege 2008; Speed 2008).  
For both Chiapas and Oaxaca, despite the great amount of external actors trying to 
work for conservation, poverty alleviation, human rights and justice, sustainable 
solutions prove to be elusive. Government paternalism has had negative effects on 
local capacities for organisation and mobilisation, mainly in Chiapas, where after 
the uprising plenty of money was invested by the government to keep people calm 
                                                          
3 North America Free Trade Agreement 
4 The San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture recognise indigenous people’s rights to “develop their specific 
forms of social, cultural and political organisation... to obtain recognition on their internal normative systems for regulation 
and sanction insofar as they are not contrary to constitutional guarantees and human rights... to freely designate their 
representatives... to promote and develop their language, culture and traditions.” (Acuerdos de San Andres 1999:35) 
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(Durand et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the current national wave of violence, drug 
traffic, illegal logging, and corrupt mining concessions in communal lands call 
more than ever for the strengthening of local structures of governance to face the 




Table 3.1 Protected areas of Chiapas and Oaxaca (adapted from CONANP 2009; INEGI 2007). 
Chiapas 












Montes Azules Biosphere 
Reserve 
331,200 
Tropical rainforest and Sub deciduous rainforest, Pine-Oak forest, Riparian 
forest, jimbales (Communities dominated by Bambusa longifolia) and 
savannah. 
Chiapas 2000 
La Encrucijada Biosphere 
Reserve 
144,868 
Mangrove, Swamp forest (selva baja inundable de zapotonales), Reed beds 




El Triunfo Biosphere Reserve 119,177 Montane moist forest, Pine forests and  Tropical Rainforest 
Chiapas 2000 La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve 167,310 
Montane moist forest,  tropical moorland and  chusqueal (Communities of the 
genus Chusquea) 
Chiapas 2000 Lacantun Biosphere Reserve 61,874 Tropical rainforest 
Chiapas 2001 Selva El Ocote Biosphere Reserve 101,288 
Tropical rainforest, Sub deciduous rainforest, Lower deciduous forest and 
Pine-Oak forest 
Chiapas 1959 
Lagunas de Montebello National 
Park 
6,022 Pine forest, Oak forest, Montane moist forest 
Chiapas 2003 




Montane moist forests,  tropical moorland and chusqueal  
Chiapas 1980 
Cañon del Sumidero National 
Park 
21,789 
Sub deciduous rainforest (Selva mediana subcaducifolia),  lower deciduous 
forest, oak forest, 
Chiapas 1981 Palenque National Park 1,772 Tropical rainforest (Selva alta perennifolia) and induced grassland. 
Chiapas 1992 Bonampak Natural Monument 4,357 Tropical rainforest  
Chiapas 1992 Yaxchilan Natural Monument 2,621 Tropical rainforest  
Chiapas 2007 
La Frailescana, Area for Natural 
Resource Protection 
116,732 No information available 
Chiapas 2000 
Cascada de Agua Azul, Area for 
flora and fauna protection 
2,580 Tropical rainforest  
Chiapas 1999 
Metzabok, Area for flora and 
fauna protection 
3,368 





Naha, Area for flora and fauna 
protection 
3,847 
Tropical rainforest, Sub deciduous tropical rainforest  and Montane moist 
forest 
Chiapas 2000 
Chan-Kin, Area for flora and 
fauna protection 
12,185 Two variants of tropical deciduous rainforest (Medium and lower) 
Chiapas 2002 Sanctuary Playa de Puerto Arista 63 No information available 
Oaxaca 











Oaxaca 1998 Huatulco National Park 11,891 
Lower deciduous forest, riparian vegetation, wetlands, mangroves, coral reefs, 
algae, and sea grass. 
Oaxaca 1937 Benito Juarez National Park 2,737 Pine-oak forest and Lower deciduous forest. 
Oaxaca 1937 
Lagunas de Chacahua National 
Park 
14,187 Medium rainforest, Lower deciduous forest, Mangrove and Coastal dunes. 
Oaxaca 1999 Yagul Natural Monument 1,076 Sub-humid deciduous forest. 
Oaxaca 2008 
Area for flora and fauna 
protection Boqueron de Tonala  
3,912 Lower deciduous forest and Oak forest. 
Oaxaca 1986 Playa de Escobilla Sanctuary 30 Coast line 
Oaxaca 1986 








3.4.3 Case study site: San Miguel Chimalapa and El Cordon del Reten as 
a Voluntary Conservation Area 
 
The Chimalapas region is located on the border of the states of Chiapas and 
Oaxaca on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Southern Mexico.  The region has been 
inhabited and defended since pre-Hispanic times by indigenous people from the 
Zoque culture, who are descendants from a group called Mokayas who were the 
historical link between the Mayan and Olmec cultures (Anaya and Alvarez 1994: 
26).  
Chimalapas is home to some 15,114 people (INEGI 2010) representing a 
multiplicity of ethnic groups5 that have migrated to the area at different times and 
under different circumstances. The region is divided into two titled indigenous 
communities - Santa Maria Chimalapa and San Miguel Chimalapa - which are also 
municipalities. San Miguel, which is the site of El Reten, has title to 134,000 
hectares of land. In 2010 it had 6,608 inhabitants (INEGI 2010) distributed 
between one main population center (the “cabecera”) and seventeen smaller 
settlements or congregaciones. El Reten is located in the eastern zone of the 
community lands, and the four closest settlements (San Antonio, Benito Juarez, Sol 
y Luna and 5 de Noviembre) have had a particularly important role in its creation 
(Fig. 3.2). The municipality is classified as a region of extreme poverty, making it a 
priority target for multiple governmental aid programs and subsidies6. However, 
internally living standards of the settlements are very variable, decreasing with 
increasing distance from the cabecera. The eastern region of San Miguel has no 
paved roads, no electricity, and very basic health and education services. 
                                                          
5 These include zoques, mixes, huaves, mixtecos, zapotecos, chinantecos, tzeltales, chamulas, chatinos and mestizo people 
(Anaya and Alvarez 1994). 
6 These include federal programmes such as Procampo (for corn cultivation), Oportunidades (for women and education) 
and Progan (for cattle ranching) and also the FAO funded programme Food Security Programme. 
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Figure 3.2 Location of San Miguel Chimalapa and the two settlements most related to El 
Reten. 
 
The region is also known for its outstanding biodiversity. It includes the second 
largest remaining areas of tropical rainforest in Mesoamerica after the Mayan 
rainforest (Grupo Mesofilo 2008) and initial surveys have revealed a high level of 
species diversity, including 146 mammal species, 316 bird species and some 900 
butterfly species, representing 36% of national biodiversity (Anaya and Alvarez 
1994). The diversity of ecosystems of the region includes cloud forest, pine forest, 
pine-oak forest and tropical rainforest with many endangered flora and fauna 
(WWF 2007). Accordingly, it is a priority Eco-region for WWF (WWF 2007); part 
of Conservation International’s Mesoamerican biodiversity hotspots (CI 2007), a 
national bio-cultural diversity hotspot (Toledo et al. 2002), and one of the 152 
Priority Terrestrial Regions for conservation identified by CONABIO7 (Arriaga et 
al. 2008). 
El Reten itself represents the largest area of pine-oak and temperate forest left in 
San Miguel. It includes patches of tropical rainforest and forms part of a natural 
corridor called “Selva Zoque”, which represents the northern limits of tropical 
                                                          
7 National Commission for the Knowledge about Biodiversity. 
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rainforest on the American continent. Despite San Miguel’s outstanding 
biodiversity, inappropriate colonization and agricultural policies and the constant 
search for sources of income by the inhabitants and migrants, who are some of 
poorest people in Mexico, together with economic pressure from cattle ranchers 
and loggers from adjacent lands, and land tenure conflicts, have resulted in 
serious impacts on the state of the environment. Villalobos (2001), Anta-Fonseca 
(2001) and Oviedo (2002) identify the most important threats to the biodiversity 
in the region: 
(1) Agrarian conflict (unclear property rights- inside and outside the 
community). 
(2) Socioeconomic marginalization and migration increasing pressures on 
natural resources. 
(3) Lack of viable and sustainable livelihood alternatives. 
(4) Forest cover loss due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier. 
(5) Illegal forest exploitation. 
(6) Trafficking of wild flora and fauna species. 
(7) Forest fires.  
(8) Inadequate development policies.  
(9) Lack of incentives to strengthen community-based forest control and 
protection. 
From a conservation perspective, therefore, the region represents a critical area, 
but in a region where a federal protected area would be politically inappropriate 
and logistically unfeasible. Therefore protected areas advocates have had to 







Section II: National legal frameworks 
and regional aspects of protected 
areas governance 
Chapter 4. Legal Frameworks for protected areas 
governance  
Governance structures are shaped through formal and informal frameworks 
defining who is entitled and legitimate to participate and the means to do it. The 
legal framework for protected areas in Mexico defines how protected areas are 
established, the legal categories of protected areas and the according management 
strategies. Mexican protected areas legislation establishes who is entitled to 
participate in the establishment and management of protected areas in the 
country but the how and when this participation should take place remain open to 
interpretation.  This chapter introduces the legal frameworks that regulate the 
establishment and management of protected areas in Mexico. It also explores who 
and how can participate in protected area management in the country and the 
recently added protected area category for Voluntarily Conserved Areas (VCAs). 
When managed communally, VCAs can be an equivalent to the international 
category of ICCAs and thus, implies a process of power devolution that will be 
explored in further chapters of this dissertation. By examining the implementation 
of ICCAs it will be possible to look closely at the potential and challenges of the 
institutionalisation of grassroots approaches for conservation in terms of local 
arrangements for natural resource management, participation, power devolution, 
accountability, legitimacy and sustainability. 
 
4.1 Protected areas in Mexico, design and implementation 
Protected areas in Mexico, as in many developing countries, have been based on 
the division between pristine nature and human of the Western thought (Adams 
and Hutton 2007; Andrade and Rhodes 2012; Brockington and Igoe 2006). The 
first state-managed protected area in Mexico was a National Park, established in 
1876 and several others were set up since then (CONANP 2011b). It was until 
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1988 that the legal and normative framework for ecosystems conservation was 
published in the country (CONANP 2011b). The General Law for Ecological 
Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) is the legal instrument defining 
and regulating the establishment and management of natural protected areas in 
the country.  Protected areas as defined by LGEEPA:  
 
“[A]im to conserve representative habitats so that the evolution and 
functional processes are preserved and to assure the continuity of the 
appropriation of natural resources by human societies”. (LGEEPA, Art. 
45) 
Article 46 of LGEEPA defines the categories of protected areas based on their 
biological and physical characteristics. Up to 2010, 175 Federal Protected Areas 
had been decreed in Mexico covering an area of 25,372,182 ha (12.92% of the 
national territory) consisting in the majority of cases of I. Biosphere Reserves 
(41), and II. National Parks (67), and followed by   V. Areas for Flora and Fauna 
Protection (36); VI. Sanctuaries (18); IV. Areas for Natural Resources Protection 
(8), and III. Natural Monuments (5) (CONANP 2012). The protected area 
categories are very consistent with the IUCN classification (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al. 2010). Nowadays, Biosphere Reserves, which combine different management 
categories from strict conservation areas, called core zones, to influence areas 
where human settlements and natural resources use are allowed but regulated, 
generally by the state (Adams and Hutton 2007) are the most widely conservation 





By law, proposals for the establishment of protected areas should consider the 
opinion of a diversity of governmental, social and academic entities (LGEEPA, Art. 
58). In order to establish a protected area within the categories I to VI, the official 
document is required to contain: (1) a precise delimitation of the area as well as a 
I. Biosphere Reserves. Representative areas of one or more ecosystems that have not 
been altered by human actions or that require to be preserved and restored, in which 
there are representative species of the national biodiversity including endemic, 
threatened or endangered species (CONANP (a) 2009).   
II. National Parks.  Areas with one or more ecosystems with outstanding 
importance for their scenic beauty; their aesthetic, historic, educational, leisure or 
scientific values; for the existence of flora and fauna; their aptitude for the 
development of tourism, or for other analogous reasons (CONANP (b) 2009). 
III. Natural Monuments. Areas with one or more natural elements, that for their 
unique character, aesthetic, historic or scientific value, are designed to an absolute 
protection regime (CONANP (c) 2009). 
IV. Areas for Natural Resources Protection.  Designated for the preservation and 
protection of soil, hydrographical river basins, water and natural resources located 
within forested lands (CONANP (d) 2009). 
V. Areas for Flora and Fauna Protection. Established on places containing habitats 
on which the existence, transformation and developments of flora and fauna species 
rely (CONANP (e) 2009). 
VI. Sanctuaries.  Zones with considerable flora and fauna richness or with the 
presence of restricted range species, subspecies or habitats. (CONANP (f) 2009). 
VII. State Reserves and Parks. Areas managed by state governments. 
VIII. Municipal Zones for Ecological Conservation. Areas managed by municipal 
governments. 
IX. Voluntarily Conserved Areas.  Any areas containing any of the features 
mentioned above, providing environmental services or which because of their location 
contribute to the aim stated in Art. 45 of LGEEPA, mentioned above (DOF 2008). 





zoning exercise;(2) the type of protected area specifying the regulations for land 
and resources use in place; (3) a description of the activities allowed according to 
the zoning exercise; (4) if required, the public benefit causes that justify the 
expropriation of the lands being declared as protected area; (5) general 
management regulations, designation of funds and decision-making bodies as well 
as the development of the management plan; (6) the guidelines for preservation, 
restoration and sustainable use actions, management regulations applying 
according to LGEEPA and other relevant laws (LGEEPA, Art. 60). The category will 
define the specific zoning of the protected area and, consequently, the regulations 
over the land and natural resources’ use within the area (LGEEPA Art. 47BIS, 
Figure 4.2). The zoning of protected areas considers that areas relevant for the 
inhabitants of protected areas should be located in the traditional use sub-zones 
which “will aim to keep cultural wealth of communities, as well as to satisfy the 
basic needs of the inhabitants of the natural protected area” (LGEEPA 1998: Art. 
55).  
Even though LGEEPA acknowledges the importance of conservation for the long-
term sustainability of ecological processes as well as of human populations, 
protected areas in Mexico have long been related to exclusion and restrictions 
over peasants and indigenous people (Fraga 2006; Reyes-Garcia et al. 2013). 
Hence, alternatives to these exclusionary approaches have been developed and 
since 2008, Articles 46 and 55BIS of LGEEPS have been modified to incorporate 
Voluntarily Conserved Areas, in addition to Federal Protected Areas, as a formal 
category of protected area (Figure 4.1).However, as will be explored later on, 
previous conservation practice in the country implied a lack of inclusion of local 
people’s needs in the creation and management of protected areas, which has 







The declaratory document for a protected area also requires a management plan 
to rule its operation, elaborated with the participation of the landowners within 
the area (LGEEPA, Art. 65). Management plans are basic instruments to respond to 
any event inside a protected area and provide legal support in cases against 
harmful infrastructure projects such as highways, dams and mines, only if these 
activities are explicitly forbidden in the management plan (CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
August 9th, 2010). Management plans formally define: location, dimensions, 
characteristics, management category and strategies, zoning and land use 
regulations of a particular protected area (LGEEPA Art. 66). They also establish a 
basic stock of activities, which are not exclusive of other activities, that any 
protected area must accomplish focused on a five year period, but applicable to 
longer periods (GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). According to protected 
I. Core zones  Areas with restricted use if any. 
a.  Protection area. b. Restricted use. 
 
II. Buffer zones.  Where sustainable use activities are limited to: 
a. Traditional use: natural resources that have been used in a traditional and 
continuous way. Related to meet the socioeconomic and cultural needs of 
the inhabitants of the protected area. 
 
b. Sustainable natural resources use. 
 
c. Agro-ecosystems sustainable use. 
 
d. Special use. Reduced extension with natural resources that are essential 
for social development, used without damaging the ecosystem or 
modifying substantially the landscape nor causing irreversible 
environmental impacts on the natural elements. 
 
e. Public use. Recreation activities with concentration of visitors that are 
within the ecosystems’ carrying capacity. 
 
f. Human settlements. Surfaces with significant modification of the original 
ecosystem previous to the protected area decree. 
 
g. Recovering. Severely altered or modified ecosystems subject to restoration 
and rehabilitation programs. 




area managers, however, developing and implementing a management plan 
remains a challenge, in Mexican protected areas most of the activities are carried 
out opportunistically to face human population growth and ecological threats (CC, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010). Thus, if an international funding body delivers 
resources to develop a certain activity or product that additionally helps to 
achieve conservation or development objectives, protected areas’ activities are 
directed towards it even though the management plan did not contemplate them. 
(CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010).  Furthermore, the amount of legal and 
bureaucratic requirements for a management plan to be fully developed requires 
a long and complicated process (GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). As a result, 
only 57 out of 173 federal protected areas have published management plans, 
representing 34.14% of the total protected areas (CONANP 2009). Thus, 66% of 
the federal protected areas in Mexico do not have a legally binding strategy to plan 
and direct their conservation actions, which is consistent with the argument of 
Wells and McShane (2004) regarding the limited legal faculties, capacities and 
resources that protected area managers have to achieve conservation targets. 
Therefore, management of protected areas in the Southern Isthmus Mexico is 
largely developed on a reactive basis and with a great reliance on the capacities 
and styles of the authorities in charge rather than on a preventive institutional 
strategy (CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010).   
 
Local community participation in the decision-making process is the only variable 
that significantly relates to compliance with the regulations in protected areas 
(Andrade and Rhodes 2012). Yet, in the Mexican context local participation is 
mostly open to interpretation and a very polemic aspect in protected area 
establishment and management (Durand et al. 2014). Despite the importance of 
management plans, the law does not define how the consultation and 
participation with different stakeholders should be carried out to define the 
category, zoning and management of federal protected areas. Consultative and 
participatory processes with people living within protected areas are subject to 
operational team’s capacities and often limited to a process of validation of 
decisions already made in upper administrative levels (Personal observation). 
There are also differences of how inclusive processes can be according to the 
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protected area category. On the one hand, National Parks are the only category 
that implies land expropriation, and as such, they are not supposed to have 
population within them, making decision-making straightforward, at least in 
theory. In practice, however, expropriations were not fully applied and National 
Park’s authorities often need to negotiate with inhabitants with the limitation that 
their status as irregular inhabitants does not legally require any participatory 
process nor provide mechanisms to support such negotiations (GE, Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, August 7th, 2010). On the other hand, all the other protected area 
categories require participatory processes to define their management plans 
(LGEEPA, Art. 65). However, the spaces, terms and conditions of such 
participation are not defined leaving a legal gap that, as will be illustrated 
throughout this thesis, has been and continues to be a source of conflict in multi-
scalar governance arrangements for protected areas. Limitations on effective local 
inclusion in protected area management, deliberate or not, work against the 
achievement of conservation objectives since local opposition makes protected 
areas more vulnerable to the negative effects of agricultural expansion, 
infrastructure and population growth (Bathari and Hammig 1998; Porter-Bolland 
et al. 2012; Wells and McShane 2004; Wilshusen et al. 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding the legal gaps defining the terms of participation, there are also 
legal means for the state to devolve, to some extent, managing powers to non-
governmental actors. Article 67 of LGEEPA entitles the Natural Resources 
Secretary (SEMARNAT) to grant, after developing the corresponding management 
plans, the management of protected areas ranging from Biosphere Reserves to 
Sanctuaries (Categories I to VI) to State and Municipal governments, ejidos, 
communities, indigenous peoples, civil groups and organisations, private 
companies and any other interested people. Accordingly, whoever acquires the 
responsibilities of managing a protected area becomes subject to LGEEPA’s 
provisions, regulations and Mexican Official Laws, as well as to follow the decrees 





4.2 Voluntarily Conserved Areas and other voluntary 
conservation alternatives 
In Mexico, the discursive change to inclusive approaches for protected areas 
(Adams and Hulme 2001) was formalised in 1996. Currently, conservation 
policies and practitioners tend to embrace a vision where the diversity of land 
uses, local livelihoods, human rights and access capacities should be 
acknowledged and considered in management decisions at a landscape level (Bray 
et al. 2008; Li 1996; Porter-Bolland et al. 2012; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Yet, the 
participatory processes need consolidation in the view of protected area 
managers (CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010). Also, the roles that local people 
should play seem to be limited to be guards of the areas as the following statement 
illustrates: 
 
… "[T]he better conserved lands within protected areas are part of an 
ejido… [hence,] lads without population are far more difficult to manage, 
because we do not have an army for conservation like the US” (GJ, Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). 
Even though the perspectives on conservation practitioners might be slower to 
change, the legal frameworks are slowly shifting to give increasing role to local 
communities in protected areas management. Additionally to state-managed 
protected areas, Art. 59 of LGEEPA states that other non-governmental actors are 
entitled to promote the establishment of protected areas in their own lands. There 
are multiple legal mechanisms by which landowners, either social or private, can 
establish their own protected areas (Gutierrez-Lacayo et al. 2002, Figure 4.3). 
VCAs can be compatible with the IUCN governance category for private governance 
and governance by indigenous peoples and local communities where these groups 
or their representatives hold the principal authority, responsibility and 
accountability of the areas and resources. This framework has allowed the slow 
transition towards multi-scalar governance arrangements for protected area 
management in Mexico. Nevertheless, federal protected areas remain the most 
promoted and institutionally supported option by CONANP (RM, Mexico City, May 
20th 2009). CONANP is the body in charge of providing the declaration of such 
Voluntarily Conserved Areas (VCAs) and the corresponding management plans, 
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though a certificate. Certified VCAs have been conceived to be promoted and 
implemented by landowners, and even though VCAs were not conceived to be 
federal protected areas (RM, Mexico City, May 20th 2009) they contribute to the 
total area under some form of protection status (CONANP 2012). Furthermore, 
their formal recognition makes them subject to the regulations of LGEEPA which, 
until 2013, did not have specific regulations for this recently developed category 
(CDC, Oaxaca, May 25th, 2009).  
 
The term “certification” of VCAs was developed by CONANP and there is a debate 
about the accuracy in its use for the process or formally recognizing VCAs (RM, 
Mexico City, May 20th, 2009). The establishment of VCAs has emphasis on lands 
located within priority areas for conservation but outside the protected areas’ 
network. Furthermore, VCAs incorporate not only private owners and companies 
into conservation efforts, but they are compatible with the concept of 
Indigenous/Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs), developed as a governance 
category by IUCN. The process of establishment of VCAs, which is by definition 
unilateral and self-promoted by landowners, involves CONANP certifying the 
willingness and means of the owners to conserve their lands for a period no 
shorter than 15 years. The establishment of VCAs is formally acknowledged 
through a certificate specifying the owners’ name, the legal document proving the 
ownership of the land, the assembly’s resolution to assign those lands for 
conservation; people entitled to develop management activities in the area; the 
area’s location and the description of management strategies and zoning. LGEEPA 
also establishes that SEMARNAT shall provide technical advice to develop 
management strategies of the area, which will be managed by the owner 
according to the strategy specified in the certificate. Since May 2014, the 2008 
LGEEPA’s reform has a Regulation body (reglamento) that defines procedures for 
modifications of areas, management strategies and certificates (DOF 2014). The 
certifications were applied during six years with an unfinished legal framework 
while discretionary powers remained in those in charge of the certification 














and Municipal  
 
LGEEPA Art. 46 on 
Natural Protected 
Areas 
º Promoted by government 
authorities at different 
territorial levels or any other 
people 
º Recognised through official 
decree 
º CONANP is in charge of the federal protected 
areas while States, Municipalities, and Federal 
District authorities can establish and manage 
their own areas 
º CONANP can delegate management to 
communities, individuals, organizations and 
private companies, subject to the decrees 




Areas (CONANP  
certification) 
LEGEEPA Art. 46, 
reformed in 2008 
(DOF 2008) 
º Promoted by landowners 
(private, corporate or 
communal) 
º CONANP certifies 
landowners’ willingness 
º Landowners define and apply management 
plans of the areas subject to the Mexican 
Laws 
º Certified lands are eligible for economic 
support to operate although the legal 
framework is incomplete. CONANP does not 





civil code 6th Title, 
Chapter 1, Art. 1057 
º Civil contracts promoted in 
Chiapas by  Pronatura A.C. 
with the landowners 
(private, corporate or 
communal) 
º NGOs provide legal and technical advice for 
landowners to set the baselines for 
management and monitoring, as well as 
assistance to find economic incentives for 
conservation.  
º Not acknowledged by CONANP, and thus 
more difficult to get economic incentives 
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The owners have to promote their lands in form of CONANP (DOF 2014, Art. 126). 
The documents required include baseline physical and biological data of the land 
and the proof; proofs of the legal ownership of the land and, the case of collective 
land tenure, an assembly agreement to set that land for conservation. The 
procedure also requires a geo-positioned map, photographs of the key features of 
the land and the specification about the management strategies including the 
zoning of the area and the surface of each land use and the management, 
determined by the landowners. The capacity of CONANP to assist landowners to 
generate all these data is limited by the human and budget capacities of the 
agency (GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). Once the area is certified it 
becomes acknowledged as a federal protected area and is included to the National 
Protected Area Database and subject to technical supervision and monitoring by 
CONANP (DOF 2014, Art. 128). The access to economic incentives by landowners 
with certified land depends of the size of the land, ecological importance and 
conservation state of the area, the activities and attention it gets from researches 
(DOF 2014, Art. 130). According to these criteria, there are three levels of 
certification, namely: priority, intermediate and basic, according to the amount of 
criteria fulfilled, evaluated by CONANP. If landowners want to withdraw, they can 
do so through a letter and assembly agreement to CONANP. The sustainable 
production from these areas will be supported through a “sustainability mark” 
provided after requisition and evaluation of CONANP (DOF 2014, Art. 135BIS). 
The emergence of VCAs is similar to the processes where there has been a 
transition from centralised governance to diversified networks for institutional 
collaboration (Lockwood 2010). Yet, the devolution of powers required for 
effective management is incomplete as it is often the case (Ribot and Peluso 2003; 
Berkes 2009). Regarding funding for VCAs, officially, CONANP does not offer 
economic incentives for the certification of VCAs, but it does offer institutional 
support to landowners in lobbying with other government agencies, foundations 
and NGOs for consultancy or funding (GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010).  
Even though CONANP can also channel resources through its programs to 
economically support the technical studies, establishment and operation of VCAs, 
the agency does not have specific budget for them. Communities with certified 
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lands in priority regions for conservation can be supported by PROCODES 
(Programme for Conservation through Development) and similar programs 
managed by CONANP. However, the agency’s power and attributes to support 
VCAs both, financially and operationally is rather limited, and institutional links 
with other related agencies are established to fulfil funding and regulation gaps 
(GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010; RJ, Lacanja, September 10th, 2010). 
Consequently, CONANP and the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) work 
together to offer the program for Payments for Environmental Services (PES) run 
by the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) to promote VCAs establishment 
(Personal observation). In their study on VCAs in Oaxaca, Martin et al. (2010) 
found that 46% of the established VCAs surveyed had received PES.  
Payments of Ecosystem Services (PES) are the transfer of economic resources 
from services users to providers as a means to reduce the risk of forest cover loss 
through market mechanisms (Corbera et al. 2007). This program is intended for 
the conservation, increase, sustainable use and restoration of forestry resources 
through the enhancement of the market for environmental services in Mexico 
(Martin et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the implementation of PES in Mexico is ill-
defined and governments are often the intermediaries deciding over the 
distribution of financial resources at pre-established prices (Corbera et al. 2007).  
CONAFOR is the agency in charge of PES implementation, the services that are 
promoted are mainly hydrological and biodiversity. The allocation and 
distribution of PES mostly relies on property rights and thus, better-off 
households tend to get access to them at the local level (Corbera et al. 2007).  In 
protected areas, PES can be used as subsidies in order to get local support or to 
reduce local resistance over the land use restrictions that they represent (Durand 
et al. 2014). Thus, even though, PES and VCAs are managed by different agencies, 
constitute different programs and there are no official links between them in 
practice, the most important source of economic incentives in place for many 
VCAs in Oaxaca is the PES for Hydrological Services (LM, Santa Maria Guienagati, 
September 23rd, 2010). The certification of VCAs started in 2002 and has been 
well received by civil society. Currently, there are 326 certified areas in 18 states 
of the country covering a 370,000 ha surface, and in which there are 11 ethnic 
97 
 
groups with 95, 522 Mexican citizens participating (CONANP 2012). In Chiapas, 
the certification of areas has just started and to date there are only five VCAs, 
three of them communal and two private. Oaxaca, on the other hand, is a leader in 
number of certifications through community-conserved areas with 124 VCAs 
(CONANP 2012; Martin et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2011).  
Even though VCAs are currently the most widely used mechanism to establish 
conservation areas through social participation, the regulations leave the terms of 
such participation open to interpretation and discretionary and monitoring 
powers remain in the federal state’s hands and limited capacities. On the one 
hand, this legal gap allows the mechanism to be fairly flexible to the diversity of 
situations present on the ground regarding access and local dynamics, for 
example. On the other hand, the potential of this legal recognition to support 
grassroots becomes limited once there is an explicit expansion of the powers of 
the state over these areas in terms of regulations supervision and certification 
under externally define standards. The latter is consistent with the literature on 
the expansion and building of the state through protected areas (Bray et al. 2012; 
Brockington et al. 2008; Durand et al. 2014). Even though PES represent an 
economic incentive, the amount of power that VCAs certification gives to the state 
over the area, raises concerns amongst local communities and other conservation 
practitioners about the transparency and legitimacy of these processes. 
Furthermore, although there are different legal mechanisms available for 
voluntary conservation and their feasibility for application in Chiapas and Oaxaca 
differs due to the local contexts. In Chiapas, for example, land tenure uncertainty 
represents a core challenge for the establishment of private and community 
conserved areas (MO, SCLC, June 5th, 2010). Notwithstanding these challenges, 
there are numerous communities that have made use of the uses and customs to 
set communal agreements in their local assemblies in order to establish their own 
protected areas without searching for official recognition due to potential 
limitations that come with it (Martin et al. 2010). Thus, even though communal 
agreements have been underused by conservation agencies, they are the ultimate 
expression of the customary law and its importance for local natural resource 
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management, representing a locally appropriate way to regulate land and natural 
resource use at the communal level (MO, SCLC, June 5th, 2010; Durand et al. 2014).  
This chapter has defined the legal framework that regulates the establishment and 
implementation of protected areas in Mexico. It has also narrowed down to look 
closer at the operational challenges that those in charge of protected area 
management have to face in terms of legal, human, technical and infrastructure 
limited capacities. It also has defined the legal alternatives for protected areas 
establishment in the country. Chapter 5 will explore the governance arrangements 





Chapter 5. Organisational arrangements for protected 
areas governance 
Once the legal frameworks regulating the establishment and implementation of 
protected areas and VCAs in the country have been examined, this chapter 
elaborates on the institutional arrangements in place for protected areas 
implementation. Multi-scalar governance arrangements, from global to local, are 
crucial in the definition of the design, implementation and outcomes of 
conservation discourses, practices and funding (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). In the 
face of the multiple scales involved in protected areas governance (Armitage et al. 
2012; Chapin III et al. 2010), it is essential to understand how the “bundles of 
powers” (Ribot and Peluso 2003) and competences are distributed along these 
networks. The allocation of rights, access and responsibilities throughout these 
networks is crucial for natural resource management (Ostrom 2009; Wells and 
McShane 2004). Thus, the clarity with which these are distributed throughout the 
governance arrangements in place is likely to determine the outcomes and their 
sustainability through time (Ostrom and Cox 2010).  These arrangements are also 
affected by informal networks and agreements that constitute “the messiness of 
politics-in-practice” (Leach et al. 2007). The struggles for control and dominance 
(Bulkeley 2005) are often asymmetric and linked to politics, markets and the 
building of the state (Adams and Hutton 2007; Adger et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006; 
Rhodes 1997; Haenn et al. 2014).  The problems that multi-scalar arrangements 
for conservation face are mostly related to ignorance (limited understanding); 
mismatch (lack of consistency between ecological scales and institutional 
apparatus) and plurality within the arrangements (Buizer et al. 2011; Cash et al. 
2006). To this challenge, power asymmetries add another dimension that is 
particularly relevant for the research on ICCAs, determining the context in which 








5.1 Protected areas implementation and advisory boards 
The National Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT 
hereafter) is the government agency in charge of biodiversity conservation 
processes in Mexico. SEMARNAT defines the legal federal framework in 
environmental matters based on the current national policy and international 
commitments. SEMARNAT has four deconcentrated agencies in charge of water 
(CONAGUA), forestry (CONAFOR), biodiversity (CONABIO) and natural protected 
areas (CONANP). The latter is the national agency in charge of natural resource 
management and biodiversity conservation through protected areas and other 
means. Administratively, CONANP has six strategic objectives, namely:  
(1) to conserve the representative ecosystems and biodiversity of the 
country;  
(2) to develop and to apply programs and plans for protected areas 
regarding protection, management and restoration;  
(3) to implement the national strategy  of conservation for 
development;  
(4) to promote tourism in protected areas as a tool for sustainable 
development and public awareness;  
(5) to consolidate the cooperation and economic support to keep the 
leadership in conservation at the international level, and  
(6) to achieve the conservation of endangered species (CONANP 
2011a). 
 
The size of Mexico, its topography and the remoteness of some areas represent 
challenges for administrative matters. This adds to the neo-liberal policies that 
promote an on-going process of deconcentration of the federal state agencies. 
CONANP was created as a deconcentrated body in 2000, and since then different 
regions have been set up for management and operational purposes. CONANP has 
one central office and additionally it also has nine operational regions. The focus 
of this study, the Southern Isthmus region, consists of Chiapas and most of Oaxaca 
(with exception of the Tehuacan-Cuicatlan desert, Figure 3.2). The different 
regional offices of CONANP are economically accountable to the central office, 
which distributes the federal budget for the agency. Operationally, regional offices 
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are fairly free to define their priorities and means of operation but these are also 
subject to the budget assigned by central offices and regulations of the 
programmes available to implement it.  Thus, each protected area is accountable 
to its region, and the latter is accountable to the federal office of CONANP, which 
in turn is accountable to SEMARNAT. 
 
The organization of regional offices varies according to the local characteristics. In 
the case of the current Southern Isthmus region, protected areas are distributed 
among different operational teams according to their geographic location and 
their dimensions. Each operational team covers one or more protected areas 
according to the location, the micro-region or the protected area’s management 
category. This means that, at times, managers are in charge of protected areas that 
are very distant from each other, as is the case for the director of all the state’ 
Chiapas National Parks. In other instances, a single operational team gives 
attention to up to three federal adjacent protected areas; such is the case of the 
team of Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, Lacantun Biosphere Reserve and the 
Area for Flora and Fauna protection Chan Kin. Operational teams are generally 
constituted by a director, a sub-director and a team whose size depends on the 
funding capacities and operational needs of each protected area. The operational 
team is formally in charge of the implementation of strategies to achieve 
institutional objectives based on the protected area’s management plan.  The 
budget assigned by the national office is allocated regionally in order for the 
regions to develop implementation strategies according to the plans made by the 
operational teams of each protected area and the budget available. However, 
funding programs that support the operation of protected areas such as the 
Program for Conservation for Sustainable Development (PROCODES) and the 
Temporary Employment Program (PET) are centrally designed. 
 
The dimensions, multiplicity of stakeholders and economic needs within the 
federal protected areas system require most of the management to involve 
collaborative arrangements for funding and implementation. Even though 
CONANP is legally in charge of the operation of federal protected areas, the agency 
is able to do so by establishing alliances with other parties, creating multi-level 
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and multi-stakeholder management arrangements. The legal figures for these 
agreements are called advisory boards that can be constituted by different 
government agencies; local and international NGOs; academics, and local 
communities’ representatives. With CONANP as a leader, advisory boards help to 
identify local problems as well as defining the operational strategies and funding 
opportunities to accomplish CONANP’s strategies. According to conservation 
practitioners at CONANP, advisory boards facilitate the application of policies 
designed at higher administrative levels through the knowledge and tools 
available, enhancing informed decision-making and planning. Advisory boards, as 
a multi-scalar governance arrangement, enhance accountability and transparency 
in order to direct the funding available for protected area operation, as well as a 
reconsideration of the discourses and practices used (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
However, the constitution and implementation of boards and structures for 
planning and decision-making is not consistent and every protected area in 
Mexico is subject to local and regional preferences and capacities (RJ, Lacanja, 
September 10th, 2010; EA, Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010).  
In the Southern Isthmus region, the management of protected areas requires the 
attention of landscapes with areas ranging from a simple coastline to large inland 
areas that include a dynamic diversity of ecosystems, peoples, cultures and 
conflicts. According to many of the interviews carried out at the Southern Isthmus 
region of CONANP (VA, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010; CC, August 9th, 2010; GJ, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010; EA, Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010; OG, 
Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010; RJ, Lacanja, September 10th, 2010), conservation 
practitioners acknowledge that some the key aspects that complicate their jobs 
and affect the management of protected areas can be grouped into three main 
subjects related to the links between different levels of the same institution:  
(1) the bureaucracy required to coordinate the regional with the central 
CONANP’s office;  
(2) the lack of a more effective regionalisation to improve institutional 
presence at the local level, and  
(3) the lack of enough economic, decision-making and accountability 




Thus, the operation of protected areas requires a constant process of adaptation. 
Institutional alliances, prioritisation and negotiation amongst multiple 
stakeholders are daily practices for protected areas operational teams who stretch 
capacities, time and resources to give attention to both, social and ecological 
needs. The interaction of multiple actors adds to the already difficult links 
between the operational and the administrative levels of CONANP. Even though 
conservation practitioners at CONANP are aware that formats and reports 
increase institutional accountability and transparency, in such a dynamic 
environment the constant filling of reports and invoices becomes a burden (VA, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010; CC, August 9th, 2010; GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
August 4th, 2010; EA, Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010; OG, Acapetahua, August 16th, 
2010; RJ, Lacanja, September 10th, 2010, CL, Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010 ; GN, 
Acapetahua, August 16th, 2010;). For example, the Biosphere Reserve of El Triunfo 
covers 119, 177 hectares with 3, 771 and covering nine different municipalities 
and multiple small locations of different ethnic origins and degrees of 
marginalisation. In order to conserve the priority ecosystems located within it and 
numerous endangered species, the operational team of El Triunfo needs to 
coordinate with communal/ejidal authorities, municipal authorities, state 
authorities and other state and federal government agencies in order to enhance 
development. With the multiple needs of the El Triunfo, the operational team 
struggles with the bureaucratic requirements of CONANP arguing that it makes 
the operation more difficult rather than facilitating it, as illustrated by the 
Biosphere Reserve director: 
… “[T]here are constant frictions [between the personnel] when 
[CONANP supervisor’s priority] would seem to be the bureaucratic 
controls instead of the achievement of protected areas’ objectives… This 
happens at the regional level but it’s even stronger between the regions 
and national offices”. (CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010) 
 
The process of communication and coordination is further complicated by the way 
the regionalization of CONANP has been established. CONANP is a fairly young 
institution in which real efforts towards deconcentration and practical operation 
104 
 
began around 2005. Thus, learning in the region happens mainly through iterative 
processes. In this regard, practitioners argue that attending the two most bio-
culturally diverse states overpowers the regional institutional and human 
capacities.  As has been explained before, Chiapas and Oaxaca represent not only 
diverse but also contrasting social contexts. Each state has particular conservation 
needs, organisational structures and requires different management 
arrangements. Within CONANP, decisions and coordination for protected areas’ 
management in Chiapas and Oaxaca have complex dynamics due to distances and 
organisational differences. CONANP’s authorities in Oaxaca have been through a 
transition from being a single region to become part of the Southern Isthmus one, 
which has a totally different context and working style. The fact that budgets, 
decisions and reports have now to go through the regional authorities in Chiapas 
(a seven-hour drive) adds bureaucratic procedures and time to processes in 
Oaxaca (SG, Oaxaca, September 20th, 2010). Hence, each side of the state 
boundaries behaves as a separate entity as there is a lack of an institutional basis 
to provide sufficient and effective response to the multiple needs within protected 
areas (SG, Oaxaca, September 20th, 2010). Furthermore, the interactions with 
other state and non-state agencies from both states multiplies the efforts required 
to achieve effective inter-institutional coordination and sound strategies, as a 
conservation practitioner in Oaxaca acknowledged: 
 
“There should be a state level strategy at CONANP in which the state 
itself was seen as a unity… I attend two states and I don’t have time to be 
in both… this generates a differentiated attention… The coordination 
process needs to be much more organised, strategic, planned. Nowadays, 
it is subject to the characteristics of the chairs of national offices… 
making it even more variable” (SG, Oaxaca, August 27th, 2010). 
 
Even though conservation practitioners adapt to the conditions to deliver results 
at the planning and operational levels, the planning processes could be further 
improved by an additional process of regionalisation that divides regions for each 
individual federal entity. Nevertheless, such regionalisation could also mean less 
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economic resources per entity, which would restrict further operational capacities 
and human resources of each region (SA, Oaxaca, July 31st, 2010). 
 
The lack of economic and human resources was also identified as an obstacle to 
protected areas management by conservation practitioners (CC, GJ, EA, AV, JJ, 
SCLC, September 30th, 2014). This constrain is a common inhibiting factor in 
conservation; however, not all of its effects are negative since limited economic 
and human resources have enhanced a certain degree of power devolution to 
other non-state actors for protected areas management. At CONANP’s Southern 
Isthmus region, budget and human constrains have promoted the establishment 
of arrangements among different governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to fulfil planning, funding and operational gaps. In terms of 
planning, the constitution of advisory boards is one of the strategies that directors 
of protected areas apply according to the local context and different actor’s 
disposition. Representatives of federal and local governments; representatives of 
ejidos, communities; landowners, academic institutions, NGOs and any other 
stakeholder can constitute the advisory board of a protected area. Advisory 
boards can provide useful insights related to the immediate context and can cover 
multiple subjects, from ecological research to social conflicts, inform the definition 
of priorities and lines of action in protected areas. Furthermore, since protected 
areas are inserted in wider landscapes and indirectly subject to regional 
development policies, there is a need to establish more formal links promoting 
coordination with other agencies to add efforts and to prevent actions with 
opposite objectives.  Despite their relevance, the establishment of advisory boards 
is subject to the disposition of the different stakeholders and to the abilities of the 
authorities of each particular area to chair them, since the implementation and 
legal responsibilities of the decisions achieved are CONANP’s.  
 
In theory, government agencies have institutional links to coordinate with one 
another and support the achievement of their objectives. In practice, the 
multiplicity of actors and the lack of institutional frameworks for information 
exchange and coordination make it difficult to ensure coherence and consistency 
in inter-institutional actions. At national level, CONANP has structural links with 
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environmentally related agencies, namely: SEMARNAT, CONAFOR (National 
Forestry Commission), CONAGUA (Water National Commission) and CONABIO 
(National Commission for the Knowledge of Biodiversity). As it has been 
mentioned, for operation purposes CONANP relies on CONAFOR and the resources 
assigned to important forested areas through PES. CONAFOR is another 
decentralised body from SEMARNAT and its objective is to develop, enhance and 
promote productive, conservation and restoration activities, as well as to 
participate in the planning, programmes and policy implementation for 
sustainable development within the forestry sector (CONAFOR 2014). Amongst its 
competences, CONAFOR is in charge of the evaluation and assignation of PES to 
areas that are of strategic importance in terms of water capture and biodiversity.  
The agency has its central offices in Guadalajara Mexico, and there are offices in 
each state of the country. According to the director of production in CONAFOR in 
Oaxaca at the time of fieldwork, many of the decisions about the allocation of PES 
were decided through remote sensing techniques in Guadalajara. Hence, while the 
agency was decentralised, decision-making remained centralised (AS, Oaxaca, July 
31st, 2010).  
Also, as the agency in charge of management of protected areas, CONANP is 
connected at the national level to SAGARPA (Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery 
Secretary), SEDESOL (Social Development Secretary), PROFEPA (Federal Agency 
for Environmental Protection) CDI (Indigenous Development Commission), as 
well as the Tourism, Defence, Fishing and Marine Secretaries. At the regional level, 
CONANP should coordinate with state and municipal governments as well as their 
respective agencies and agendas. Nevertheless, one of the main obstacles for the 
operation of protected areas in the region is the lack of coherence and 
coordination between different government levels and their respective agencies, 
objectives and actions. Thus, even though national level agencies have agreements 
to keep coherence, this does not reflect on the regional, state and local levels. As 
the statement of the director of two National Parks in Chiapas describes below, 
while CONANP is promoting sustainable land use practices in settlements located 
within protected areas, other agencies either regional or national often operate 
with contrasting objectives:  
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“...while we are trying to [promote] environmental awareness, people 
don’t come to my meeting because [at the same time] the Agriculture 
Secretary is distributing agrochemical products… we need to work a lot 
at the inter-institutional level”(GE, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 7th, 2011). 
Hence, planning and applying transversal processes remain subject to personal 
assets and disposition of civil servants, reducing consistency and certainty in 
protected areas management. Processes of negotiation and coordination defining 
lines of action between agencies largely depend on personal relationships and 
links rather than constituting a basic practice within different institutions.  The 
results are often that development and agriculture agencies or local governments 
promote practices that directly oppose the aims and objectives of environmental 
agencies. 
In Chiapas, the state government since the late 1980s has enhanced “sustainable 
development” practices without coordinating with CONANP’s protected areas 
directors. Between 2006 and 2012, for example, Chiapas’ government through the 
agriculture agency promoted the cultivation of up to 45 thousand hectares of palm 
oil and 10 thousand of Jatropha through the distribution amongst small 
landowners and ejido members of packages of plants, fertilizers and pesticides 
(Garcia-Aguirre 2011). It also established a deficient production chain with some 
processing plants for biodiesel production. The distribution of such packages was 
portrayed by the state government as sustainable development and was taken to 
lowland populations of the state, including those inside the Biosphere Reserves of 
La Encrucijada, Lacantun, Montes Azules and El Triunfo; the Natural monuments 
Bonampak and Yaxchilan; the National Park of Palenque, and the Areas for Flora 
and Fauna Protection of Chan Kin, Naha and Metzabok (Garcia-Aguirre 2011). 
These cultivations have been promoted without the previous authorisation of the 
protected areas authorities. Consequently, institutional agreements are being 
developed in the region in search for coherence in different agencies’ work 
crossing different organisational levels and administrative stages. However, the 
continuity of those coordination efforts is subject to political periods and has to be 
built from scratch every time a new government arrives to power, every six years 
for state governments and every three years for municipal ones. 
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As alternative examples, El Triunfo and La Sepultura Biosphere Reserves are also 
under constant threat from the agreements and commitments the state and 
municipal governments have made without considering the land use restrictions 
that protected areas imply (CC, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010; VA, Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010). Due to the intricate topography of the land, many of 
the communities and settlements are located in remote areas with precarious 
roads. If this scattered distribution has enhanced low population densities and the 
conservation of important ecosystems, it has done so at the expense of the 
marginalisation of the inhabitants of those lands, who lack of infrastructure such 
as pavement roads and health services. The roads are also needed for transport of 
local products such as coffee. These needs are used for election purposes every 
electoral campaign, where candidates invariably promise roads and highways to 
voters as if these were synonym of “progress”. Consequently, both Biosphere 
Reserve authorities are constantly lobbying with municipal presidents, deputies 
and senators to inform them about the restrictions and, currently, developing 
studies to propose the design of a network of roads with the least ecological 
damage to the reserve. Despite of these initiatives, all is subject to political 
agreements and will. But perhaps more alarming is the latest threat to the reserve. 
There are nine mining prospections authorised inside El Triunfo Biosphere 
Reserve. Under such authorisations, four companies are already carrying out 
extractive activities (Gonzalez 2012). These actions that are diametrically 
opposite to the purposes of the reserve have been authorised by SEMARNAT 
despite the explicit opposition of the protected area’s authorities and numerous 
groups of the civil society, raising serious concerns about corruption.  
Thus, institutional structures require further development for coordination and 
consistency between the efforts and actions for conservation by CONANP and 
other agencies. Agencies like SAGARPA and SEDESOL are often promoting actions 
incompatible with sustainable lands management; moreover, they do so with 
more budget and infrastructure capacities than the environmental agencies. 
Accountability and transparency in the decision-making processes are also an 
urgent need, but a difficult task for a state in a country that ranks 105 amongst 





5.2 Funding restrictions and alliances for protected areas 
management 
Another relevant aspect when defining priorities and strategies for protected 
areas management relates to funding. In the Southern Isthmus region, funding 
available for protected areas operation is sourced from both, the federal fiscal 
budget distributed from the national offices to the regional level of CONANP and, 
increasingly, from international funding channelled through NGOs. According to a 
Financial Gap Analysis carried out by Bezaury-Creel et al. (2011), CONANP’s main 
economic source are fiscal funds (the budget for 2011 was equivalent to £ 67 
million nationally) with an increasingly important source of external fiscal funds 
from CONAFOR through Payments for Environmental Services in protected areas 
(£3.7 million annually approximately). The budget assigned by the federal 
government for protected areas is not enough to cover their operational needs. 
Bezaury-Creel et al. (2011) calculated that funding for protected areas 
management requires an increase of 287% in the next eight years to fulfil 
operational needs. In functional terms, practitioners acknowledge that the 
differences in management of protected areas are not due to their different 
categories as much as to the budget available for their operation, as the following 
statement from the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve director points out: 
 
 … “basically, the programs are the same, the difference is that not all 
(reserves) have budget… we are always in deficit. Thus, we cannot give 
the attention we would like to, but we try to mix resources and to 
coordinate between protected areas to give a good attention” (CC, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010).  
 
In El Triunfo Biosphere Reserve (119,177 ha), La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve, La 
Encrucijada Biosphere Reserve and El Ocote Biosphere Reserve, the budget for 
operation has been reduced since 2000, according to informants(CC; VA; RE; ER; 
SCLC, September 30th, 2010), . For example, in El Triunfo in 2000 the operational 
team had $1.1 million pesos (~£53,298 GBP) for operational expenses, while the 
budget for operation for 2009 and 2010 were $300, 000 (~£14,533 GBP) pesos 
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each year. The economic constraints not only create uncertainty in the planning 
process but also make the agency dependent on external projects for continued 
implementation. The subsidy programs are additional to the funding allocated to 
each protected area every year. Protected areas heavily rely on three subsidies for 
operation, namely:  
 
(1) Program for Conservation through Development (PROCODES), 
designed to support the operational needs of natural protected areas 
and priority areas for conservation through funding for activities and 
projects that support the achievement of their objectives, e. g. 
ecotourism and sustainable fish production projects.   
(2) Temporary Employment Program (PET) that provides sources of job in 
rural areas source of income when demand of unqualified workforce is 
lower in districts classified as extremely poor. CONANP applies it to 
fund fire prevention activities and cleaning of rivers for example. 
(3) Conservation Program for Native Corn (PROMAC), created to support 
the cultivation of native varieties of corn through traditional means 
within protected areas.  
 
Although useful, these programs do not come with extra funding for their 
implementation, causing extra effort to execute them within administrative 
regulations and with limited personnel. Furthermore, there are not specific funds 
for protected areas management itself such as monitoring and research, 
increasing the need for coordination with NGOs and academic institutions to 
achieve these objectives. 
 
The funding restrictions have led CONANP to establish collaboration and funding 
agreements at different levels: national, state-wide and locally. These agreements 
can include government institutional partners: CONAFOR; the Tourism Secretary; 
SEDESOL; SAGARPA, and the Indigenous Development Commission; as well as 
international funding agencies such as UNDP, GEF, and international development 
agencies from countries like Spain, U.S.A., Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom (Bezaury-Creel et al. 2011).  National and international NGO’s such as 
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Fondo Mexicano para la Conservacion, Pronatura A.C., World Wildlife Fund, 
Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy also have important 
funding and implementation roles in the Southern Isthmus protected areas. 
Likewise, the private sector is increasingly involved in funding CONANP as 
external sources of funding are essential for the operation of protected areas in 
Mexico. Even though the real figures of funding arriving to the country for 
conservation are difficult to calculate accurately, an average of £5.2 million are 
invested every year by external sources for protected areas operation in Mexico 
(Bezaury-Creel et al. 2011). For the governance of large protected areas, where 
human productive processes mix with conservation objectives, the investment of 
the private and non-governmental sectors has become essential at planning, 
implementation and evaluation stages.  
The cases of the Biosphere Reserves of Montes Azules and El Triunfo illustrate 
these interactions, where local and international NGOs coordinated with CONANP 
define the strategies to achieve the protected area’s objectives. Decision-making, 
funding and implementation of management activities within Montes Azules and 
El Triunfo are supported by a group of Academics, NGOs and private funders. 
Advisory boards are co-chaired by the protected area director to plan and 
coordinate fund-raising and implementation for management activities that would 
not be possible to develop with state funds only. Thus, the diversification of 
sources of funds, human and technical capacities has enhanced power devolution 
for the protected area’s management. It also enhances innovation and adaptation; 
such is the case of the interaction between ecotourism and organic coffee 
production and the operation of both Biosphere Reserves. Conservation in the 
rainforest relies heavily on ecotourism, while high altitude regions of El Triunfo 
are related to organic coffee production. In order to face the uncertainty of the 
markets, service providers and producers in the region have assembled in 
cooperatives. With the help of NGOs, these cooperatives have improved their 
services, infrastructure and practices to achieve good practices’ certifications and 
to get better prices for their services and products. These processes have not only 
facilitated capacity building, certifications and better income, but also have 
enhanced organisation and implementation of activities compatible with 
conservation of the ecosystems present in both reserves reserve (Tejeda-Cruz and 
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Sutherland 2003). Even though authorities acknowledge that decision-making is 
now more complex and requires more conciliation and coordination amongst 
multiple level stakeholders, authorities also feel supported by a network to 
achieve conservation. These are two examples of how important multiple-scale 




5.3 Multi-scale coordination for implementation  
Besides the shortage of economic and human resources to operate protected 
areas, the legal competences of CONANP also limit the possible lines of action, 
making inter-institutional coordination a necessity. Even though CONANP would 
seem to be the leading actor within protected areas for decision-making and 
planning, its competences and capacities are rather restricted, while extra 
responsibilities are not clearly defined. Notwithstanding that CONANP is in charge 
of the management of protected areas, the regulation powers of the agency are 
uneven. For instance, it cannot regulate the speed limit within protected areas, as 
this falls under the jurisdiction of the Communications and Transport Secretary. 
Hence, even when vehicles exceed speed limits and transit regulations within 
protected areas, often resulting in harm to fauna or even to local inhabitants, 
CONANP as institution and managers of protected areas are not entitled to act (CC, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 9th, 2010).  The same applies for the example mentioned 
above about the mining concessions since the regulatory powers of CONANP cover 
only the land use but do not apply to the mineral deposits under the soil, unless 
their management plan specifies it, which is rare. Furthermore, even when an 
event falls into the competence of CONANP, such as the projects of highways or 
illegal traffic of flora and fauna, the outcomes largely depend on other agencies’ 
capacities to respond. This situation creates not only a constant uncertainty but 
also a sense of powerlessness for protected area managers (VA, SCLC, September 
30th, 2010). The latter became evident during the course of environment defence, 
when a Biosphere Reserve’s director mentioned the concerns that managers need 




“…at the end of the day, you can’t do enough... the needs are so many that 
members of the team and I do not have enough energy to think about the 
strategic or what is important, such as the relationships between coffee 
producers within the reserve, or if the recently elected municipal 
president wants to build a highway in the middle of the area and so on”… 
(CC, SCLC, September 30th, 2010).  
Under such circumstances, the need to get other government agencies more 
actively involved and coordinated in planning and implementation of 
conservation processes becomes critical. To face legal, economic and capacity 
limitations and to accomplish organisational objectives, particular protected area 
directors are entitled to adapt the programs according to the social and 
environmental local contexts. Every region has particular social-ecological 
characteristics that add to the experience of the personnel working there, defining 
their strategies for policy implementation. For instance, CONANP’s institutional 
presence in Chiapas and Oaxaca is limited not only by institutional capacities but 
also by the difficulty in accessing communities situated in geographically remote 
areas. Thus, operational teams of large protected areas such as Biosphere 
Reserves can be divided into smaller sections, to reach more isolated communities 
and to deliver projects more effectively.  This is not to say that the human and 
institutional capacities are not exceeded by the needs, but it points out the 
freedoms granted to those individuals in charge of implementing conservation 
strategies. Such freedom has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand it 
enhances adaptability of the operational teams to local contexts, increasing the 
reach of the state through protected areas (Durand et al. 2014). On the other, 
coordination and appropriation of the objectives amongst operational teams 
becomes more difficult to the point that, in some cases, different regions of a 
single reserve can behave as different reserves as a whole.  
Practical collaborative efforts are established at the local-regional level through 
social more than institutional networks. According to practitioners, 
communication links amongst government agencies has slowly developed 
although they are not institutionalized yet. The implementation of advisory 
boards and the availability of external sources of funding depend on variable 
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conditions such as the delivery style of protected area directors and the charisma 
of the ecosystems and species represented by the area. Advisory boards can be 
adapted to the needs, availability and possibilities of local stakeholders but in 
practice, not all protected areas have operational committees and if they do, their 
consistency is not secured due to constraints in resources and availability. Thus, 
the projects to achieve management objectives in protected areas are 
implemented on an opportunity basis, depending on the external sources of 
funding available, the agenda of those sources and the ability of directors to 
orchestrate them with the protected area’s needs. The challenges and 
responsibilities faced by protected area’s directors require multiple technical and 
political skills to complement different actors’ capacities with conservation 
objectives, as the following statement by one operational member of the region 
emphasized: 
 
“[Conservation] activities are often done through opportunity [and these 
opportunities] emerge from political trends… These trends still drive 
many [processes] in the Mexican conservation politics. So, we [civil 
servants] catch the directions and search for the opportunities because 
they are our means to operate… even if we have our management plan, 
without [these opportunities] we would not have the resources to 
implement them”. (JJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010) 
Notwithstanding the current problems and limitations, the institutional continuity 
of CONANP at the Southern Isthmus region has allowed the development of 
learning processes that some of the local staff regard as their most powerful tool. 
However, there is still much left to improve in order to respond to current 
conservation and social needs in the region. Thus the protected areas’ network in 
the Southern Isthmus region represents an outstanding living laboratory where 
different approaches for ecosystem management and protected areas governance 
are constantly challenged. According to some of the interviewees, conservation in 
Chiapas has been and continues to be a slow process where the use of subsidies 
has worked to strengthen state paternalism instead of promoting local 
appropriation of the management activities and sustainable practices (HA, Tuxtla 
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Gutierrez, June 11th, 2009; GM, SCLC, December 16th, 2010; RJ, Lacanja, September 
10th, 2010; HJ, Palenque, June 16th, 2009). Hence, most of the management 
activities at the federal protected areas level are related to solving or managing 
conflicts with people living within or around them, rather than managing 
ecosystems (NS, Lacanja, September 10th, 2010).  
 Furthermore, participation models imply a transformation of top-down 
bureaucratic systems (Cooke and Kothari 2001) that is not perceived in Mexico’s 
case. Even though nowadays there are spaces for local representatives to have an 
input in planning and management, these remain limited by asymmetric power 
structures (Adams and Hutton 2007; Adger et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006; Rhodes 
1997). Local representatives are expected to defend their stakes in front of boards 
that bring together academics, NGOs and state agents with different discursive, 
inclusive and negotiation capacities. Thus, up to date, protected areas authorities 
are still the main actors in the operation of advisory boards while local 
communities remain supporting operation through paid work and government 
subsidy programmes (GM, SCLC, December 16th, 2010). Consequently, active and 
informed participation from local communities for decision-making and 
implementation of protected areas remains limited to a political discourse that 
lacks of the social and technical infrastructures to become a common practice. The 
path to reverse decades of reinforcement of paternalistic policies and top-down 
designed projects is still underdeveloped. At the operation level of CONANP, the 
institution needs to be flexible and responsive, while processes and reforms are 
increasingly slower as the level on the institutional ladder ascends. Furthermore, 
with responsibilities unclear, the workload and gaps different operational teams 
are required to fulfil increases. According to the situation, the resources and staff 
available, protected area operational team members may have to act as facilitators 
of processes that require them to become tourism promoters, workshop 
facilitators for community enterprises, technical advisors for sustainable 
agriculture techniques, as well as delivering subsidies available in protected areas, 
verify activities and elaborate reports. The workload only increases with the lack 
of mechanisms and clear procedures to facilitate the active participation of 
different stakeholders and coordination amongst them for protected areas 
governance. Hence, although in-situ conditions often require managers and 
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technicians to be in continuous adaptation, training and flexibility, management 
needs and bureaucratic structures increase the risk for conservation practitioners 
to fall into the mechanical repetition of procedures and rigid application of 
operation rules with little attention to contextual needs.  
This is the gap that the emergence of participatory conservation in the form of 
Voluntary Conserved Areas is meant to fulfil. Due to institutional promotion and 
to the economic incentives they represent, certification has become very popular, 
especially in Oaxaca (Martin et al. 2011). Yet, for the practitioners, the reality on 
the ground differs from the success that CONANP displays publicly (GJ, Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). According to interviews with some operative 
members at CONANP, providing support to particular and smaller areas on the top 
of giving attention to other federal protected areas exceeds the institutional 
capacities by far, as one member of CONANP’s staff acknowledged: 
 “It is easier to establish a [state managed] protected area ... than 
generating self-management processes… you require leaders… it takes 
longer and is more difficult” (GJ, Tuxtla Gutierrez, August 4th, 2010). 
Once more, the efforts of individuals within CONANP as institution, to make 
conservation a more participatory process, have not permeated to the 
organisational structure. Thus, the performance of participatory conservation 
processes depends on specific actors and their negotiation skills to validate the 
processes rather than on established institutional frameworks enhancing local 
deliberation and capacities (Walker et al. 2007). 
 
5.4 Community governance and conservation in the Southern 
Isthmus region 
Indigenous communities often acknowledge how integral forests are for their 
general wellbeing. Yet, protected area implementation have long neglected local 
knowledge, value and management systems (Brockington and Igoe 2006; 
Brockington et al. 2008: 93; Colchester 2004; Dowie 2005; Duffy 2005; Fairhead 
and Leach 1996; Pimbert and Pretty 1995; Pujadas and Castillo 2007; West et al. 
2006). Indigenous people, however, have diverse sources of knowledge and 
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complex relationships based on reciprocity and cooperation, which can benefit 
decision-making for natural resource management (Mitchell 2006). Even though 
they are not the norm, the Isthmus South region of Mexico also has some 
outstanding examples of capacity building, community empowerment and 
conservation processes (Merino-Perez 2001), such is the case of the communities 
located in the Sierra Norte (Mitchell 2006) and Sierra Juarez (Bray et al. 2003) 
regions of Oaxaca. These regions provide numerous examples of arrangements for 
common-pool resources use, different networking strategies and, consequently, 
diverse social and conservation outcomes. Since the legal reforms officially 
recognised VCAs and different economic incentives (e.g. Payments for 
Environmental Services) have been implemented, new scales and cross-scale 
relationships have been added to those previously local arrangements. The 
outcomes of this shift are diverse and illustrate the constant challenge of fitting 
institutional and social scales with ecological systems for natural resource 
management and conservation (Wyborn and Bixler 2013). 
As a product of the Mexican Revolution, indigenous communities in Oaxaca were 
entitled their ancestral lands. However, each community has struggled in its own 
way at different stages to gain and maintain control over their lands and access to 
natural resources (Bray et al. 2003; Merino-Perez 2001; Haenn et al. 2014). In the 
Sierra Norte and the Sierra Juarez regions, grassroots movements to claim local 
control over natural resources are considered a leading example throughout 
Mexico (Bray et al. 2003; Mitchell 2006). In these regions, community structures 
for natural resource management have developed through struggles with public 
and private companies for timber exploitation operating within communal lands 
in the early 20th Century. Those companies operated through concessions that 
gave little if any retribution to the legitimate owners of the forests (Bray et al. 
2003), allowed by a largely absent government regulation for forest resources use. 
Forest resources use, then, fall into the responsibilities of the local communal 
committees. Eventually, communities claimed back the right to access to their own 
forests, enhancing the development of community forest enterprises. Local 
communities in these regions have developed strong structures for organisation, 
decision-making and enforcement through similar struggles to get access to 
ancestral lands and to the right to make profit out of the natural resources. 
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Simultaneously, the government’s absence enhanced independence and local 
autonomy, leaving the main-decision making to local and traditional structures 
(Mitchell 2006). Such empowerment processes have been central to develop the 
community cohesion and organisation for natural resources use and protection 
for which communities in the Sierra Juarez and Sierra Norte are known.  
In her paper, Mitchell (2006) explores two contrasting cases in the Sierra Juarez, 
where one community (Ixtepec) successfully developed a community forestry 
enterprise (CFE), by establishing strong structures for forest management and by 
making alliances with government institutions and international agencies for 
forestry certification. In this CFE, managerial positions are held as voluntary 
positions and while for some people these positions are a real commitment with 
one’s community, they are a heavy burden for others, with long working hours 
and no remuneration. Despite these contrasting views, there is a sense of local 
pride and cohesion in holding responsibility of the community enterprise and 
perform well in the position. Additionally to these local arrangements based on 
customs, Ixtepec has also allied to government and international agencies to fund 
their operation, provide technical support and get certifications for sustainable 
production. Such multi-scale arrangements, with local structures as the basis, have 
allowed Ixtepec to be a successful example of common natural resource 
management. On the other hand, another community (Yavesia) preferred to 
preserve their forests from commercial exploitation and refused to develop links 
with external agencies. However, surrounding communities did not agree with 
Yavesia and, based on inter-community arrangements, neighbouring communities 
started making use of Yavesia forests and conflicts emerged. Through this 
example, Mitchell (2006) argues that conflicts tend to arise where social bonds are 
weak and there is no definition of responsibilities and instruments for resources 
management. Research points also concerns regarding corruption, gender 
equality and the quality of deliberation in communal natural resource 
management (Bray et al. 2003; Klooster 1999; Merino-Perez 2001; Mitchell 2006).  
Hence, community governance is the basis for multi-scale governance, but 
community decision-making and cooperation are not exempt from conflict, 
corruption and poor management practices. The diversity of governance 
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structures for forestry enterprises, and consequently for Voluntary Conserved 
Areas, represents a wide range of capacities for leadership, debating, decision-
making and transparent implementation that result in different managerial 
weaknesses and strengths (Mitchell 2006). Sierra Norte and Sierra Juarez along 
with many other localities in Oaxaca are examples of how complex contexts have 
given place to a diversity of community management arrangements that have 
conserved their forests and generated income to local people (Robson 2007). In 
these regions, empowerment processes have led to local governance structures to 
positive social as environmental outcomes that have also influenced other 
processes in the country and are currently considered as a living laboratory where 
community resources management, economically viability, social justice, 
environmental sustainability and multi-scale governance can be evaluated (Martin 
et al. 2011). As multi-scalar governance arrangements emerge, communal 
structures have been progressively linked to new institutional structures, 
negotiation arenas and regulations. Multi-scale conflicts also emerge. On the one 
hand these new arrangements provide communities of new resources for conflict 
resolution and development of negotiation skills in the policy arena (Li 1996), as 
well as access to alternatives for income and capacity building through training 
and experience exchanges. However, on the other hand, multi-scale governance 
arrangements also enhance communal structures to be increasingly subject to 
policy simplifications as well as external market and political constructions of 
what community conservation is (Li 1996) that challenge and homogenize 
previously autonomous and complex arrangements (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2004; Li 1996). Furthermore, multi-scale governance arrangements require of 
trust, social capital, co-production of rules, collective actions and enforcement at 
multiple scales that keep making difficult for local people to see the gains out of 
the costs of getting involved in such arrangements for conservation (Abrams et al. 
2003; Bray et al. 2012; Ostrom 1996; Fischer et al. 2007). 
Local participation in protected area establishment and management has made 
important steps in Mexico (Haenn et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the risk of falling into 
mechanic simplifications and overlook local heterogeneity is a constant 
(Colchester 2004; Li 1996, 2001; Mosse 2004). Furthermore, even those 
approaches portraying the participatory rhetoric seem to be replicating top-down 
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forms of conservation. In 2010, the first VCA in the country, Santiago Lachiguiri, 
expressed their will to withdraw their VCA status during the COP 16 in Cancun, 
Mexico. In interviews with international media, the communal authorities alleged 
that the process was being imposed over them and they were being forced to 
change their traditional practices in exchange of PES which were not enough to 
cover the opportunity costs of growing corn in a slash-and-burn scheme as they 
have done it throughout the history of the community (Vigna 2012). Furthermore, 
VCAs and the linked PES have been proven to have negative impacts of the food 
security of communities that, persuaded by “purist” conservation ideas, external 
regulations and NGOs, ban hunting and gathering in order to attract the economic 
incentives (Ibarra et al. 2011). As will be explored in more detail later, the limited 
information used to persuade communities to engage in the certification process, 
at least in the Southern Isthmus region, leads communities to confusion and later, 
to disappointment.  
5.5 Closing section: Institutional arrangements for protected 
areas management 
This chapter has provided an overview of the regional institutional arrangements for 
protected area management; this is the context in which the case study of this 
dissertation is framed. Park managers and staff often lack capacities, resources and legal 
faculties to carry out management and enforcement duties (Wells and McShane 2004). 
Despite their limited capacities to achieve conservation objectives (Porter-Bolland et al. 
2013), there is an explicit expansion of the powers of the state over these areas in terms 
of regulations supervision and certification under externally define standards. The latter 
is consistent with critiques that argue the expansion and building of the state through 
protected areas (Bray et al. 2012; Brockington et al. 2008; Durand et al. 2014; Scott 1998; 
Li 2005). Furthermore, the spaces for local representatives to have an input in planning 
and management are limited by asymmetric power structures (Adams and Hutton 2007; 
Adger et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006). Local representatives are expected to defend their 
stakes in front of boards that bring together academics, NGOs and state agents with 
different discursive and inclusive capacities. Decision-making for protected area 
management remain dominated by the state and funding agencies who determine 
conservation priorities, management strategies and evaluation standards. This 
participatory rhetoric, naïvely overlooks the power relations implied (Cooke and Kothari 
2001) and available spaces for local participation avoid positions that go against the 
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interest of powerful groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Operationally, despite protected 
areas have an increasingly wider range of scales; the participation spaces for local 
institutions remain limited by a classic “take it or leave it” approach (Rahnema 2010). The 
prevailing use of local participation rhetoric is seen as a means to get local support and to 
increase efficiency in protected area management (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Pimbert and 
Pretty 1995), with very few cases where participatory processes have reached the 
development of local capacities for natural resource management (Bray et al. 2003; 
Merino-Perez 2001; Mitchell 2006). Within this framework, VCAs represent an alternative 
for power devolution and enhancement of local active participation. However, the local 
capacities to hold their stakes in from of legal and institutional frameworks used to top-
down approaches are constantly challenged. 
The following section provides empirical data about the issues that emerge during the 
implementation of multi-scalar governance arrangements for conservation in the 
Southern Isthmus region of Mexico, focusing on an in-depth case study of the 
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Chapter 6. Local governance dynamics and the process 
leading to the creation of El Reten  
As it is often the case, the implementation of legal frameworks requires people in 
charge of implementation to adapt them to local contexts. In San Miguel, local 
conditions such as the physical characteristics of the land; the distribution of the 
population; interactions between settlements and communal authorities in 
charge, as well as land tenure conflicts in place have resulted in different 
strategies for community governance according to local dynamics. The formal 
governance structures for agrarian communities have been already presented in 
Section 2.2.2. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the actual local governance 
arrangements in place, the structure of the general assemblies and the communal 
statute in San Miguel. This will lead to the historical process for the establishment 
of El Reten as a VCA and the exploration of the multi-scale governance 
arrangement in place. Although municipal authorities are relevant to community 
matters, during my stay in San Miguel, there was no municipal government due to 
an alleged fraud.  Furthermore, since the establishment of a VCA is a matter 
related to land, its use and community organisation and work, the agrarian 
authority is of most relevance. Thus, this section of the dissertation will focus on 
the agrarian authorities and communal decision-making structures that were 
directly involved in the establishment and operation of El Reten. San Miguel has a 
long trajectory of interaction with external agencies which have delivered 
different capacities and discourses (Doane 2007; Russell 1996; Walker et al. 
2007). These have been appropriated by the community and shape the way local 
dynamics interact with the external agencies determining natural resource 
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management in the VCA. Third, by looking at the different processes for the 
implementation of the VCA and the role of external institutions and regulations, 
this chapter makes use of the common pool resource theory in order to examine 
the implications of institutional arrangements in place for the long-term 
sustainability of conservation efforts. The final part of this chapter explores the 
interactions between local community governance structures and external 
agencies, programs and regulations that take place in the management process of 
El Reten. Such interactions illustrate how participatory or community-led 
conservation is being implemented in the region and highlight the issues 
encountered in the process. It also explores the role of NGOs within these 
arrangements, facilitating the roles that were previously played by government 
agencies, legitimising discourses and the expansion of the state to reach to areas 
where it could not before. The data provided in the final part of this chapter 
focuses on the interactions for decision-making, benefit-sharing and scale 
dilemmas that the governance of El Reten poses to the different stakeholders 
involved. 
 
6.1 Local governance structures and dynamics in San Miguel  
In communities like San Miguel, population is scattered throughout the land and 
transportation and communication can be difficult, populations aggregate in 
smaller settlements. Each settlement that is part of San Miguel has representatives 
of both authorities and holds its own local assemblies for immediate and local 
needs. Auxiliary secretaries of the communal committee and municipal agents are 
those individuals from each settlement that are elected by the local assemblies to 
work as the link between the local assembly of each settlement and the communal 
committee and municipal authorities respectively.  Local assemblies meet every 
month or more often if required by the needs of the settlement. Communal and 
auxiliary authorities in each settlement are voluntary and unpaid positions, being 
regarded as a service to the community that each comunero has to develop as part 
of the tequio (work that community members contribute in the name of 
community’s benefit). These unpaid positions tend to be perceived as a burden 
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but also as an opportunity to serve the community and, at times, also as a source 
of pride for community members. 
In San Miguel, the population is scattered in 17 settlements including the centre or 
cabecera, with communication between them limited by distance and the 
geographic characteristics of the region. Consequently, communal authorities in 
San Miguel tend to be from the settlements in the centre of the community, which 
means that non-central settlements are not normally represented in the 
communal committee. Because of the periods and amount of energy required to 
call for a general assembly, the seventeen auxiliary secretaries are called to 
smaller assemblies (every two or three months), so communal authorities can 
inform them about relevant issues and to keep a regular communication between 
the local assemblies and the communal committee. Hence, each auxiliary secretary 
of the communal committee elaborates the reports from the local assemblies and 
delivers them during the auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies where s/he informs the 
communal committee about the agreements reached by the local assembly. Then, 
the communal committee sends feedback through the auxiliary, and secretaries 
who report back in the following local assembly. At the local level, different 
settlements have different structures of organization and hence, the size and 
frequency of their assemblies as well as the strength of their agreements differ 
greatly in the overall community.  
The general assembly, on the other hand, is a bigger event, where all entitled 
community members congregate at the centre and interact with each other 
discussing and striving for major decisions in the community. General assemblies 
are spaces of great value for sharing information and coordinating action amongst 
community members as well as important spaces for decision-making regarding 
natural resource management (Gutierrez-Montes 2005). According to 
extensionists working in San Miguel, general assemblies of the Chimalapas region 
are known for their strength and mobilisation powers (MJ, Oaxaca, July 22nd, 
2010). These assemblies were one of the main bases for successful resistance to 
the imposition of the Biosphere Reserve and other development projects that have 
been explained before (GM, SCLC, December 16th, 2010). However, general 
assemblies are a delicate matter as well since accumulated personal and political 
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tensions make discussions to go round in circles, can prompt violence and have 
usually little achievements in decision-making as stated by an extensionist with 
long experience in the region: 
[San Miguel’s] “assembly is bloody… The management of the general 
assembly is difficult, you need a group of policemen… because there are 
antagonistic groups not only due to the land conflicts but [also]… 
resentments between political parties” (Skype conversation MJ, May, 6th, 
2012). 
Moreover, due to the large amount of comuneros, achieving a consensus and 
agreement over controversial issues in a general assembly can be an endless job 
(PR, Zanatepec, July 7th, 2010). These are some of the reasons why a general 
assembly has not been called in San Miguel on a regular basis since at least 2005, 
according to local informants (RA, San Miguel, November 30th, 2010). The 
auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies have substituted general assemblies; this change 
enhances local concern about the legitimacy of the decision-making processes as 
well as the transparency and accountability of communal authorities (SB, San 
Miguel, December 11th, 2010).   
The opposition to decisions taken merely by auxiliary secretaries is particularly 
acute among members of the assemblies from San Antonio and Benito Juarez 
along with La Cristalina and Sol y Luna, which have worked together to fight land 
invasions and lack of institutional presence in the eastern region of San Miguel. 
Despite the existence of inter-settlement differences, conflicts and competition, 
San Antonio and Benito Juarez constitute a local alliance to face the ejidos from 
Chiapas located within the eastern border of the communal lands. This is also the 
case for the management of El Reten, where these settlements continue to 
assemble together to negotiate with external agencies and communal authorities. 
Informants from the eastern settlements argue that the refusal of communal 
authorities to call for a general assembly aims to limit the participation and 
resistance of community members, diminishing the legitimacy of the agreements 
achieved (SC, San Miguel, December 10th, 2010). These issues are raised during 
local and auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies where members claim for a general 
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assembly. Nevertheless, according to an external agency’s extensionist, general 
assemblies are only called for the election of the communal committee, every 
three years, and they are so contentious that authorities are afraid of calling them 
(OD, Oaxaca, February 26th, 2011).  
Political parties divide the community and, consequently, both local authorities’ 
elections, communal and municipal. Even though in principle, customary 
institutions should be free of the influence of political parties, these play an 
important role in the definition of the communal authority. Hence, the 
relationship of the authorities with the different settlements varies according to 
their respective political inclinations. The internal divisions due to political parties 
create a delicate situation in San Miguel, only increased by land tenure conflicts. At 
the time of the development of this research, the two dominant political parties, 
PRI and PRD8, were struggling to get the municipal power. San Miguel is one of the 
biggest municipalities in the country and its marginalisation score makes the 
municipality eligible for multiple economic resources and infrastructure projects, 
which are managed by the municipal authorities. Hence, the stakes are high and, 
according to numerous members of the community, the PRI coerced people for 
their vote in order to win the elections. Consequently, community members, 
dissatisfied with the election procedures and results, occupied the municipal 
house asking for the state electoral authority to guarantee a transparent process, 
to nullify the elections and to carry them out again. This process lasted for over a 
year, until the state electoral authority called for new elections.  Meanwhile, the 
municipal authority was headless and there was no involvement of the municipal 
authority in the land tenure conflict, neither in the implementation of El Reten and 
the programmes arriving through it.  
Community institutions are struggling to keep up social transformation in San 
Miguel. On the one hand, political divisions have had their toll on local trust. On 
the other, subsidies and population growth challenge traditional forms of 
organisation (CyC, San Miguel, November 3rd, 2010). According to local 
informants, since the arrival of subsidies and development projects from the 
government, communal work or tequio has slowly faded in central parts of San 
                                                          
8 Acronym for the Institutional Revolution Party and Democratic Revolution Party, respectively. 
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Miguel, and people expect an economic retribution for every work done 
regardless of the common good. Additionally, population growth and dispersal 
make enforcement of the communal statute difficult (CA, San Miguel, November 
3rd, 2010). Throughout the community there have been many incidences of rule-
breaking in relation to local agreements regarding illegal logging, land invasion, 
leasing of lands for cattle ranching, excessive hunting and illegal trafficking of 
fauna. These elements of the local context have carved the way local people 
organize themselves, the way they prioritise their needs, their perceptions and 
use of their environment. These dynamics and conflicts have taken their toll on 
community cohesion and have defined the interactions between the different 
settlements and communal authorities San Miguel as well as the interactions of 
the community with external agencies (GM2, San Miguel, December 8th, 2010).  
However, according to local accounts, in the case of the settlements located in the 
eastern region, where El Reten is located, land tenure conflicts have also 
promoted community cohesion and organization through inhabitants shared 
resistance (GM2, San Miguel, December 8th, 2010). Community members and 
extensionists working in the region acknowledge the strength in the local 
assemblies of the eastern region (SB, SC, DC, MJ, PR). However, trust relationships 
with the communal authorities of San Miguel and external agencies tend to be 
rather unstable (Doane 2007; Gutierrez-Montes 2005; Walker et al. 2007). As a 
result, there are many sources for political and social tensions and suspicion in the 
eastern region. This became evident when I arrived to one of the settlements and 
after a couple of visits to a household, a man told me:  
“We, as a community, investigate the institutions and people that 
arrive… we need to see if you can be trusted” (SB, San Miguel, November 
25th, 2010).  
Therefore, although the settlements San Antonio and Benito Juarez are influenced 
by the dynamics in San Miguel, local struggles and distance from the centre 
enhances a certain degree of autonomy. Also, since members from Benito Juarez 
tend to vote for the PRD and communal authorities are mostly from the PRI, 
attention from the communal authorities to this settlement has been minimal, 
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according to local accounts (SC, MA, DS, San Miguel, November 23rd, 2010). This 
way, distance and lack of institutional presence have meant that, in contrast to the 
central areas of San Miguel, many of the customary institutions are kept in the 
eastern region, such as the local assemblies and the tequio. These settlements and 
their local assemblies have been determinant in the formal recognition of El 
Reten, and remain the strongest link to its implementation.  
The governance of one of the biggest municipalities in the country with a 
scattered population poses a problem of scale. As has been described, distances 
and deficient communication links make deliberation and decision-making an 
inefficient process in terms of the amount of time and energy required to achieve 
consensus.  In response, local assemblies have developed to provide immediate 
responses to local needs, but still are subject to a centralised and mostly absent 
authority. This increases tension between the communal authorities, which tend 
to focus mainly in the centre of the community, and the different settlements, 
which tend to feel neglected. Another issue related to scale is that of boundaries, 
since the land tenure conflict increases the difficulties implied to rule over such a 
large area. The amount of external agencies as well as the economic and political 
interests involved in this inter-state conflict erases the possibilities to clearly 
distribute rights and responsibilities over the land and the natural resources 
within it. Consequently, there are little incentives for compliance and enforcement 
of the communal agreements. The dysfunctional general assembly and the 
establishment of the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly further enhance this lack of 
rule of law. An even though, current arrangements for decision-making reduce the 
risk of tension and violence, they do so at the expense of transparency and 
accountability between the communal authorities and community members in 
both ways. 
 
6.1.1 Local structures for natural resource management 
 
The communal statute is the document that, by law, should rule the natural 
resource management in any agrarian community. The last communal statute in 
San Miguel was published in 2000. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other 
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NGOs took an active role in defining the local Natural Resource Committee and in 
writing the communal statute, linking community priorities with wider 
conservation discourses (Walker et al. 2007). The Title six of this statute specifies 
the local regulations for use and conservation of natural resources in the 
community. Articles 89 and 90 define the conditions for use of forestry resources 
which are subject to the regulatory frameworks and previous permission by 
SEMARNAT and the general assembly. Article 95 established that the use of timber 
and non-timber products should be done according to the Forestry Law without 
further specification. Articles 96-97 define the conditions on which fire for 
agriculture should be practiced, while Articles 100-101 state that all community 
members should participate in reforestation activities every year and each 
comunero should plant two trees for every tree he uses. The statute mentions the 
existence of an Environmental Committee that would be in charge of protecting 
species and resources (Art. 105). Hunting pregnant females is forbidden but the 
species are not specified and Articles 107 required a permit for hunting but does 
not specify who is entitled to provide it. Contrastingly, Article 111 establishes that 
the use of fauna can only be done through Environmental Management Units 
(similar to synergetic farms) with permits granted by SEMARNAT. Articles 112-
114 describe the duties of the Environmental Committee, which include the 
establishment of protection brigades against illegal logging and to carry out a 
registry of the wood cut per month. Article 126 prohibits the use of explosives and 
poisons for fishing. Finally, Articles 128-131 define who is entitled to apply 
sanctions in cases of rule-breaking. 
 
The content of this document was developed amidst controversy about the 
process of elaboration and its legitimacy. According to local accounts, the statute 
was developed by external agencies and authorized by the communal authority at 
the time without consultation and without the consent of the general assembly 
(DS, MA, SC, SB, RS, San Miguel, November 23rd, 2010). As a result, the members of 
the different settlements are not aware of the content of the statute and needless 
to say, the regulations have not been implemented. Local settlements, like San 
Antonio and Benito Juarez have their own arrangements for fire control which is 
still considered tequio, while logging remains a delicate issue. The regulations for 
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natural resource management, according to Ostrom’s work lack of coordination 
amongst those involved, distribution of responsibilities and building trust, as well 
as clear means for enforcement and sanctioning (Ostrom 2002). 
 
 
6.2 The process leading to the establishment of El Reten 
Located in the heart of the Isthmus of Mexico, connecting Central South America 
to central Mexico, Chimalapas is of strategic importance in terms of natural 
resources and economy (Pacheco-Sanchez 2006). The last three decades of history 
in San Miguel have seen the evolution of the relationship of local institutions with 
conservation-related agencies; this process portrays the enduring local struggle 
for land and local sovereignty (Walker et al. 2007).  The Chimalapas region is 
widely known for the ferocity of its land and resource conflicts, and this is related 
both to its complex history of settlement and to its location on the (ill-defined) 
boundary between the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. Land conflicts are the 
overriding concern of the inhabitants of the region and have a deep influence on 
every aspect of their life, and therefore they are described in some detail here. 
Although there is archaeological evidence of human presence in the eastern region 
of San Miguel since pre-Hispanic times, population densities were very low until 
1947, when a group of logging companies were established in the area after it was 
claimed by Chiapas state as federal forest lands (Doane 2007: 455). During 1950s 
the federal government, through the National Commission of Colonisation 
(Southern Region of Mexico), entitled new settlements or “colonias” in the area 
under the jurisdiction of the state of Chiapas, overlooking the Colony titles of San 
Miguel and Santa Maria Chimalapa. By 1967, the region was officially divided into 
two titled indigenous communities within the state of Oaxaca - San Miguel 
Chimalapa, the site of El Reten, and Santa Maria Chimalapa - which are also 
municipalities. At the same time as San Miguel and Santa Maria received their 
titles as indigenous communities, logging companies present in the eastern region 
of San Miguel mobilized their workers to claim the lands for themselves under the 
auspice of the agrarian reform. Three months later, the federal government gave 
formal titles to two ejidos within San Miguel’s communal lands, again under the 
jurisdiction of Chiapas. Between 1970 and 1980, the Agrarian Reform Secretary 
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(SRA) gave further titles to other private owners and ejidos as part of Chiapas in 
areas within San Miguel’s communal lands. Thus, although San Miguel is officially 
within the state of Oaxaca, five ejidos within its borders have titles as part of the 
state of Chiapas.  
 
Through the years, these overlapping titles have been the cause of numerous 
conflicts, especially regarding the access rights to forest resources. The land 
tenure uncertainty has had impacts not only in the local relations between 
inhabitants, but also in the attention that federal and State government agencies 
provide to the area. Even for PROCEDE which was the program designed to solve 
these kind of conflicts, Chimalapas remained as an area under conflict. Different 
agencies at different scales deal with the land tenure conflict and access rights 
dilemmas in often contrasting ways. The concessions for forestry use for the 
eastern settlements of San Miguel are just one example of this. Inhabitants from 
the eastern zone of San Miguel have sought permits for timber extraction from 
Oaxaca’s office of the National Secretariat for Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), but 
the permits have always been denied on the basis that they cannot be granted in 
an area where land tenure is disputed. Nonetheless, in 2005 the federal office of 
SEMARNAT provided a 12-year authorization for timber extraction in this same 
area to one of the Chiapas’ ejidos. This permit has been source of constant tension 
and numerous encounters, violent at times, between the inhabitants from San 
Miguel and the ejido Diaz Ordaz. However, it is not clear which government office 
has jurisdiction to solve the situation and define clear access rights to forest 
resources, enhancing illegal exploitation. During data collection, some comuneros 
mentioned that they prefer to use their forests illegally rather than leaving them 
to the ejidos to exploit, and thus it is not surprising that there has been a low but 
constant level of illegal logging (ES, SB, UP, San Miguel, November 23rd, 2010). The 
situation created by the lack of rule of law, clear definition of rights and 
responsibilities and trust of people enhancing overexploitation of natural 
resources. This was acknowledged by community members as well as 
conservation practitioners in the region (PR, Zanatepec, July 7th, 2010) and is 
consistent with the CPR literature on the importance of institutions and property 
rights for natural resource management (Fischer et al. 2007; McCay 1995 in 
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Berkes and Folke 1998). Property rights and access are two key aspects for 
exclusion over natural resources (Ostrom 2002; Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
 
Simultaneously, the land tenure conflict with Chiapas has and continues to define 
the way local people in the eastern zone of San Miguel organize themselves, their 
settlement patterns, the way they prioritise their needs and perceive and use their 
environment and, above all, the way they negotiate with external agencies. Many 
of the current settlements were created through the movement of households 
from the Centre of the community to peripheral areas in order to defend the land 
from specific threats. This is the case for the four communities closest to El Reten 
–Benito Juarez, San Antonio, Sol y Luna and 5 de Noviembre-, which were formed 
from 1972 onwards by landless people from the central settlements who settled 
there and successfully mobilized to displace logging companies and cattle 
ranchers. The uncertainties of tenure and the related conflicts have taken their toll 
on community cohesion and on the environment (GM2, San Miguel, December 8th, 
2010). Consequently, extensive forest areas within San Miguel have been 
destroyed, and only a few large remnants of primary vegetation remain. However, 
despite the ecological damage, these forested areas still constitute a priority for 
conservation (SC2, Juchitan August 25th 2010). Due to the land tenure structure, 
conservation NGOs and agencies in the Southern Isthmus region participation is a 
strategic need to get access to communities and territories (Walker et al. 2007).  
 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the remaining forest areas and the threats they 
faced attracted the attention of national and international conservationists, and 
several proposals have been made for the establishment of protected areas in 
Chimalapas. However, the multiple actors in the region have worked 
uncoordinated most of the times (Walker et al. 2007). In 1988, under the 
auspices of the federal agency for urban development and Ecology (SEDUE), the 
first land-use planning exercise was published, and this eventually resulted in a 
proposal for the establishment of a Biosphere Reserve. A Biosphere Reserve 
would take considerable control out of the hands of local people and therefore 
there was significant opposition. In 1990, with funding from WWF, a Socio-
Environmental Diagnostic of the Chimalapas Rainforest was undertaken by local 
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NGOs Ecological Groups Pact and Maderas del Pueblo in coordination with the 
Economic Research Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM). Through their work and economic capacities, Maderas del Pueblo a local 
NGO, became a leading actor in the region. This was due not only to its 
involvement with the communities but also to its approach, which, in contrast 
with other environmental NGOs, also conceded importance and efforts to the 
resolution of the land tenure conflict.  The role of Maderas del Pueblo has been 
analysed by Russell (1996) and Doane (2007), and for the purposes of this thesis 
it is sufficient to say that at the time Maderas del Pueblo was the main external 
institution working in place in the absence of formal government involvement. 
  
In 1991, a National Committee for the Defence of Chimalapas (NCDC), with 
Maderas del Pueblo as a main actor, was established which worked to protect 
Chimalapas both at the level of national policy (Russell 1996) and also by 
supporting local people to oppose the imposition of an increasing array of major 
development and conservation projects on their lands. These included a forestry 
project promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank; a hydroelectric dam; 
a highway from Chiapas to Veracruz, and – also perceived as a threat because of its 
implications for the loss of local control - a Biosphere Reserve. The movement 
gained political weight and brought the Chimalapas region and its problems to 
national attention, enough to stop the projects, including the Biosphere Reserve. 
With Maderas del Pueblo facilitating, a series of workshops and community 
planning processes let to a proposal for a Campesino Ecological Reserve. This 
proposal from the community and the local NGO was developed as an alternative 
to the Biosphere Reserve, and at the time it represented an innovative alternative 
to top-down conservation approaches. The Campesino Reserve would enhance 
biodiversity conservation whilst allowing local inhabitants to maintain greater 
control over their lands.   
 
In 1994, local people recovered an area called La Gringa (40,954 ha) in Santa 
Maria Chimalapa that had been invaded and set a local agreement to establish the 
Ecological Campesino Reserve on this land. The community plans for the reserve 
were delivered to the federal office of SEMARNAT, but it was rejected on the basis 
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that it was not in line with existing legal frameworks and government policy. At 
that time, LGEEPA considered legitimate protected areas only those managed by 
the government under a determined set of management classifications that did 
not include community or private conservation. After all the effort and resources 
invested, carefully described by Anaya and Alvarez (1994), the creation and 
implementation of an Ecological Campesino Reserve did not proceed due to a gap 
in the legal system in terms of a mechanism for community conservation. Hence, 
the official establishment of any kind of protected area in the region was 
postponed due to the lack of institutional frameworks for voluntary conservation 
and the local opposition to the establishment of a Biosphere Reserve. 
 
Yet again, forest conservation became an increasingly pressing issue for people in 
the Chimalapas region in 1998, when a combination of extreme drought, 
increasing slash-and-burn farming, burning of pastures to renew grasslands for 
livestock, and illegal fires started by hunters led to the biggest wildfires in recent 
regional history (Gutierrez-Montes 2005). Local people, with the assistance of 
some one thousand members of the Mexican army and Mexican and U.S. fire 
brigades, fought the fires for a month, but in spite of this some 37,806 has of forest 
were damaged in San Miguel, and one third of the entire Chimalapas region was 
affected. The fires were a milestone in local perceptions of the importance of 
forests: fighting the fires, people realized how logging and land clearance for cattle 
ranching had made the area around their settlements more vulnerable both to 
fires and to soil erosion, with worrisome implications for water supplies and 
climate change. The area that suffered the highest impact was the eastern region 
of San Miguel – the area that now includes El Reten (Anta-Fonseca and Plancarte 
2001). From that point, the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) 
strengthened its presence in the area and started to pay a certain number of 
community members in each settlement to prevent and to fight fires. This 
institutional intervention did not consider previous local arrangements that 
established those works as part of the tequio and, as will be explained later on, has 
affected local governance for forest protection.  
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By 2000, due to the political atmosphere in the region and the country, the 
funding of Maderas del Pueblo was suspended at the same time rumours emerged 
about their management of economic resources. The relationship with the 
communal authorities deteriorated up to a point where the NGO had to leave the 
community. However, local informants acknowledge that the information and 
capacities the NGO helped to develop within the community still remain (UP, San 
Miguel, October 15th, 2010). Accordingly, many of the key informants in San 
Antonio and Benito Juarez and current local leaders reported to have been 
involved with the work of Maderas del Pueblo in the region. People in Chimalapas 
are perceived by external actors as “empowered, organized, knowledgeable, and 
highly sceptical” (Walker et al. 2007: 12). The community leaders have three 
empowering experiences that accompany them to participatory spaces: the long-
term involvement and negotiation with state institutions and programs, a 
transforming legal framework fostered by the rise of indigenous politics, and 
negotiations with national and international NGOs in the region (Walker et al. 
2007). Thus, as a consequence of the constant conflicts and conservation priorities 
in the region, San Miguel authorities and the inhabitants from the eastern region 
have been involved in multiple negotiation processes through time. This general 
context has given shape to the local perceptions and attitudes towards external 
agencies. Consequently, such interactions set the local basis on which El Reten 
was formally established and determine the strategies local people and external 
agencies follow for its implementation. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of external state and non-governmental 
institutions, the process leading up to the official recognition of El Reten started 
with the establishment of communication and collaborative links between 
representatives of the Oaxacan government offices for environment, protected 
areas, and forestry (SEMARNAT, CONANP and CONAFOR respectively), together 
with more punctual participation of a group of NGOs led by the international NGO 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The working strategy of WWF has changed through 
time (Walker et al. 2007), and while they now work with other NGOs, they make 
sure to keep the leading role in the processes as well as direct and close but still 
fragile relationships with communal authorities (Walker et al. 2007). After the 
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fires of 1998, WWF promoted and funded a series of activities to build capacity, 
information-sharing structures and common strategies among the different 
external agencies working in the region. Once a working group, a common goal 
and a single discourse had been established, negotiations were started with the 
two Chimalapas communities in order to promote the establishment of Voluntary 
Conserved Areas (VCAs) through CONANP’s certifications.  
The proposal for VCAs came at a time when there had been significant changes in 
government policy and institutional structures for conservation. In 2000, the 
National Secretariat for Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) underwent structural 
changes, and the Natural Protected Areas Commission (CONANP) became a 
deconcentrated institution from SEMARNAT. The recently created CONANP was 
divided into different regions, and the one corresponding to Oaxaca started to 
work together with directors from other environmental government agencies (e.g. 
CONAFOR, SEMARNAT). Environmental authorities in Oaxaca acknowledged 
widespread local community resistance to the imposition of Biosphere Reserves 
and thus, enhanced the development of “softer” legal mechanisms for 
conservation that did not involve a loss of local autonomy and sovereignty over 
lands and resources. This development in Oaxaca was important in shaping 
changes in national environmental law and policy in support to civil and 
community initiatives. The general Law for Ecology and Environmental Protection 
(LGEEPA) was reformed repeatedly between 1996 and 2008, and through these 
reforms a mechanism was created for formal “certification” of Voluntarily 
Conserved Areas (VCA) on private and community conserved lands in priority 
regions for conservation. Communities or ejidos who received a certificate from 
CONANP for a VCA would increase their eligibility to get environmental services 
payments from the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) and other 
programs managed by CONANP.  
 
The first Voluntarily Conserved Area (VCA), known as Cerro Azul, in the 
Chimalapas’ region was established in Santa Maria Chimalapa in 2004.  Following 
this certification, negotiations started with San Miguel in order to persuade local 
people to support the creation of a second VCA that would act as part of a natural 
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corridor across the Selva Zoque. The area for the proposed VCA was selected 
through a process of land-use planning developed by WWF and an Oaxacan NGO 
called Mesofilo. El Reten is located in the mountains, in areas used only for 
hunting and collection of palm products. Since 2008 San Miguel, as a community, 
receives Payments for Environmental Services for the conservation of 2,899 has of 
forested lands within the area of El Reten, and finally, CONANP certified the 
conservation of El Reten as a VCA in October 2010, covering an area of 15,328 has 
for a period of thirty years.  
 
6.3 Institutional arrangements around El Reten 
The establishment and early implementation of El Reten have required the 
development of a multi-scale governance arrangement that is operating at 
different levels and management stages (Fig. 6.1). Along with an increased 
institutional presence in the eastern region, there are a series of projects, 
subsidies and alternative sources of income that are currently arriving to San 
Miguel to enhance local support for the management of El Reten. Each of these 
projects and programmes come with their respective regulations and interact in 
particular ways with local governance structures. 
 




The main body promoting the establishment as well as the implementation of El 
Reten is a Planning and Operational Committee for the Chimalapas Region 
(operational committee, hereafter) constituted by government agencies and NGOs, 
WWF among them. This body is similar to the advisory board figure within federal 
protected areas. The operational committee brings together funding bodies, 
government agencies, and NGOs related to environment and development in the 
Chimalapas region for both communities, Santa Maria Chimalapa and San Miguel 
Chimalapa. The creation of the operational committee resulted out of the constant 
misunderstandings and frictions generated between government agencies and 
local communities. It is also a result of the need to develop more consistent, stable 
and cost-effective processes in the region. The operational committee is first 
mentioned in the Master Plan for Development in Chimalapas of 2004. This 
document was a product of a regional planning exercise which aimed to facilitate a 
more coordinated and strategic attention to both communities, Santa Maria and 
San Miguel. The operational committee members at the time when this research 
was developed were: the office for the priority region for conservation of 
Chimalapas of CONANP; the Oaxacan office of the international NGO, the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF); a local NGO called Helping Group for Sustainable 
Development (GADES); the local office of a national NGO called Pronatura-Sur A. 
C.; one funding body called FONDO from the state of Oaxaca. Even though some of 
the member agencies of the operational committee are in charge of wider regions, 
the group structure allowed a somewhat clear distribution of responsibilities and 
monitoring their own performance, enhancing a certain degree of coordination 
and transparency.  
In this arrangement, CONANP provided the institutional platform and the legal 
mechanisms for conservation, while WWF and GADES were the institutions most 
directly involved with the community concerning the implementation of projects 
related to El Reten.  WWF was a source of funding and also the main link to the 
communal authorities, while GADES was so for the settlements in the eastern 
region, implementing projects for the development of economic alternatives. The 
participation of Pronatura Sur consisted in the development of technical studies, 
139 
 
such as biodiversity inventories and land-use planning exercises; nevertheless, 
their role on the operational committee table was subject to the routes defined by 
WWF and other funding bodies. Finally, FONDO was the channel through which a 
conglomerate of private funding bodies, such as Fundacion Comunitaria A.C., 
Carlos Slim Fund, and the Spanish International Development Agency, 
participated in the operational committee and monitored the implementation of 
the economic resources of the funded projects. 
Hence, the operational committee represents an innovative and positive approach 
for institutional coordination, bringing together a diversity of organisational 
capacities to support conservation objectives in the region. Some of the 
extensionists within the committee have worked in the region since 1990s, and 
know the local context, leaders and dynamics, which give them greater insight to 
define appropriate courses of action. The operational committee offers a space for 
strategic and focused planning, based on the needs and the experience of its 
members. In the implementation of strategies, the committee also aims to avoid 
the scattered and confusing presence of multiple external agencies that often 
duplicate efforts or compete to achieve either similar or contrasting goals within 
communities. With clear duties and competences distributed, committee members 
argue that to allocate responsibilities and to evaluate the performance of the 
projects in place has become easier (SC2, Juchitan, August 25th, 2010). According 
to some members of the committee, compared to previous conservation efforts in 
the region, the establishment and coordination of different agencies in the 
operational committee has enhanced transparency. This was declared to have a 
positive effect on the relationship with local communities, by having clearer and 
more strategic means to interact with them (AI, Juchitan, August 25th, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the operation of the operational committee soon started to face the 
trade-offs between economic efficiency (maximisation of benefits within the 
system), environmental effectiveness (to achieve expressed objectives), equity 
(further explored below), and political legitimacy (decisions are accepted 
according to who makes them and implements them) of heterogeneous 
institutional contexts (Agder et al. 2003; Corbera et al. 2007). Through the direct 
observation of meetings of the operational committee and dynamics in the 
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implementation (See Appendix II), it was possible to detect that despite the 
institutional advantages and the benefits of coordinated efforts, its running was 
far from smooth. The first aspect drawing my attention was that the operational 
committee lacked of local community representation. Secondly, the composition of 
the operational committee at the time created alliances and power dynamics that 
made the active participation of less powerful members (the ones in charge of 
implementation) subject to the strongest members, namely, CONANP, WWF and 
FONDO. However, other members of the operational committee such as Pronatura 
or GADES, in charge of implementation, did not have the same weight in the 
decision-making process of the operational committee and thus, were subject to 
the directions of CONANP and WWF, mainly. Thus, even though the establishment 
of ways of action was declared to be determined by previous participatory 
planning exercises, the implementation of the VCA depended on the institutional 
choices influenced by national elites and donors (Ribot et al. 2008) and thus not 
achieving the equity and legitimacy  that VCAs portray as their advantage in front 
of top-down approaches to conservation. 
The Master Plan for Development in Chimalapas and other relevant documents 
regulating conservation in El Reten (Figure 6.2) define the strategies and actions 
to be developed by the operational committee.  
Figure 6.2 Chronological account of the regulatory frameworks related to El Reten (Grupo 




The Master Plan is the strategic platform over which conservation and 
development in the region are based and it is also the main element for funding 
applications for implementation. After this document was generated in 2004, the 
next exercise consisted in a Land Use Planning for the municipality, where the 
potential areas for conservation were identified and promoted in front of the 
communal authorities, the biggest of them being El Reten. Once the process 
already described for the creation of El Reten had taken place, the certification of 
El Reten required the area to have a management plan. In order to become 
certified as a VCA, San Miguel needed a management plan for El Reten, as well as 
economic resources to develop it. Despite being in a priority region for water 
capture in the country, San Miguel did not meet the criteria to receive PES due to 
the agrarian conflicts and to previous unfulfilment of reforestation projects of 
CONAFOR in the region (CA, San Miguel, November 3rd, 2010). Thus, external 
institutions of the operational committee lobbied for San Miguel to become 
eligible for Payment for Environmental Services (PES) to generate economic 
incentives for support and resources for the development of the management 
plan. In 2008, San Miguel received the first PES for El Reten for the conservation of 
2,899 ha of forested lands, included in the area that would be certified later. Part 
of the resources from PES, were used to pay for technical studies to develop a 
management plan for El Reten, which was delivered to the community in 
December of 2008. Additionally to the generation of the management plan, 
CONAFOR (the agency granting the PES) required the community to develop a 
Plan for Better Management Practices of the area receiving PES, which was 
already inside of El Reten. This document contains particular activities to ensure 
the area would remain standing at least the five year period that the PES 
programme lasts (MJ, Oaxaca, July 22nd, 2010). 
Therefore, for planning and implementation concerning El Reten, the reference 
documents are the Management Plan for El Reten and the Better Management 
Practices Plan for the area receiving PES within El Reten. The management plan is 
a very comprehensive yet general document, which defines the general objective 
of the VCA of El Reten as:  
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“To maintain natural ecosystem elements of El Cordon del Reten, in 
particular species of flora and fauna, through activities that allow the 
conservation of the current communities of flora in the area and that 
generate the sustainable development of the eastern region’s 
inhabitants”. (Grupo Mesofilo 2008) 
The management plan recovers the section of the communal statute that defines 
that the community should have a zonification, dividing El Reten into different 
management zones, namely: (1) Use and restoration zone; (2) Conservation and 
non-timber resource use; (3) Strict conservation; (4) Forestry management and 
reforestation; (5) Forest Management and (6) Settlements (Figure 6.3) and gives 
general indications about the activities that are compatible to each zone. However, 
the management plan does not specify or distribute clear rules, responsibilities 
and rights to manage each of the zones. Moreover, the document states that 
management should be adaptive and should provide opportunities for 
participation, training and benefit-sharing of the local communities, although it 
does not specify how these opportunities should be available to the local 
population.  
The Better Management Practices Plan, on the other hand, includes the activities 
that community members should develop in order to make sure that the forested 
areas receiving PES will remain standing at least during the five years that PES 
last. The activities suggested by this plan include fire-breaking lines, surveillance 
walks, and other fire and illegal logging prevention activities, all these measures 
were already part of the communal statute but were not fully implemented until 
the PES program started. Hence, in technical terms, both documents are 
comprehensive of the activities required to conserve the natural resources present 
in El Reten. Nevertheless, the Management Plan of El Reten and the Better 
Practices Plan fail to acknowledge the importance of the local and communal 
assemblies, the tequio as well as the land tenure conflict with the consequent 
contestation for access to natural resources has over the management of El Reten. 
When asked about these gaps, the CONANP representative said that the document 





Figure 6.3 Management categories of El Reten: (1) Purple: Use and restoration zone; (2) 
Brown:  Conservation and non-timber resource use; (3) Blue: Strict conservation; (4) Green: 
Forestry management and reforestation; (5) Pink: Forest Management and (6) Red: 




6.4 San Miguel and the governance of El Reten: decision-making, 
scale and benefit-sharing dilemmas 
6.4.1 Decision-making and representation 
 
During the data collection and coding periods of this research at the settlement 
level the salient subjects referred to issues on decision-making and 
representation. These issues are exemplified at different management stages of El 
Reten. First, the process of establishment and implementation of the VCA shows 
how the interactions between external institutions and local governance 
arrangements raised local concerns regarding devolution, participation and 
representation. Then, the process of implementation of the conservation activities 
and the funding programmes applied continue to develop in manners that 
ultimately affect the local sense of involvement and appropriation towards El 
Reten, as will be explained below.  
The proposal to establish a VCA in El Reten came more than ten years after the 
proposal from San Miguel and Santa Maria Chimalapa to SEMARNAT to establish 
the Ecological Campesino Reserve (1994). The communities’ proposal was 
developed in response to the initiative to set up a Biosphere Reserve in the region, 
but as described in Chapter 5, voluntarily conserved areas were not considered a 
category of protected area at the time. By 2006, there had been significant changes 
in government policy and institutional structures for conservation. Immediately 
after the certification of the VCA Cerro Azul in Santa Maria, negotiations started 
with San Miguel to persuade local people to support the creation of a second VCA 
that would act as part of a natural corridor across the Zoque Rainforest. The 
decision to establish a VCA in El Reten was mainly defined by the fact that it 
represents the largest area with primary vegetation in San Miguel, belonging to 
the biological corridor called “Selva Zoque” and, consequently, is a Priority Region 
for Conservation for CONANP. According to local accounts, already since 1990s, 
when environmental agencies and NGOs promoted the creation of a Biosphere 
Reserve in the Chimalapas region, the current area of El Reten was included in the 
proposal. Even though the Biosphere Reserve was never established, when the 
Ecological Territorial Planning was developed in San Miguel, El Reten was defined, 
along with other five areas, as potential lands for conservation (Grupo Mesofilo 
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2006). Due to the size of the area (15,328 has), environmental agencies promoted 
the certification of El Reten as the first step of a series of conservation related 
activities within San Miguel as a community. However, even though for members 
of the operational committee the establishment and implementation of El Reten is 
just part of a bigger process that involves the whole community, local perceptions 
differs from this perspective. The fact that there were other four (smaller) areas 
eligible for certification and only El Reten got to be recognized as a VCA, raised 
questions locally about who really made the decision about the area to certify. 
Then, when adjacent settlements to El Reten (San Antonio and Benito Juarez) 
started to receive different projects to develop alternative sources of income, 
other non-eastern settlements started to complain openly during the auxiliary 
secretaries’ assembly, since alternative sources of income are also needed in their 
own settlements. This will be further explored in Chapter 7 on benefit-sharing 
issues.  
According to the view of inhabitants from settlements other than San Antonio and 
Benito Juarez, the decision to certify only El Reten as a VCA attended to the 
external agencies’ interests more than to local initiatives. Furthermore, in the view 
of key informants, the decision to establish El Reten as a VCA was only possible 
through a decision-making process that did not involve the consensus of a general 
assembly, but that of an auxiliary secretaries’ one. This procedure created 
suspicions amongst local people, who believe that the suspension of the general 
assemblies and its substitution by the auxiliary secretaries’ one was the way for 
external agencies to achieve the establishment of a Biosphere Reserve, only with a 
different name, as the following statement of a community member from San 
Miguel illustrates: 
“We refused the [declaration of the Biosphere Reserve] before, but [the 
external agencies] turn it… we propose [the Ecological Campesino 
Reserve and other areas] and the government does another thing… it 
happens because the agreements are signed in the [auxiliary] 




Local accounts state that the process of negotiation to achieve the formal 
recognition of El Reten involved many workshops and meetings (RS, San Miguel, 
October 22nd, 2010). Representatives of CONANP, CONAFOR, and the NGOs WWF 
and Grupo Mesofilo held these meetings in the eastern settlements of San Antonio 
and Benito Juarez, where El Reten is located. However, according to local people, 
in spite of the amount of workshops developed in the region for consultation, 
people did not feel like active participants of the decision-making regarding the 
establishment of the VCA (SC, San Miguel December 10th, 2010). The cause for this 
lack of appropriation, according to informants, was the fact that the communal 
committee did not call to a general assembly for the final decision about the 
certification. The auxiliary secretaries’ assembly formally agreed for El Reten to be 
certified as a VCA and San Miguel received a certificate by CONANP in 2010, 
despite this process was illegal for not calling to a general assembly to establish 
the agreement. Thus, the formal procedures for the establishment of El Reten 
were fulfilled through a process that was locally perceived as spurious by setting a 
communal agreement through the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly. Furthermore, 
the process was illegal and lacked of transparency and legitimacy to local 
inhabitants since it did not respect the local uses and customs. Besides the unrest 
that this decision-making process created among local people, there is the fact 
that there are not hard copies of the management plan or the zoning maps 
available in the local settlements. Hence, since most of the population in San 
Miguel was not fully informed about the content of the management plan, and 
people from the eastern settlements doubt about the decision-making process the 
implementation of the VCA is often charged of tension, as will be explored below. 
These omissions to the federal and customary law saved time and energy at the 
expense of legitimacy, affecting the likelihood of collective action for 
environmental protection (Ostrom and Cox 2010). 
The implementation of an approach that has been conceived as community-led 
conservation, in the case of El Reten, depends on the practitioner’s interpretation 
of what a participatory process is and how it should be implemented. VCAs just as 
other protected areas categories omit local heterogeneity in order to give way to 
homogenized dominant discourses and management practices legitimised by 
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validation processes that are portrayed as community-driven (Sachs 2010). This 
became evident during the data collection period, when documenting the 
decision-making process for operation of El Reten. The institutional interaction 
for decision-making process in El Reten starts with the definition of agendas by 
the operational committee. Once the different agencies exchange, negotiate and 
set their objectives and financial capacities, they coordinate together the aims, 
funding strategies and means of action. This may require further coordination 
with other agencies to fund, operate and deliver conservation and development 
programs in the region. For example, during the first meeting of the operational 
committee I attended, the members of the operational committee identified the 
actions needed to give continuity to the conservation process in San Miguel, 
beyond El Reten. Pronatura Sur presented, among other points, a proposal to 
develop field visits to determine the location of specific land uses and to identify 
areas eligible areas for conservation and restoration in different areas of San 
Miguel. The activities proposed served a bigger purpose in order to set up a 
conserved areas corridor throughout the entire community. At that moment, the 
two main sources of funding for conservation activities in the region were a 
project of WWF and Carlos Slim Fund as well as the Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) from CONAFOR. Nevertheless, the continuity of the PES was 
uncertain due to the failure of the previous communal committee to provide 
economic and activities’ reports to CONAFOR. Hence, members of the operational 
committee agreed that, in order to keep the process in San Miguel, CONANP, WWF 
and the new communal committee would lobby with CONAFOR’s representative 
in Oaxaca for San Miguel to continue receiving PES. At the same time, the new 
communal committee would have to agree to make a more transparent use of the 
PES and use them for the activities already established in the management plan 
and the better management practices plan. 
Once the strategies had been defined and the roles distributed, the operational 
committee phoned the comisariado of San Miguel and asked him to join the 
meeting. Once he and his secretary arrived, the representatives of WWF and 
GADES informed them about the strategies to follow and the way PES funds 
should be used. The structure of the meeting between the comisariado and the 
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operational committee made it difficult to discern operational regulations from 
suggestions from the operational committee. The comisariado, recently arrived to 
the position, attended and expressed his willingness to go along with the plans 
proposed by the operational committee with no further discussion or changes. 
Nowadays, all decisions and projects promoted by external agencies need to be 
validated by the assembly of the communities involved. Thus, if the comisariado 
gives his approval, the topic of the proposal is added to the agenda of the next 
auxiliary secretaries’ assembly for discussion and validation. As previously 
explained, communal committees have stopped calling general the assembly 
regularly to keep flexible decision-making processes without the risk of violence. 
This is relevant for El Reten, since the general assembly has not taken place on a 
regular basis for the main decisions related to it, creating reactions amongst local 
people. Still, decision-making in San Miguel adds another stage to the process 
since before auxiliary secretaries can validate anything, they should report back to 
their settlements and get their approval. Figure 6.4 illustrates the different stages 
required for the flow of information and decision-making processes in San Miguel; 
it points out at the frequency of the different assemblies that make deliberation in 
the community a long process.  





Even though the task of auxiliary secretaries is to represent the position of their 
own local assembly, different secretaries have different priorities and capacities to 
stand for their points during auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies. There are also 
difficulties emerging from the communication process due to the different 
interpretations that auxiliary secretaries make out of the information received 
during the assemblies, and the information they actually transmit to their own 
settlements’ assemblies. These obstacles can extend the decision-making process 
and have immediate effects on the participatory process of El Reten as well as a 
negative effect on natural resource management decisions. As will be further 
explained the communication process for decision-making and the lack of 
deliberation capacities in San Miguel make informed, equitable and legitimate 
decision-making regarding the management of El Reten difficult. 
Therefore, during the meeting between the operational committee and the 
recently elected communal committee, it was agreed that the budget expenditure 
plan for the PES would be presented to the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly in 
December 2010, five months after the meeting. The first auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly I attended was on December 10th, 2010. This was the third assembly in 
San Miguel since the new communal committee was elected. The consultancy 
GADES was, at the time, the main link between the community and the operational 
committee on the one hand, and between the eastern settlements and the 
communal committee as well, since it was also in charge of the operation and 
technical advice for the activities developed in El Reten. During the assembly of 
December, among other points, auxiliary secretaries were informed about the 
distribution of the money from PES that was discussed five months before 
between the operational committee and the comisariado. The information was 
provided to the representative of the different settlements of San Miguel at a time 
when the works and investments had already been started. Still, after this 
meeting, auxiliary secretaries had to take the information back to their 
settlements, report and get feedback from them. Due to the distance between 
settlements, the communal committee’s agenda and the scheduling of the 
assemblies, the next opportunity for discussion happened in early March 2011. 
Thus, the members of the community were able to provide feedback on this 
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decision only until the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly occurred nine months after 
the operational committee meeting, when the budget plan had already been 
applied.  
Despite of the mismatch in times for discussion and decision-making, people from 
San Antonio, Benito Juarez and Sol y Luna met previous to the auxiliary 
secretaries’ assembly, in a parish outside San Miguel. The aim was to establish a 
common front and to assign a commission group that would defend their standing 
points regarding the expenditure of the PES and also about the land tenure 
conflict. This group would travel to San Miguel along with the auxiliary secretaries 
to ask the communal committee to assign more funding from PES to the eastern 
region and to ask for more support from the communal authorities to the land 
tenure conflict.  The day of the assembly on March 4th, 2011, people from the 
eastern region arrived to the meeting in a group of approximately 15 people. From 
the beginning of the assembly, members of this group constantly made the claim 
for the resources from PES to be mainly invested in the area of El Reten (i.e., San 
Antonio, Benito Juarez and Sol y Luna). Nevertheless, the agenda of that meeting 
was not to discuss a plan that was already being applied. Instead, the operational 
committee was introducing a new program of Matching Funds, by Fundacion 
Comunitaria hat was a similar framework but under different operational rules. 
Thus, every time members of the commission started to talk about the way 
resources from the PES were being managed, the representative from GADES 
reminded the attendants that the operational rules of PES established where the 
resources should be invested. The representative from GADES explained briefly 
how the decision to distribute the PES was made when the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly decided to support the technical assistance, the restoration and 
conservation in Cerro Prieto (more than a year before), and argued that there was 
nothing to discuss. In order to go back to his agenda, he called back and argued 
that if the discussion continued they would leave, and underlined: 
 … “this is why, if you agree with the comisariado to sign the agreement, 
we can go ahead; but if this is going to be a fight, Fundacion 
Comunitaria will not feed conflicts, this is a proposal we bring. It is not 
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an imposition; it is an investment that they are doing” (PR, San Miguel, 
March 4th, 2011). 
The meeting continued in two different directions, with members from the 
eastern settlements raising their opposition to the way PES money was being 
spent and the way that decision was made on the one hand; while on the other, the 
extensionist insisted in persuading them to accede and to secure a new source of 
funding, in which GADES would also be the consultancy in charge. 
Out of insistence of the commission, the representative of GADES explained that 
the operational committee modified the budget from the original Better 
Management Practices Plan in order for the comisariado to be able to report to 
CONAFOR, so PES could keep arriving to the community. For the rest, he argued 
that everything was a proposal and they were there to discuss it, but once the 
agreement was achieved there were obligations that would affect everybody, even 
those who were not present. When asked to accede to the new program, people 
from the eastern region insisted in their claim to be more involved in the decisions 
for the distribution of the benefits, as the following statement shows: 
“It is not true that we come to a meeting in which all of us are going to 
decide how the resources will be managed. We come… and everything is 
already there… that is why there are always problems… - either we take 
it or we leave it in peace -… if we decided among us it would be 
something different. We as auxiliary secretaries have seen that this is not 
about an agreement, but [instead] we are told what has to be done” (SR, 
San Miguel, March 4th, 2011). 
The representative of GADES argued that the activities and assignation of 
resources were based on the operational rules of the programs and according to 
the Master Plan. He also reminded the assembly that all these subjects had been 
already discussed during the workshops previous to the establishment of El Reten 
(at least 3 years before). However, an auxiliary secretary suggested that before 
approving any new program, such as the one from Fundacion Comunitaria, 
workshops should be held in each settlement in which mechanics and rules of the 
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program could be clearly explained to everybody. In this way, the decision would 
not be rushed, he added: 
“The problems with the conservation are there because there has not 
been enough information, or because there were people who did not 
understand everything from the beginning, which is why there are so 
many struggles” (RS, San Miguel, March 4th, 2011). 
Despite this suggestion, the representative of GADES emphasized the fact that if 
the decision was not taken that day, the call for projects from the funding agency 
would be closed by the time the workshops in each settlement would be finished. 
However, he assured that there would be sets of rules and new Better Practices 
Plans within a structure that would be discussed later: 
“In the first place, what you have to do is to authorise your comisariado 
so that he can sign the agreement [for the project]… Then, we can 
elaborate the Better Practices Plans, instead of discussing endlessly how 
the resources will be distributed…There is already a structure and the 
comisariado will make you the proposal”. (PR, San Miguel, March 4th, 
2011). 
In the face of the pressure and with a strong emphasis on the new sources of 
funding that would arrive to the community, auxiliary secretaries voted and 
accepted, enabling the comisariado to sign the agreement for the new project. At 
the end of the four-hours long meeting, everybody was so tired that the PES 
budget was not further discussed.  
During the meetings mentioned above, it was possible for me to observe that first 
the operational committee determines the agenda of the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly related to El Reten. Second, that the participatory aspect of the process 
is largely reduced to a validation, which is displayed to comply with legal 
regulations, and third, that there is a total mismatch between the institutional 
times for applications for funding and the consultation process required for this 
consultation to be regarded as legitimate. Furthermore, during my time in the 
community and in the meetings I attended, I could not find a single case where 
153 
 
proposals were posed, discussed and then adapted to the feedback provided by 
the members of the assembly. Instead, the processes were focused more on 
validation of pre-designed plans to apply for funding within institutional 
timeframes that were presented to strong and actively involved people in a “take 
it or leave it” frame (Rahnema 2010). Hence, the space and time available for 
discussion was scarce, increasing local tension and mistrust. This emphasised a 
frequent situation within community conservation in which brokers accumulate 
decision-making power by rushing processes in order to get access to institutional 
sources of funding (Corbera et al. 2007). This often means that there is no process 
that allows for a common understanding of the regulations and commitments 
involved until communities are already engaged, undermining legitimacy (Adger 
et al. 2003). The latter is also related to the extension of the state to places where 
it could not reach before through conservation projects, regulations and practices 
(Durand et al. 2014). This mismatch between institutional times and community 
decision-making process undermines the local ability to engage in an informed, 
active and meaningful manner through collective action (Ostrom 2002).  
 
Thus the current decision-making process in El Reten, driven by the operational 
committee, has increased coordination and joint management efforts for the VCA. 
This has implied a re-consideration of the politics in place and the inclusion of 
wider networks for natural resources management (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). It 
also saves time and energy in discussion with locals to achieve agreements more 
effectively, fulfilling institutional requirements on time. This, ultimately, makes 
funding available for the application of management plans and alternative income 
projects to be developed in the settlements around El Reten and in the central 
region of San Miguel where the communal committee is located. Nevertheless, the 
constitution of a single operational committee diminishes the potential for 
dialogue and negotiation between external agencies and community members. 
The local sense of involvement in the design of the proposals and the decision-
making process is also diminished. Hence, by working as a single block with pre-
defined strategies and actions, the operational committee has increased efficiency 
in local-decision making processes regarding El Reten but at the expense of 
deliberation and legitimacy of the plans and programs being applied. Is this case, 
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greater pluralism means that rights and responsibilities are constantly negotiated 
(Fritzen 2007). From the communal structure’s perspective, this example 
highlights on the on the hand, the need for local capacities to develop decision-
making processes capable to be representative and allow for deliberation but with 
accurate facilitation since often in assemblies discussions go around in circles with 
little achievement. Furthermore, it requires communal authorities to truly be 
representative of their community instead of automatically conforming to the 
funding requirements, perpetuating the client-patron relationships in the region.  
On the other hand, in the eastern settlements, local settlement assemblies were 
concerned about the implementation of conservation activities related to forest 
fires prevention. Since the fires of 1998, CONAFOR installed an office in the nearby 
municipality of Zanatepec; this office has its own workers who belong to a 
syndicate. Also, during the three driest months of the year CONAFOR pays a group 
of six people from each settlement, San Antonio and Benito Juarez to patrol the 
mountains around El Reten in order to prevent forest fires and illegal logging. 
Even though these arrangements provided temporary sources of paid work, they 
were established without consideration of the local structures of tequio and, 
consequently, enhanced more division within the settlements. According to local 
accounts, settlements have been divided between those who defend that the 
patrolling and forest prevention should keep being part of the duties of every 
community member, and those who receive an economic incentive to do it and 
who now refuse to go and control fires if there is no payment involved. In both 
cases, community members disagree with the fact that CONAFOR prefers to pay 
external people who have no further incentive to control fires but who are 
protected by a syndicate, than paying local people to do the work. Once more, this 
decision was made by CONAFOR and delivered to the eastern settlements without 
any further discussion. Thus, even though the operational committee represents 
coordination, planning and implementation advantages, the delivery style used 
implies that the communal authorities and GADES are the main interlocutors 
between the community and the operational committee. This limits the 
interaction of external agencies with the community to a minimum, which might 
be time and energy-efficient but limits the input that community members can 
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provide to the implementation of programs. These situations only increase the 
questions amongst community members about the legitimacy of the operational 
committee and its decisions.  
The situations described above illustrate how externally designed programs 
attend bureaucratic times and requirements defined by administrative agencies 
with little or no consideration of local community’s dynamics. Consequently, 
external agencies in the operational committee promote decision-making in local 
assemblies within institutional times and regulations providing only the 
information that will allow them to reach consensus, avoiding further 
deliberation. In the rush of getting agreements the agencies often omit important 
details or information about the projects or programs being discussed, such as 
operation rules; moreover, the time and spaces for deliberation and discussion are 
also limited. Notwithstanding the fact that discussions within assemblies are 
usually time and energy consuming and easily politicized, the deliberation process 
is important for community members to feel involved in the decision-making 
process, regardless of the efficiency of the discussion. Thus, even though 
management decisions require more effective decision-making process about the 
implementation of externally designed programs in the community, a balance is 
required for external agencies to really devolve power and become transparent 
and accountable to local communities. The starting point would be to enhance 
really informed decision-making instead of avoiding contentious subjects to reach 
agreements faster. Even when processes are called participatory, in practice, 
decision-making is mainly limited to the operational committee and funding 
bodies deciding unanimously. This is consistent with Corbera et al. (2007) who 
argue that equity and legitimacy are compromised when decision-making powers 
are accumulated by the brokers. Consequently, the viability and sustainability of 
the conservation and natural resource management efforts are not consistent with 
the principles that the common pool resource theory defines to prevent the 
tragedy of the commons and the “prisoner’s dilemma” prevents any meaningful 
collective action (Becker and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2002). These practices have 
no relation to the principles of Indigenous Community Conserved Areas (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004). Moreover, the implications of the current arrangements 
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for decision-making processes are reflected in the management of El Reten, more 
emphatically in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities, as will be 
explored below. 
6.4.2 Economic benefits: Scale and sharing dilemmas 
 
The origins of economic resources derived from El Reten are another relevant 
aspect to its current management and influence directly the governance 
arrangement of the VCA.  The process of certification of El Reten has been 
accompanied not only by new institutional arrangements but also by a series of 
economic incentives and programs aimed to persuade local engagement and 
participation, this a common practice in Mexico to face community opposition 
(Durand et al. 2014).  These mechanisms are mainly designed at national level but 
adapted and negotiated at the regional and local levels, according to the funding 
agreements. They are generally managed by the external agencies, through the 
members of the operational committee, GADES in this case, who is the consultancy 
in charge of monitoring the compliance and accountability of the projects. The 
four main funding programs operating in El Reten at the time of my stay in the 
community were:  
 
(1) The Temporary Employment Program (PET) and the Program for 
Conservation through Development (PROCODES), from CONANP. 
(2) Payments for Environmental Services, from CONAFOR. 
(3) Matching Funds, from CONAFOR and other funding bodies through which 
a project to develop alternative sources of income in San Antonio and 
Benito Juarez through pine-resin harvest was developed. 
 
6.4.2.1 Temporary Employment Program and Program for Conservation and 
Development (PET and PROCODES) 
In El Reten, CONANP applied mechanisms like the Temporary Employment 
Program (PET) and PROCODES that fund the implementation strategies for fire 
prevention and control. PET is designed to provide a source of income when 
demand of unqualified workforce is lower in districts classified as extremely poor. 
The instrument is used by different governmental entities, but in the case of 
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CONANP it is applied to support conservation related activities like forest fire 
prevention and patrolling around protected areas.  According to operational rules, 
the economic support provided by PET is equivalent to the 99% of the minimum 
wage $59.08 pesos (~£2.8 GBP) per day, for up to 88 days per year, per person 
(SAT 2012). Up to 2010, CONANP contracted through PET a brigade of ten people 
in San Antonio to develop monitoring activities within the area of El Reten, 
prevention of forest fires, logging and hunting.  The activities were mainly 
surveillance walks through different areas of El Reten. The brigade was divided 
into two teams that walked the VCA twice per week, located the points they 
visited with GPS and reported back to CONANP. The salaries provided by these 
activities were $150 pesos (~£7 GBP) per day during up to 90 days, which totals 
$13,500 pesos (~£618 GBP) per member of the brigade per year. In 2010, 
CONANP withdrew the funding arguing that the community could, from then on, 
fund those activities through PES. 
On the other hand, PROCODES aims to promote ecosystem conservation through 
local population’s involvement in land management; natural resources 
appropriation, management and protection; as well as the economic valuation of 
ecosystem’s services. It does so through the generation of alternative productive 
activities in order to improve the livelihoods of the people living around protected 
areas and other forms of conservation. PROCODES supports economically the 
development of technical studies, community projects and training courses 
related to conservation within priority areas. The amount of resources and the 
kind of projects supported include a wide range of features, but in the case of 
community projects the program requires that applicants are able to contribute 
20% of the total cost of the project. The maximum limit for funding through 
PROCODES is $2,100,000 pesos (~£99,590 GBP). Although the amount of money 
invested in El Reten through PROCODES, local accounts state that PROCODES 
funded the material to build firewood saving stoves, orchards in household 
backyards and feasibility studies for an ecotourism project and an Environmental 
Management Unit (ES, San Miguel, November 6th, 2010). The feasibility studies 
were developed by consultancies hired by CONANP, but the results had not been 
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communicated to the community or made available for consultation, and have not 
been implemented to date. 
6.4.2.2 Payments for Environmental Services 
Since 2003 the National Institute of Ecology designed the PES program which has 
been implemented by CONAFOR since then. The program has had an iterative 
learning process. Nowadays, it has clear eligibility criteria on a points-based 
system according to the type of ecosystem, the forest cover, the deforestation risk, 
economic, marginalisation and water capture parameters (Rolon-Sanchez 2009). 
PES are distributed on a yearly basis and the price per hectare is defined 
according to the type of ecosystem and the surface under protection. The PES 
scheme pays for a maximum area of 3,000 has of a designated area for a maximum 
a five years period with possibility of renewal. Also, since 2003, programs of 
economic incentives and productive alternatives in communal lands have 
enhanced official recognition of VCAs in Mexico. Since CONANP lacks enough 
resources to provide economic incentives for conservation and to support the 
implementation of VCAs, institutional links and operational alliances have been 
developed with other government agencies, NGOs and private funding bodies. 
Thus, although PES, from CONAFOR, and VCAs, certified by CONANP, do not have 
any formal link, within priority regions for conservation, CONANP and CONAFOR 
work together to offer the program of PES. The implementation of PES is similar to 
subsidies that provide alternative sources of income to people who are engaged 
into conservation schemes. PES programs last for five years and involve a 
commitment from the community to engage into activities that help to conserve 
forest cover in areas that are important for water-capture or biodiversity. 
CONAFOR expects that by the end of the five-year period, communities and local 
networks will have developed capacities and agreements in order for economic 
resources to continue representing an incentive for locals to prevent land-use 
change in the long term.  
 
The PES scheme pays for a maximum area of 3,000 Ha of a designated area. Thus, 
out of the 15,328.54 ha certified in El Reten, San Miguel as a whole community 
receives annual PES equivalent to $1,200,000 pesos (~£57,047 GBP) for a portion 
of 2899.00 ha of that area.  Despite the fact that PES currently represent the 
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biggest source of economic resources derived from El Reten in San Miguel, the 
benefits do not appear as evident to community members. According to the survey 
carried out at household level in the settlements of San Antonio and Benito Juarez, 
respondents reported that they did not receive economic benefits from PES. This 
probably reflects the fact that if even if those $1,200,000 pesos were divided 
among the 1,584 households of San Miguel each year (INEGI 2010) the amount 
would not be very significant (~£34 GBP per household per year). Furthermore, 
the distribution of these resources has highlighted some of the key issues in 
community-conserved areas and benefit-sharing dilemmas in conservation, as will 
be explained below. 
 
6.4.2.3 Matching Funds 
Additionally to the programs mentioned above, over the last eleven years, 
CONAFOR promotes a scheme of matching funds, which aims to give continuity 
and to consolidate PES. Thus, CONAFOR contributes with up to 50% of the 
investment and encourages private companies or “environmental services users” 
to match the other 50% to fund projects that contribute to the conservation of 
river streams, biological corridors or priority areas (CONAFOR 2012). In the 
eastern region of San Miguel, the matching funds scheme and other funding bodies 
have allowed the implementation of a resin harvest project with the investment of 
Fundacion Comunitaria. During the data collection period for this research, the 
resin harvest started to represent an alternative source of income for local 
livelihoods. As will be detailed in Chapter 7, this project is more recognised than 
PES by local people, despite (or because) it has required more time, resources and 
organisational processes. It is already delivering interesting outcomes in terms of 
economic alternatives, local appropriation and changes in the local perception 
towards the forest. 
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6.5 Closing section: Multi-scalar governance arrangements and 
local decision-making 
Chapter 6 has elaborated on the governance structures in San Miguel that have 
been relevant to the establishment of the VCA El Reten. The chapter has also 
explored the process leading to the establishment of El Reten as a VCA as well as 
the multiplicity of actors, scales and funding programmes involved in it. The local 
institutional context in which El Reten is being implemented has been explained 
as well as the practical implications emerging from the early interactions of local 
and external governance structures. The implementation of El Reten illustrate 
practical issues of multi-scalar governance arrangements for conservation in 
terms of access, the definition of right-holders and resource boundaries as well as 
decision-making for joint use, representation, monitoring, sanctions, conflict 
resolution and legal recognition (Ostrom 1990, referenced by Abrams et al. 2003). 
The regulations for natural resource management in El Reten lack of coordination 
amongst those involved, distribution of responsibilities and trust amongst actors, 
as well as clear means for enforcement and sanctioning (Ostrom 2002). Even 
though this condition was previous to the establishment of El Reten, the 
expectation of the operational committee that by creating economic alternatives 
local dynamics will turn to environmental sustainability is not realistic.   
Furthermore, by avoiding political sensitive issues such as general assembly 
management and land tenure conflicts, external agencies neglect the incentive 
systems for natural resource overexploitation. According to Fischer et al. (2007) 
interventions at the operational levels that ignore the system of incentives 
underneath, such as conflicting or contradictory rules, help to consolidate the 
pattern of over-exploitation of natural resources rather than providing a solution. 
 
In the Chimalapas region participation “has recently come under fire for being co-
opted and mainstreamed by governmental and nongovernmental agencies, part of 
a new development “tyranny that betrays the concept's populist roots” (Walker et 
al. 2007). People in Chimalapas are “empowered, organized, knowledgeable, and 
highly sceptical” (Walker et al. 2007: 12). Communal structures have not only 
resisted the imposition of external development and conservation projects, but 
developed their own ones in order not to lose local control over decision-making 
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and natural resources management. With the establishment of El Reten and the 
arrival of PES and other conservation-related projects, there is a trade-off of 
powers between local governance structures and the externally designed ones. 
This is consistent with the critiques to the expansion of the state through 
conservation projects (Li 2002; Durand et al. 2014). These power interactions are 
asymmetric and the state is a strong agent (Adams and Hutton 2007; Adger et al. 
2005; Lebel et al. 2006; Rhodes 1997). However, as Kenway (1990) pointed out, 
power is not located in a central apparatus; instead, there is a relationship 
between all the points of the social totality. The community leaders have three 
empowering experiences that accompany them to participatory spaces: the long-
term involvement and negotiation with state institutions and programs, a 
transforming legal framework fostered by the rise of indigenous politics, and 
negotiations with national and international NGOs in the region (Walker et al. 
2007). This has allowed them to contest the imposition of external regulations and 
discourses in the past (Doane 2007). Yet, the implementation of the VCA depends 
on the institutional choices influenced by national elites and donors (Ribot et al. 
2008) and, thus, is not achieving the equity and legitimacy that VCAs portray as 
their advantage in comparison to top-down approaches to conservation. (Adger et 
al. 2003) 
The multi-scalar nature of the El Reten as a VCA, with a coordinated group of 
external agencies illustrates a form of elite capture by external agencies (Platteau 
and Gaspart 2003).  The decision-making processes illustrated in this chapter 
show that the implementation of the VCA omit local heterogeneity in order to give 
way to homogenized dominant discourses and management practices legitimised 
by validation processes that are portrayed as community-driven (Sachs 2010). In 
these dynamics, there is not a retreat from the state but a re-definition of its role, 
while NGOs become the link between the state and the community, legitimising its 
discourses (Arts 2004; Rahnema 2010). Thus, even when processes are called 
participatory and even community-driven, in practice, decision-making is mainly 
limited to the operational committee and funding bodies deciding unanimously. 
This is consistent with Corbera et al. (2007) who argue that equity and legitimacy 
are compromised when decision-making powers are accumulated by the brokers. 
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Consequently, the viability and sustainability of the conservation and natural 
resource management efforts are not consistent with the principles that the 
common pool resource theory defines in order  to avoid the tragedy of the 
commons and the “prisoner’s dilemma” prevents any meaningful collective action 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2002). These practices have no relation to the 
principles of Indigenous Community Conserved Areas (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2004). Moreover, the implications of the current arrangements for decision-
making processes are reflected in the management of El Reten, more emphatically 
in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities, as will be explored below. 
This chapter has explored the issues emerged from the establishment and 
implementation of a VCA through a multi-scalar governance arrangement. The 
historical context for the evolution of relationships between the local governance 
structures and the operational committee for the Chimalapas around El Reten has 
been detailed as well. The early implementation of El Reten illustrates the 
challenges of that ‘community-driven’ conservation projects have in terms of 
attracting external actors with their funds and time frameworks and the 
implication for decision-making and legitimacy. This chapter has mapped the 
multi-scalar institutional arrangement in place for the operation of El Reten and 
regulatory frameworks that have been developed through time. Finally, the 
practical interactions between these formal, externally designed arrangements 
and the local governance structures have been exemplified through the data 
gathered during meetings, auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies, local settlements’ 
assemblies and unstructured interviews with local informants. These interactions 
emphasise practical issues of decision-making, particularly regarding 
representation and legitimacy of the processes (Adger et al. 2003) since the 
decision-making process around El Reten lacks the principles that have been 
identified to enhance sustainability and trust amongst different actors. The last 
chapter of this dissertation moves on to analyse the arrangements for benefit-




Chapter 7: Multi-scalar governance in practice: fuelling 
the tragedy of the commons 
So far, this dissertation has provided different examples of the early 
implementation of the VCA in El Reten along with the issues emerged in terms of 
multi-scalar governance arrangements, decision-making and the interactions 
between local and external governance structures. Chapter 7 analyses the benefit-
sharing, accountability and self-regulatory issues. Even though technical and 
organisational support for the operation of El Reten are indeed important for the 
community to continue receiving the benefits of formal conservation and the 
market economy, local claims for self-organisation and self-regulation require 
further attention. Furthermore, the final data chapter of this dissertation will 
explore if the devolution of a ‘bundle of rights’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003) implied the 
VCA mechanism is enough to guarantee the legitimacy, equity and sustainability of 
this conservation governance arrangement (Corbera et al. 2007; McDermott and 
Schreckenberg 2009) Features related to accountability, transparency and self-
regulatory structures will illustrate how the implementation of this ‘community-
driven’ conservation project is failing to prevent the elite capture (Fritzen 2007; 
Platteau and Gaspart 2003). The early operation of El Reten and the 
implementation of projects to generate alternative sources of income require the 
coordination of the different actors involved in the multi-scalar governance 
arrangement at different stages.  In this VCA, promoted as a community-led 
initiative, the inter-institutional operational committee keeps discretionary 
powers while neglecting local and regional power interactions. Furthermore, this 
arrangement is developing a “co-production” of rules (Ostrom 1996) that do not 
fit local dynamics. The issues encountered in this multi-scalar conservation 
practice provide illustrations regarding the importance to recover and to develop 
local capacities for self-organisation and regulation if these conservation 





7.1 Scale and benefit-sharing dilemmas 
The decision-making processes around El Reten that were explained previously, 
cause frictions between communal structures and external agencies, especially 
about benefit-sharing issues. During the negotiation process for the establishment 
of El Reten, external institutions put a strong emphasis on financial incentives in 
the form of future jobs and economic alternatives to gain local support for the 
certification of the VCA (RS, San Miguel, October 22nd, 2010). This is a common 
practice amongst conservation practitioners in order to face resistance and to 
achieve consensus, especially in sceptical localities like those in Chimalapas 
(Durand et al. 2014; Walker et al. 2007). The fact that a certified VCA would make 
San Miguel eligible for payments for environmental services (PES) was a powerful 
incentive for local people to give their support (LA, San Miguel, March, 17th, 2011). 
In addition, the VCA’s management would integrate conservation and sustainable 
use, prioritising the conservation of ecosystems and environmental services, while 
allowing commercial use for the benefit of local inhabitants in the eastern region 
of San Miguel (SB, San Miguel, December 11th, 2010). During unstructured 
interviews, informants mentioned projects such as a water bottling plant; an 
ecotourism project; an environmental management unit (wildlife breeding 
centre); avocado plantations; horticulture for women as well as resin and palm 
harvest projects (SC2, DC, RS, LA, SB, MA, UP, ES, GM2, ST, PR). At the local scale, 
the economic possibilities that the development of those projects could represent 
for local livelihoods worked as incentives for the assemblies of San Antonio and 
Benito Juarez to reach consensus and agreement for the establishment of El Reten 
(RS, San Miguel, October 22nd 2010). However the regulatory conditions and time-
frames of these projects for alternative income were not specified. For example, 
PES are delivered for San Miguel as a community, and according to local accounts 
this was not indicated clearly enough during the negotiation process. 
Consequently, the distribution of responsibilities and benefits amongst different 
community members and the struggles about what corresponds to particular 
settlements and what to San Miguel as a community is one of the current sources 




 As has been described before, once the agreement to establish El Reten was 
reached in San Antonio and Benito Juarez, the final consultation was taken for 
validation to the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly, where most of the people 
involved in previous negotiations were not present. Thus, even though the 
negotiation took place with the two settlements surrounding El Reten, the final 
decision was made in the centre of the community, enhancing mistrust towards 
the external agencies involved and a lack of legitimacy in the process amongst 
people from San Antonio and Benito Juarez. Other non-eastern settlements also 
felt neglected for not being considered as options to establish a VCA. In 
conversations with comuneros about the reasons for external agencies to discuss 
with local settlements’ members and make the official decisions in the centre, 
their perspective was that external agencies use the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly for validation to avoid the resistance of the general assembly (LA, San 
Miguel, March, 17th, 2011). According to some informants, the plans and strategies 
validated reflect only the interests promoted by the external agencies who are 
also getting economic benefits from the funds derived from the VCA (SB, SC, San 
Miguel, December 10-11th, 2010). In this sense, some of the community members 
expressed their disagreement arguing that external agencies were obtaining 
economic benefits from the communal efforts, but neglecting local needs and 
governance structures, as the following statement illustrates: 
“[External agencies] forget their role and put the community as a third 
party; they do not pay attention to the community structure. What they 
try to do is to channel resources to their own interests; then, they get all 
the recognition while the community is restricted” (SB, San Miguel, 
December 11th, 2011). 
 
The operational committee has linked all the economic mechanisms mentioned 
above to El Reten in order to provide sources of economic resources for operation 
and to fund alternative activities for livelihoods in San Miguel, especially those 
living in the eastern region of the community. In general, there is no public 
information about the total amount of economic investment that has been made 
by external agencies for the certification and implementation process of El Reten 
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to date. However, it is common knowledge that all this funding comes through the 
community-led conservation discourse portrayed from WWF and CONANP to 
funding bodies. This is consistent with the elite capture through the selective 
distribution of limited knowledge in both ways: to donors and to beneficiaries 
(Platteau et al. 2014). Economic inputs promoting conservation and development 
in the Chimalapas region have been continuous since the end of 1980’s. Then, after 
the fires in 1998, the institutional presence of government agencies and NGOs as 
well as the diversity of funding programs progressively increased, especially in 
the eastern region, where the land tenure conflict is also located. The planning, 
negotiation and certification of El Reten took from 2004 to 2010, and it is reported 
that only in 2004 the investment that different external agencies put into the 
process in the Chimalapas region was of $71,379,106.30 pesos 
(~£3,441,525 GBP).  This quantity includes the costs of participatory processes, 
diagnostics and technical studies, and thus, it does not necessarily mean that 
community members have been directly benefited from it (Plan Maestro 2004). 
The economic incentives related to El Reten arrive at San Miguel at two scales, as 
an agrarian community, in the case of PES, and to San Antonio and Benito Juarez 
being the two settlements most directly related to El Reten, in the case of PET, 
PROCODES and the pine-resin harvest project.  
The distribution of economic benefits from PES provides evidence of the scale, 
benefit-sharing and equity issues encountered in the early operation of El Reten. 
In 2008, the first PES was delivered to the community adding to PET and 
PROCODES (Section 5.1). Since 2008, the distribution of PES in San Miguel has 
been very different from year to year. From the beginning of the program in 2008, 
there have been two successive communal committees in charge of the 
administration of the resources. Both committees have had two different styles of 
distributing PES among settlements. Until 2009, the documents for Management 
and Better Practices Plan for El Reten were still being developed by the 
operational committee and thus, the guidelines for the application of the 
resources were rather loose (PR, Juchitan, July 7th, 2010). After receiving the first 
PES of $1.2 million pesos (~£ 57, 279 GBP) in 2008, the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly decided that the PES would be used to pay neighbouring settlements 
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(San Antonio and Benito Juarez) for the fire breaking breaches on the perimeter of 
El Reten. After the forest fire prevention activities were financed (~$140,000 
pesos/~£6, 683 GBP), the communal committee and the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly decided to distribute $408,000 pesos (~£ 19,470 GBP) among the 17 
settlements ($24,000 pesos, ~£1,145 GBP each). According to some community 
members and external informants, the remaining ~$600,000 pesos (~£ 28, 640 
GBP) were not accounted for by the previous comisariado, implying a misuse of 
the funds (CA, San Miguel, November 3rd, 2010). Furthermore, although $24,000 
pesos were distributed to each settlement, people interviewed in the settlements 
could not recall receiving PES or how the money was spent.  
The first meeting I attended with the operational committee in July 2009 was 
focused on the application of the budget from the PES and problems related to 
funds and reports missing from the previous communal committee (2005-2009). 
The representative of CONANP explained to the other members of the operational 
committee that the subsidies paid to the community by CONAFOR in 2007 to 
develop activities of reforestation had not been accounted for (the money was 
delivered but the activities were not developed), and the authorities at the time 
did not provide any formal report. Besides, during the first two years of PES for El 
Reten the budget had been distributed with only a proportion of it being applied 
in conservation activities, while some of the money was missing. Therefore, the 
operational committee wanted to take the opportunity that the change in 
communal authorities represented in order to improve the accountability and 
transparency in the use of PES in San Miguel. They did so by taking a bigger stake 
in the decision about where the resources from PES should be invested, using the 
operational regulations of PES and the Better Management Practices Plan as their 
arguments. By 2010, there were new communal authorities and GADES was in 
charge of developing a budget plan based on a social diagnostic, the Master Plan 
for Chimalapas, and the needs expressed by the new communal committee. In the 
new budget, the distribution of resources among the 17 settlements was reduced 
from $24,000 (~£1,145 GBP) each to an aid for transportation for auxiliary 
secretaries to commute to the assemblies ($6,000 pesos/~£ 286 GBP per year, per 
settlement). The rest of the resources were distributed for specific purposes 
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including activities of the communal committee, technical advice (provided by 
GADES), funding for alternative productive activities, and wages for fire fighting 






























Table 7.1   Proposal for the distribution of the resources from PES in San Miguel in 2010, adapted from GADES.  
Coin is in Mexican Pesos (Unpublished document). 
 




Break-fire lines 10 km 5,500.00 55,000.00 55,000.00 
Maintenance of break-fire lines 20 km 3,500.00 70,000.00 70,000.00 
Burning  of break-fire lines 5 km 4,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 







Establishment of the surveillance 
committee in Benito Juarez 
1  1,500.00 1,500.00 1,500.00 
Surveillance activities 12 Month 5,000.00 60,000.00 60,000.00 
Sign posting of the PES Area 5 Sign post 6,500.00 32,500.00 32,500.00 
Transportation of the posters 1  3,000.00 3,000.00 3,000.00 
Constitution of the Community Conserved 
Area in La Cristalina 




Technical and administrative/accountable 
assistance for the Rural Production 
Societies in San Antonio and Benito Juarez 
12 Month 10,000 120,000.00 120,000.00 
Restoration 
 
Development of a Restoration Program in 
Cerro Prieto 








Acquisition of vehicle for official use  












Repairs of the communal house 1 Repair 50,000 50,000.00 50,000.00 
Operation expenditures of the communal 
committee 
12 Month 35,000.00 420,000.00 420,000.00 
Communal statute 1 Process 25,000.00 25,000.00 25,000.00 
Communal census 1 Process 25,000.00 25,000.00 25,000.00 
Auxiliary Secretaries expenditures 6 Assembly 17,000.00 60,000.00 102,000.00 
Technical Services 1 Annual 57,500.00 57,500.00 57,500.00 




Once the budget was discussed, the comisariado was called to join the meeting 
where the representatives of CONANP and WWF explained him the general 
conditions for the PES to continue. The comisariado was reminded about the 
commitments of the Better Management Practices Plan, which required the 
community:  
(1) To hire a CONAFOR’s service provider to report forest conservation 
activities developed. 
(2) To formally establish a social enterprise and to hire the accounting 
services for the economic alternative projects being developed in the 
eastern region. 
(3) To hire a consultancy to develop workshops informing people about 
the responsibilities and commitments of the certification.  
It was implied that all these services would be provided by GADES who would 
then elaborate the funding reports for CONANP and CONAFOR.  
The incoming members of the communal committee in 2010 argued that there 
were no reports left about the use of PES for 2008 and 2009 by the previous 
committee. However, due to local dynamics and in order to prevent any 
retaliation, neither the operational committee nor the new communal committee 
would proceed legally against the previous communal committee members; this 
situation seems to be common in the community, as the following statement 
suggests: 
… “[Communal authorities] come and go, they do not give reports, and 
we cannot get into personal problems [trying to get explanations], all 
what we want is to work” (CA, San Miguel, November 3rd, 2010).
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The proportion of the distribution of PES in 2010 based on the budget that was 
developed by GADES and consequently presented to the auxiliary secretaries’ 
assembly is presented in Fig. 7.2. It illustrates the proportion of resources arriving 
to San Miguel at the community level and those that actually land as economic 
incentives on the eastern settlements next to El Reten. 
 
 
The distribution of PES and the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly of March 2011 
have been partly described in the previous section in terms of decision-making. 
Thus, this section focuses on the scale and benefit-sharing dilemma created where 
economic benefits from PES are distributed at the community level but the 
responsibilities over the area rely mostly on two settlements only.  The size of San 
Miguel (134,000 has) and its complicated topography have enhanced a scattered 
distribution of the population. In the case of the settlements in the eastern region 
of San Miguel, where El Reten is located, its remoteness and position next to the 
area under land tenure conflict make the fair distribution of responsibilities and 
benefits difficult. The distance between settlements means that only two out of 17 
settlements, San Antonio and Benito Juarez, are directly located within the 
surroundings of El Reten in the eastern region of the community. Even though El 
Reten is part of the communal lands and certified as an area conserved by the 
community of San Miguel, in reality, San Antonio and Benito Juarez, with frequent 
participation of Sol y Luna are the main settlements involved when it comes to the 














settlements and the centre without direct responsibility to the area, but still 
holding an equal share on the benefits. This is a common difficulty in development 
projects, since programs like PES are based on constructed images of community 
(Li 1996) and applied by extensionist without further consideration of local 
dynamics where," as Lummis (2010) pointed out, “to treat [people] as if they were 
the same is not necessarily to treat them justly”. 
According to the communal committee, and to data recorded through direct 
observation of meetings and assemblies, there is a common feeling among the 
settlements other than San Antonio and Benito Juarez that all the benefits derived 
from El Reten and alternative production projects are directed to the eastern 
settlements. Even though it makes sense that economic incentives for 
conservation and alternative sources of income are focused on the area where the 
highest conservation priorities are located, the current distribution of economic 
benefits creates disagreement in two senses. On the one hand, people from 
settlements not involved with El Reten argue that all the community should 
benefit equally from it, since the VCA is located within communal lands. On the 
other hand, people from neighbouring settlements, San Antonio and Benito Juarez, 
think they should be the most benefited from PES and other funds, since they hold 
most of the responsibilities related to El Reten. These contrasting perspectives 
create friction and polemic during local settlements and auxiliary secretaries’ 
assemblies. This equity issue has derived from the fact that the benefit 
distribution mechanisms and management decisions have not been determined by 
the local governance structures but, in this case by the inter-institutional 
operational committee, which is a consistent practice in Mexico (Corbera et al. 
2007).  
Regarding the perceived fairness of the cost-benefit sharing (Brown and Corbera 
2003), inhabitants from San Antonio and Benito Juarez, next to El Reten have 
coped with having to claim those lands from the logging companies, living under 
constant conflicts with the ejidos and police from Chiapas. They are also in charge 
of fighting the fires in the area and of protecting it from foreign hunters. Thus, the 
argument of the eastern settlements is that the fact that El Reten is still considered 
a conservation priority is mainly due to their efforts and at the expense of their 
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constant conflict with the ejidos from Chiapas. Therefore, comuneros from San 
Antonio and Benito Juarez feel that they should receive the bulk of the benefits 
from the establishment of the VCA.  Claims due to the imbalance between the costs 
of living next to the area under conflict and the benefit-sharing are phrased as 
environmental concerns by comuneros, as was expressed during one of the 
auxiliary secretaries’ assemblies: 
“In the eastern region, we have been protecting El Reten with no 
payments… we want to conserve. If that money gets distributed [among 
the 17 settlements], who is really going to protect El Reten?” (MG2, San 
Miguel, March 4th, 2011).    
The economic benefits of PES are targeted at the community scale and, according 
to the members of the operational committee, a proportion of them must be used 
for conservation related activities. In a large area with scattered population and 
relying only in two settlements for the stewardship and management of El Reten, 
the challenge for the communal and operational committees is to deliver not only 
equitable, but also fair benefits derived from the VCA to the community.  This 
creates a dilemma for the communal authorities and resentment among the 
inhabitants from San Antonio and Benito Juarez. Nevertheless, people from other 
settlements of the community are also marginalized, and receive even less 
institutional attention due to the lack of important areas for conservation in their 
lands (LA, San Miguel, March 17th, 2011). For non-eastern settlements, it is 
important that the resources from the PES for El Reten are distributed among all 
the members of the community. In the words of a comunero from La Compuerta: 
“It is good that a project benefits all community members… after all, all 
of us are hungry” (TC, San Miguel, March 4th, 2011). 
But for members from Sol y Luna is not so easy. Sol y Luna is also located in the 
eastern region, but the settlement was not considered for alternative income 
activities, even though they participate in the fire fighting activities for El Reten. 
Since they have not been included in the current projects related to the VCA, the 
auxiliary secretary of the settlement refused to receive the aid of $6,000 pesos 
per year offered to each auxiliary secretary for transportation to the assemblies 
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from PES. When asked about the reason for refusing taking the money, the 
auxiliary secretary from Sol y Luna replied:  
“[We don’t want to receive the money because]…it is not a gift, we are 
the ones who have to stand strong, people from the centre [of San 
Miguel] do receive [PES] as a gift” (RE, San Miguel, March 4th, 2010). 
The arrival of economic benefits enhances different interests and questions 
amongst community members. However, the current benefit distribution has 
also fragmented the group of four eastern settlements (San Antonio, Benito 
Juarez, Sol y Luna and La Cristalina) who have worked together through time 
looking for solutions to the agrarian conflicts affecting them. The fact that 
only two out of four are receiving institutional attention has had an impact 
on the relationship between them, as the following phrase of a key informant 
states: 
“There is fractioning between settlements due to the different treatment 
that the communal committee and… [External agencies] give to different 
settlements” (SC, San Miguel, December 12th, 2010). 
Moreover, the differences around benefit-sharing go further that between 
neighbouring and non-neighbouring settlements to El Reten. Additionally to these 
claims there is also a division caused by the differences in economic incentives 
arriving to San Antonio and Benito Juarez. Despite being part of the same 
community and being next to El Reten, San Antonio and Benito Juarez are different 
in ethnic composition, local organisational arrangements and ways of interaction 
with external agencies. According to local accounts, Benito Juarez is mainly 
inhabited by Zoque people who migrated from the centre of San Miguel (SB, SC, ES, 
GM2, MA). Contrastingly, San Antonio’s population is mainly constituted by 
families who migrated from Chiapas and Michoacan as workers of the logging 
companies, but who agreed to be part of San Miguel once the community claimed 
the lands (MA, UP, SC2, GM2). These differences in backgrounds also mean 
differences in the ways both settlements relate to communal authorities, and 
external agencies. At the end of 1990’s, after the forest fires, brigades were created 
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by SEDAF9, to control and prevent forest fires. This implied that only a certain 
number of community members would get paid to control and fight fires in each 
settlement. People from Benito Juarez did not agree, they argued that community 
members’ collaboration to control fires was part of their customs, and if payments 
were added to this arrangement it would not be tequio anymore, making the 
responsibility rely only on four or five people. On the other hand, San Antonio 
agreed and accepted while Benito Juarez decided that they would keep controlling 
fires as tequio. This event is identified as a breaking point between and within both 
settlements. Since then, people from San Antonio are perceived by Benito Juarez as 
betrayers to the community, while people from Benito Juarez are perceived by 
external agencies as rebels. Later on, when CONAFOR implemented its own 
brigades to control fires within and around El Reten, both communities decided to 
participate with six comuneros being paid each season to control fires in El Reten. 
Hence, despite the economic opportunities the temporary employment represents, 
it is also affecting the local structure of the tequio. Nowadays, each time a big fire 
threatens the region and exceeds the capacity of the twelve comuneros hired by 
CONAFOR, there are heated debates in the local settlement assemblies about 
whether fire-fighting in the VCA should be done only by those receiving a salary, or 
this activity should stay as a part of the tequio, regardless of the payment. Local 
opinions on this matter are divided.  
More directly related to El Reten, based on field observations, there were 
differences in institutional presence and benefits received between the two 
settlements; consequently, awareness and involvement in the VCA differed as well 
due to two main reasons: 
1)  the distance to the area, as San Antonio is located adjacent to El Reten while 
Benito Juarez has less proportion of the area inside its perimeter, and  
2) the different interactions that both settlements have with communal 
authorities and agencies in the operational committee.  
                                                          




The differences in involvement with activities related to El Reten could be 
explained by the differences in the way both settlements interact with the external 
agencies as I could acknowledge during my stay. The predominant feature of the 
assemblies in Benito Juarez is that people are more reactive in terms of their 
interaction with external agencies and the projects delivered, to a point they can 
be confrontational. Previous conflicts between the Benito Juarez and CONANP 
representatives, which involve the murder of a member of the settlement that was 
working as representative of CONANP at the time, have resulted in Benito Juarez 
being ruled out from the agency’s programs. Even though people in Benito Juarez 
disagreed with the projects not reaching the settlement, they also recognise that 
this is due to their relationship with the extensionists. Beyond previous conflicts, 
comuneros acknowledge that contrary to other settlements, people in Benito 
Juarez refuse just to take anything external agencies want to promote, as the 
statement of a comunero reflects: 
“...Since we have always confronted the vertical way in which they work, 
they say ‘let’s not even touch Benito Juarez’…and there is a different 
treat to settlements… they keep bringing their projects from up there, 
which nobody wants or is interested in… institutions treat each 
settlement as a community by itself” (SB, San Miguel, December 22nd, 
2010). 
People from San Antonio, generally sympathetic to the dominant political party in 
San Miguel, the PRI, has traditionally received more attention from the communal 
authorities. As I could confirm through direct observation, through time, people in 
San Antonio have had a closer relationship with both authorities, communal and 
municipal, providing votes for the PRI. Consequently, San Antonio has had more 
projects and subsidies arriving to the settlement through time, such as the tomato 
orchards and the firewood saving stoves. These projects did not reach Benito 
Juarez, which population is more aligned with the central-left political party, PRD. 
As a result of the different treatment San Antonio and Benito Juarez receive, there 
are clear and constant disagreements between both settlements. Nevertheless, 
Benito Juarez hold stronger organisation and when needed, i.e. in times of conflict 
with ejidos, Benito Juarez holds the leading role.  
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Once more, the fact that community members are paid to fight fires is portrayed by 
external agencies as participation. On the ground, this “participatory” program has 
been applied as a “tool” and a discourse to achieve the voluntary submission of 
people to external regulations and achieve externally designed goals (Pimbert and 
Pretty 1995; Walker et al. 2007). It does so at the expense of local uses and 
customs, diminishing local reciprocity, trust links, the stability of the group and 
thus, limiting the potential for collective action for natural resources management 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995). 
The situations presented in this section illustrate the difficulty that ruling over 
such a large area poses in order to define the boundaries of the community as well 
as the cost-benefit sharing of natural resources management. Further challenges 
emerge regarding the accountability of different community members, included 
the communal authorities. Scale issues in the community are also reflected by the 
implementation of El Reten, emphasising the differences between local 
settlements’ structures and the communal structures. These differences become 
more evident when looking at the challenge that the fair distribution of 
responsibilities and benefits regarding El Reten represents for the communal 
authorities and the operational committee. The following and final data section 
will then explore the practical implications that multi-scale governance 
arrangements have in three relevant governance features: accountability, 
transparency and rule of law.   
 
7.2 Accountability and transparency issues in El Reten 
As has been mentioned in sections 3.4.2, regional and top-down politics in San 
Miguel have enhanced paternalism and a consequent deterioration of the 
communal structures for self-organisation, self-regulation, accountability and 
transparency. Thus, programs that supposedly supported by locals tend to last as 
long as funds do(Pimbert and Pretty 1995).   This is the case especially in the 
central region of the community, where comuneros are used to the arrival of a 
diversity of subsidies and development projects (mentioned in Section 3.1). Once 
economic resources arrive to local communities, the challenge for local 
governance structures is to prevent and to control the elite capture and 
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corruption, which plays as a key factor determining the way development and 
conservation programmes and local agreements are implemented. The 
Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) has ruled San Miguel politically for the last 80 
years. Hence, every municipal president in San Miguel has been aligned to that 
political party. Similarly, even though communal authorities are independent of 
politics in theory, communal committee presidents are both, from the central 
region and aligned to the PRI.  This political party is widely known for its 
paternalistic approach as well as the development of client-patron relationships 
with rural and indigenous communities (Gledhill 2000). As a result, in rural areas 
like San Miguel, subsidies arriving to the community for multiple purposes have 
eroded community structures and productive means, as one member of the 
communal committee related: 
 “Individualism is big, since political parties intruded in the community, 
people do not organise anymore… [Twenty years ago], in San Miguel 
used to produce… today the fruit does not go out but comes in… 
tomorrow, if the government wants to stop giving us [subsidies], what is 
left for us?… only migration” (CyC, San Miguel, November 3rd, 2010). 
Although communal structures are still strong in the eastern settlements, the 
same pattern is also present and, according to informants, government 
interventions have also created client-patron relationships and internal divisions 
between San Antonio and Benito Juarez (DS, San Miguel, November 26th, 2010).  
The operational committee for El Reten prides itself for attempting to shift local 
paternalism by promoted the establishment of cooperatives for rural production 
(OD, Oaxaca, February 26th, 2011). This is aimed to enhance self-organisation 
structures at the same time of providing alternative sources of income. The 
generation of alternative productive projects to provide sustainable sources of 
income has become an important component of the economic incentives in El 
Reten (Section 7.1). Hence, most of the management activities in San Antonio and 
Benito Juarez related to El Reten are about the development of cooperatives and 
alternative sources of income that include the adoption of more sustainable 
practices (Plan Maestro 2004). However, the process to change patterns has not 
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considered local systems of incentives and patterns so the persistence of local 
elite capture has been further complicated with the capture of powers that the 
operational committee developed. Through the observation of the implementation 
of one of these projects I could observe the local reliance on external institutions 
and economic incentives for the operation of the projects implemented within the 
framework of the VCA. Moreover, I could appreciate how not only external 
agencies’ extensionists are used to treat local people as passive receptors but how 
local people have learned to behave as such. This became evident during my stay 
in both settlements when I could observe part of the implementation process of an 
alternative income generation project, the Pine resin harvest. This was one of the 
projects proposed by external agencies to persuade eastern settlements to accede 
to the certification of El Reten. This project has been externally designed and 
funded but involved increasing local involvement as the project developed. The 
project reached a stage where it required local structures for accountability and 
transparency that were not easy to improvise through training workshops, and 
where local dynamics were easily reflected, as will be explored below. 
 
7.2.1 The pine-resin harvest project 
Even though PES revenues are not perceived by the responses from informants, 
the debates about their distribution give already an idea about the problem of 
keeping accountability locally in San Miguel. Contrastingly, the development of the 
pine resin is already having positive effects as an alternative source of income, 
while local cooperatives promote local organisation to be incorporated into the 
formal economy. However, despite the positive performance of the project in 
technical terms, rural enterprises managing the cash start to reflect local 
dynamics regarding accountability and transparency in San Antonio and Benito 
Juarez.  This section will explore the resin harvest project as an alternative source 
of income and a viable project enhancing shifts in perceptions towards the 
possible uses of forested areas. It then goes further into the dynamics in which the 
lack of local accountability mechanisms would seem to make external mechanisms 
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and regulations necessary to keep projects running and to prevent relations of 
trust from further deterioration, justifying external interventions. 
The general belief about community market-oriented enterprises of common pool 
resources is that the costs of their establishment exceed the benefits perceived 
(Antinori and Bray 2005). The resin harvest project was first proposed as part of 
the alternative economic activities accompanying the certification of El Reten as a 
VCA. According to local informants, after a long lobbying campaign and search for 
funding, the project started in 2008 with the formal constitution of Rural Capital 
Societies (hereafter cooperatives) in both settlements, San Antonio and Benito 
Juarez. Technical studies developed by members of the operational committee 
defined the areas available for harvesting and distributed them among 
cooperative members in a pilot stage of the project. Then, one hectare in each 
settlement was established as pilot area where cooperative members were 
trained and learned about good practices and developed their skills in resin 
harvesting. Local informants reported there was a big fluctuation in local interests 
on the project from the start. According to initial reports, the Rural Production 
Societies for pine resin harvest started with 17 people from San Antonio and 19 
people from Benito Juarez in each cooperative, but numbers dropped soon after 
the project failed to deliver immediate results. Still, thanks to the funding of 
external agencies through the operational committee and the technical advice 
from GADES, the project continued in both settlements. Between 2009 and 2010, 
the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation for Development and other 
national private funds financed the formal setting of both rural cooperatives as 
well as the establishment of one resin collection centre in each settlement. 
Simultaneously, GADES established links with a distillery company in Michoacan, 
which agreed to pay 10 pesos (above the market price) per litre of resin. The 
company also supported the cooperatives lending money for the equipment 
needed by cooperative members so the harvest could be started. Later that year, 
SEMARNAT funded the purchase of mules to support the acquisition of 
infrastructure for the work of the cooperatives.   
By November 2010, the cooperatives were preparing for their first shipment of 
resin to the distillery. Once the harvest started, both cooperatives agreed with the 
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purchaser that he would support the capitalization of the enterprises with 
$50,000 pesos for each collection centre. In this way, collection centres could pay 
in cash to the producers as soon as they handed their resin, and the money would 
be returned once the purchaser paid for the product.  Each settlement elected a 
local committee for their own cooperative, this committee is in charge of receiving 
the product, paying the producers, picking up the money from the city and 
elaborating accounting reports to GADES.  In December, a first shipment of 42 
tons of resin was sent to Michoacan. The production was equivalent to an income 
of $378,000 pesos (~£17,181 GBP) distributed between the members of both 
cooperatives according to their production ($9 pesos/ ~£0.40 GBP per kg). Also, 
for each kilo of resin sold, the cooperatives agreed that $1 peso stayed in the till, 
$0.20 cents out of that peso were to be paid to the communal committee for land 
use rights, and $0.80 cents were to be saved for an emergency fund. The 
treasurers of both cooperative committees were in charge of keeping those 
resources. By February 2011, two shipments had been sent and the income 
opportunities the project was generating were so attractive that many community 
members wanted to join the cooperatives. However, there were not enough plots 
and materials to distribute amongst the newcomers, so people started to share 
plots with family members and dividing the materials and the profits. GADES and 
the cooperatives applied to SEMARNAT for an extension of the harvest area in 
both settlements. The permit for extension had already been granted in May 2011, 
when the data collection period of this research ended. The project kept 
progressing and the purchaser sent his technicians from Michoacan to improve 
local skills in order to increase productivity and to make sure environmental 
regulations were being met.  
At the end of the data collection period, the pine resin harvest project was already 
making evident differences within San Antonio and Benito Juarez. During my last 
visit to the settlements in May 2012, I could observe and discuss with some 
cooperative members the benefits that the resin project has brought to their 
homes. During informal conversations in both settlements and a meeting I had 
with the comuneros in one of the settlements, people expressed the various ways 
in which the cash arriving through the resin is making a difference in their 
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livelihoods. In the view of the housewives from the community, the resin harvest 
is making a difference in the sense that the household budget is less constrained, 
or as one put it, ‘more relaxed’. A statement from a head of household also 
confirmed this: 
“Now there is money in the pocket, you can buy biscuits for your coffee or 
a soda… before you could only watch others having them” (QO, San 
Miguel, May 5th, 2012).  
For another producer, the economic resources generated through the resin 
harvest mean increased opportunities for younger generations, as parents are 
now able to send money for members of the family to study outside the 
community at higher education levels. In general, cooperative members were very 
enthusiastic about the benefits that the resin harvest is bringing to the 
settlements. Notwithstanding all these positive effects, for some other households, 
it was mentioned, the increased income meant a higher alcohol intake and 
domestic violence related to it.  
Local perspectives are particularly relevant when cooperative members compare 
this newly established activity with their previous sources of income. One 
informant, who was in jail for marijuana cultivation years ago, is now one of the 
most prolific harvesters and, until recently, the president of the cooperative in his 
settlement. He was particularly enthusiastic during our conversation about the 
benefits he can perceive as head of household, he expressed:  
“I’m feeling the difference, before I could not afford to have a TV, DVD, 
concrete floor, motorcycle, horses and cows… It is an honest, clean job. 
You can come and go without any concern” (DS, Benito Juarez, May 14th, 
2012). 
Furthermore, there are already comparisons between the resin harvest and the 
extensive cattle ranching. For monetary and time reasons, the resin results more 
profitable to local producers than cattle ranching and logging. It also provides an 
incentive to prevent forest fires and to stop clearing pine forest for extensive 
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cattle ranching. According to one informant, harvesting one ton of resin each 
month and a half is tantamount to sell a stallion:  
“I have reared cattle during five years and I have only sold three of them 
for $5,000 pesos each, while with the resin I obtained the same money in 
one shipment” (GF, Benito Juarez, May 13th, 2012).  
Thus, even though the resin harvest is the only project successfully functioning 
out of the many offered by external agencies as incentives, the benefits derived 
from it are already being perceived through an improvement in local livelihoods 
and local attitudes towards the forest and its resources. Furthermore, the 
technical advice, capital and company to set up formal enterprises and 
cooperatives have been crucial for the project. At the same time the cooperatives 
are new platforms where community members can learn new skills and negotiate 
with communal authorities, local assemblies and external agencies, enhancing 
local capacities. 
However, notwithstanding the progress and benefits of the resin harvest project, 
the arrival and management of economic resources related to it has triggered 
some local dynamics providing hints about the aspects contributing to previous 
project failures. These dynamics, I argue, are also reflected in the local natural 
resource management and represent an obstacle for the long-term sustainability 
of the project and natural resources in El Reten. The local dynamics point to 
structural flaws regarding accountability, transparency and enforcement at the 
settlement and community scales. The first event that highlights these flaws 
happened at the beginning of the resin harvest project, when funds from 
SEMARNAT to buy mules for the cooperative members arrived. In one of the 
settlements, comuneros who were not part of the cooperatives argued that the 
funds should be used to buy horses -which are cheaper but less resistant- for all 
the comuneros. In normal circumstances, the pressure of particular members of 
the local assembly would have been enough to affect the performance of the 
project. In this case, it would have meant that horses, if purchased at all, could not 
cope with the intensity of the work, affecting directly the long-term performance 
of the project. Moreover, the change would have to be reported to SEMARNAT and 
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it would negatively affect further funding applications by the cooperatives. Once 
more, the representative of GADES, in charge of the technical implementation of 
the project, intervened so funds were applied according to the operational rules of 
the funding program. On the one hand, this situation could work in the long run 
for the benefit for the community by enhancing the trust of external agencies to 
the community for investment. On the other, this is another externally imposed 
decision that illustrates the role of NGOs imposing external discourses and 
priorities, legitimising state regulations (Arts 2004; Durand et al. 2014). 
Another event where local transparency and enforcement challenges became 
evident took place when the reports for the resin harvest were delivered, in April 
2012. My last visit to San Antonio and Benito Juarez happened just after the 
accountability report for the resin harvest project had been elaborated by GADES 
in both settlements. Despite numerous requisitions to see such reports in both 
settlements and the consultancy itself, the replies were elusive. According to key 
informants and corroborated by GADES later, there were $50,000 pesos missing 
from the capitalisation and emergency funds for the Rural Production Enterprises 
in one of the settlements. This is probably one of the reasons for keeping the 
reports hermetic, as this information could impact negatively further possibilities 
of funding for this and other projects in the region. Key informants in the 
settlement argued that this was not the first time the performance of a project was 
affected by people misusing economic resources. It was always the same group of 
people behind these issues in the settlement, but since they were used to make 
use of violence, no one in the settlement dared to openly complain about their 
actions. In that sense, the settlement had no way to force the rule-breakers to pay 
for their misbehaviour, causing frustration for people who had been working hard 
to get the resin project working in their settlement. Therefore, already weak 
relations of trust and community structures for compliance in that particular 
settlement were further broken and members of the cooperative felt discouraged. 
When asked why those individuals were still allowed to hold positions that 
involved dealing with community’s economic resources, informants stated:  
“[In the settlement] everybody knows who works and who does not; however, 
those who are trusted cannot hold many positions within the community at the 
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same time” (QO, San Miguel, May 14th, 2012). 
Hence, in this particular settlement, internal divisions mutually reinforce the lack 
of clear structures for accountability, transparency and enforcement for rule 
breakers. Furthermore, local groups are organised to take the positions that 
manage economic resources and the threat of violent retaliation also prevents 
other community members to act about the diversion of funds. Facing this 
situation, people get discouraged by the impotence of not being able to enforce the 
rule of law and drop from projects. The case detailed above is a common elite 
capture situation (Adams and Hutton 2007; Fritzen 2007), a local vicious cycle 
that is difficult to break by external agencies and that should have not been 
overlooked when designing and implementing the VCA. Therefore, despite the 
potential for improvement of sources of income that the resin harvest project 
represents, the local dynamics within the settlements already affect the 
performance of both cooperatives. Externally designed accountability mechanisms 
are failing to acknowledge local patterns with the risk of strengthening them even 
more (Fischer et al. 2007). Without clear structures to keep local accountability, 
the sustainability of the project increasingly relies on external sources of funding 
and accountability without further changes in power dynamics and strengthening 
client-patron relationships between the community and the funding agencies 
(Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
Even though formal requirements and regulations from externally designed 
projects in El Reten provide an impersonal platform that allows external 
institutions to keep accountability, power was being accumulated by the brokers 
(Corbera et al. 2007). Since formal reports are the condition for the continuity of 
external sources of funding to arrive to the community, these requirements have 
enhanced a closer interaction between communal authorities, settlements and the 
operational committee through GADES. The multiple links and responsibilities 
that GADES has within the governance arrangement increased the influence that 
the consultancy can have in the overall process. Moreover, issues on 
accountability were also evident in the relationship between the settlements and 
the external agencies regarding the clarity with which the external funds were 
being invested. The question of how much money is being received from 
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international and national funders by NGOs and government agencies has 
captured local attention. This subject became relevant to local people after an 
event where the collection centres for resin were inaugurated San Antonio and 
Benito Juarez. Besides the members of the operational committee, a 
representative of an international donor (the Spanish Agency of International 
Cooperation for Development, AECID) that had been funding the implementation 
of the resin project attended the event. During the inauguration, members of the 
operational committee emphasized the enthusiasm of AECID’s representative 
about the community-led project. However, according to local accounts, 
throughout the event the representative of AECID was never introduced to the 
communal authorities or the community members, who did not get the chance to 
talk to him. As local people realized that this project, as many others in the past 
(Walker et al. 2007), had been funded through international aid, they started 
questioning the NGOs about the amounts and investments of the funding. 
Nevertheless, responses from the members of the operational committee were 
elusive, as a local community member related: 
“NGOs and embassies are supporting with funds, but those funds never 
fully reach their destination and we do not know how much stays 
where… [External agencies] tell us that they are not right the person to 
ask about those issues” (SMV, San Miguel, November 17th, 2010). 
Even though the economic information is openly shared within the operational 
committee during meetings, only filtered information reaches community 
members. As has been shown so far, issues in the community can easily be 
politicized, and the arrival of economic resources is a big source of disturbance 
and discussion. This can turn an obstacle for agencies in charge of the 
implementation, as local community members will not necessarily acknowledge 
all the costs and bureaucratic requirements for funding to land on a community. 
However, it is contrasting that in a “community-led’ conservation initiative, the 
mechanisms for accountability only go from the community to external agencies 
but not in the opposite way.  
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Therefore, local dynamics and the lack of clear structures for accountability affect 
the performance of alternative productive projects and make the local structures 
dependent of external mechanisms and agencies to keep processes transparent in 
a clear elite capture at both, the local settlement and the community-external 
agencies levels. The elite capture by the operational committee is kept through 
information distortion to the funding bodies and to local community members 
(Platteau et al. 2014). Information and capacities remain centralised and make the 
operational committee indispensable for the funding, implementation and 
monitoring of the VCA; meanwhile, local structures for accountability and self-
regulation capacities remain behind in attention.  Furthermore, there are not 
accountability structures between scales. Consequently, accountability structures 
have been developed to keep local communities accountable, to a certain degree, 
but there is a lack of structures to keep external agencies accountable in front of 
local communities. This processes portrayed as community-led to funding 
agencies, is imposing externally designed economic incentives that make local 
communities increasingly relying on external capacities for funding and reporting. 
Even though there are not clear data about the allocation of resources, the 
likelihood is that a disproportionate share of benefits is being controlled by the 
self-imposed elite that presents the projects as a “take it or leave it” situation 
(Platteau and Gaspart 2003). This ultimately affects relations of trust between the 
different actors involved in this multi-scalar governance arrangement and the 
overall performance of the VCA. 
 
 7.3 Self-regulatory mechanisms related to natural resource 
management in El Reten 
The last part of this chapter makes emphasis on the issues regarding self-
regulatory mechanisms in place for the management of El Reten. The concept of 
ICCAs, which in principle could be considered as equivalent to the Mexican VCAs, 
implies the power devolution from the state to give emphasis to self-regulatory 
mechanisms. Accordingly, the reforms to LGEEPS imply the devolution of powers 
to local governance structures to establish and manage protected areas. This 
chapter explores whether this devolution of “bundles of powers” (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003) with insufficient decision-making and funding powers is enough to 
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sustain conservation efforts in El Reten. Hence, this final data section explores the 
effects of the interactions in the multi-scalar governance arrangement in place 
over the communal structures’ capacity to regulate natural resource use and 
conservation around El Reten. As has been explained in Chapter 6, internal 
communal structures in San Miguel are adapting to respond to the responsibilities 
acquired by the formalisation of their VCA and the resources arriving through it. 
Natural resource access in El Reten is at the same time a source of conflict, the 
reason for external institutional support and the means of livelihoods for 
inhabitants in the eastern settlements. However, the lack of legitimacy of local 
regulatory frameworks is further complicated by the open access situation 
maintained by the land tenure and for natural resource access dispute in the 
eastern region (Becker and Ostrom 1995). While the operational committee was 
trying to promote the update, redefinition and enforcement of self-regulatory 
mechanisms in San Miguel, the participatory discourse only made the top-down 
strategies used more evident. This final empirical section aims to emphasise the 
importance of self-promoted and designed rules that move beyond the provision 
of externally designed priorities if the local natural resource access wants to be 
sustained. However, authentic local and autonomous efforts are not usually 
welcomed by the state and external agencies.  
During the early implementation of El Reten, as links between the communal 
authorities and San Antonio and Benito Juarez started to be renovated, the 
internal community needed to define rights and responsibilities of community 
members stated to be promoted by the operational committee through the 
communal authorities. Thus, local institutional arrangements in San Miguel, and 
more particularly in San Antonio and Benito Juarez, were challenged to adapt to 
fulfil new accountability and institutional requirements and to define clear natural 
resource access regulations. These requirements were the result of San Miguel’s 
formal incorporation to conservation efforts through the certification of the VCA, 
and to the market economy through the resin-harvest cooperatives. Community 
governance structures were required to adapt for the implementation of 
externally designed management programs; to the arrival and accountability of 
economic resources from PES and the resin harvest project. As described in 
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Section 2.2.2, the communal statute represents the regulatory basis of agrarian 
communities. Even though the communal statute establishes the internal 
regulations, and despite the fact a statute was developed in San Miguel in the year 
2000, the document remained largely unknown and unapplied. Furthermore, 
enforcement of self-regulatory frameworks, especially those related to natural 
resource use such as logging remain limited as will be explained below. 
In San Antonio and Benito Juarez self-subsistence hunting is practiced; however, 
local concerns about the lack of self-regulatory and enforcement mechanisms are 
focused mainly on deforestation and forest fires. The group of people who 
participate in the local network for illegal timber extraction is clearly identified by 
members from settlements, NGO members, and people living in the surrounding 
areas. Nevertheless, people are very cautious when talking about it, and only two 
large seizures of timber were mentioned during the various talks and interviews 
developed. The first seizure mentioned was in 1998, and the second was in 2009. 
According to local informants, one person in each of both settlements is the link to 
the buyer in the nearest town, El Jicaro, close to the highway, who then re-sells the 
wood to merchants from Cintalapa, Chiapas. Informants alleged that these 
activities are known and covered up by the police from Chiapas and Oaxaca states, 
the federal police and even the army, which has a surveillance point on the road 
down from the eastern region to El Jicaro. For security reasons, I could not explore 
the illegal logging more in depth. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention that I 
received different explanations when discussing the reasons for such illegal 
behaviour in the eastern region. Some of the informants expressed their 
frustration for not being granted a formal permit for forestry exploitation, despite 
numerous applications to SEMARNAT, as the following statement shows:  
“We went to a Forestry workshop and we had the intention [to apply it], 
but [there is no flexibility], whatever the document up there says, that is 
what has to be done and [the government] sends us projects that are not 
very useful to us”  (DS, San Miguel, November 26th, 2010, 2010).  
The discontent was further enhanced after SEMARNAT, the same agency that 
denied a permit to San Miguel, granted a forest exploitation permit to the ejidos 
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from Chiapas, within communal lands. This authorisation overlooked the fact that 
the area assigned for timber exploitation is not only within the conflict area, but 
also within the perimeter of the area certified as El Reten. Hence, the lack of 
coherence from the government agency in charge of regulating forest resources 
use is part of the problem by enhancing a lack of rule of law. Consequently, 
collective action is discouraged and some of the inhabitants of the eastern region 
refuse to comply with local self-restriction regulations for forestry exploitation. 
Discontented inhabitants argued that they prefer to make use of the resources 
illegally than allowing the ‘invaders’ (free-riders, Becker and Ostrom 1995) to take 
them with the auspices of the government agencies. And even though loggers find 
opposition within the local assemblies, and many informants expressed their 
discontent about the continuous logging, the lack of coherence in SEMARNAT’s 
actions leaves them with few arguments against the loggers, as one of the local 
moral leaders of one of the settlements stated: 
“Loggers tell me: ‘You are envious, you do not eat and do not let the 
others to eat’, but I don’t know why the ejido is stronger than the 
community [in front of the government agencies]” (DS, San Miguel, 
November 26th, 2010). 
During one of the surveillance walks in December 2010, after we found a group of 
logs left abandoned, the brigade members talked about loggers, saying that the 
previous weekend there were members of the community exchanging tables of 
cedar for beer in the next settlement. But, despite its dimension, the illegal logging 
was not openly or thoroughly discussed, with exception of brief mentions in the 
local assemblies. During one auxiliary secretaries’ assembly, the authorities told 
off the auxiliary secretary of one of the eastern settlements about a recent incident 
where wood coming from that locality was seized by the army. The comments of 
the comisariado were brief but emphasised his embarrassment at San Miguel 
being portrayed as a community conserving their natural resources while some of 
its members were actually doing the opposite. Nevertheless, no further 
penalisation was made public and I could not observe any kind of enforcement or 
sanctions being applied to the settlement or to particular people. 
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Despite environmental institutional mismatches, and convoluted local dynamics, 
communal authorities and the members of operational committee were applying 
strategies to stop illegal resource extraction in order to comply with conservation 
commitments. These strategies included the generation of alternatives for income 
and using the certification of the VCA as an anchor to update and enforce local 
agreements and regulations through the communal statute. Common rules and 
sanctions are two of the core features that enhance social capital for sustainable 
natural resource management by providing the incentives for individuals to invest 
in the common good and by making sure that rule-breakers are punished in 
accordance (Pretty 2003). As has been illustrated in section 7.1, there are 
numerous examples of a widespread lack of transparency in both external project 
management and local natural resource use. Informants at different levels of the 
governance arrangement acknowledge that government agencies and previous 
communal authorities share a responsibility in the deterioration of local 
governance structures in San Miguel. Thus, agencies in the operational committee 
and the new communal committee were focusing on improving institutional 
coordination, local transparency and accountability for the use of natural and 
economic common resources in San Miguel, particularly around El Reten.  
In order to enhance transparency and accountability, and to promote sustainable 
natural resource use in San Miguel, different changes were set up at different 
levels of the governance arrangement. For CONANP’s officers on the one hand, this 
shift involved sharing some degree of power and to be more clear and accountable 
to other members of the operational committee in charge of implementation and 
funding such as WWF and FONDO. During the meetings, CONANP’s representative 
would report to them and would negotiate the share in investments over 
particular management actions stated on the management plan of El Reten. This 
was mainly rearticulated by WWF; however the state remains a power container, 
political regulator and economic competitor in the negotiations and decision-
making (Arts 2004). On the other hand, for communal authorities the shift implied 
changes concerning many actors within and around San Miguel. These changes 
included communal authorities to stop receiving money as bravery from ejidos 
occupying communal lands and cattle ranchers leasing lands illegally. Changes also 
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included more presence of the NGOs and communal authorities in local 
settlements, along with the dominant discourses, where conservation is more 
important than local struggles. In a region where empowerment processes have 
been effective (Walker t al. 2007), there was resistance at different levels, from the 
cattle ranchers leasing lands, to people from political parties in the community and 
local settlements’ members used to the absence of an active authority. According 
to informants in the settlements, until then, the prevailing pattern was for 
authorities to misuse the communal resources and accept money to bend internal 
community regulations e.g. allowing illegal logging and land invasions. In response 
to this lack of government, settlements like San Antonio and Benito Juarez had to 
develop their own strategies and structures to face their immediate realities, in 
which the land tenure conflict has had always a prevailing influence. As such, the 
subsistence and defence of the land are the first priorities to settlement members, 
and local assemblies have remained as the self-organisation structures in order to 
face the lack of attention of communal or government authorities and keeping a 
certain degree of autonomy from the communal committee (GM, SCLC, December 
16th, 2010). Nevertheless, as has been explored in Section 7.1, local conflicts, 
commercial interests and internal divisions have taken their toll on the allocation 
of natural resource access, accountability and enforcement in both settlements, 
creating the ideal conditions for the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). 
The power of communal structures to self-regulate local natural resource use in 
San Antonio and Benito Juarez has been negatively affected by the lack of rule of 
law and the open access situation created by land tenure conflict and the external 
institutional mismatches. Thus, there is a double discourse that, on the one hand, 
gives autonomy to local communities for self-regulation, while on the other 
creates and perpetuates the conditions for external control through discourses 
like conservation and development. Hence, even though some of the local 
informants in San Antonio and Benito Juarez identified themselves as advocates 
for the long-term maintenance of El Reten, they defend their livelihoods as the 
first of their priorities over any external regulation that aims to restrict their 
access to natural resources, such as hunting and logging. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding their reliance on external funding and their clarity about 
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rejecting any imposed restriction over local natural resource use, local people also 
acknowledge that the lack of respect to local regulatory frameworks about natural 
resources access is having a negative impact on their immediate environment 
(CJM, San Miguel, November 27th, 2010).  
The process of development of the communal statute and the challenges faced by 
community institutions as enforcement bodies exemplify to what extent power 
has been devolved to local governance structures in El Reten for natural resource 
access. While local structures represent a strong core for community conservation 
with regulations that are both culturally appropriate and locally established, the 
inclusion of San Miguel in formal conservation and the market economy imposes 
externally designed structures and regulations. Therefore, the development of an 
updated communal statute was also an open space for the agendas of the 
communal authorities, local people and external agencies alike. In December 2010 
the communal authorities in charge started a process in order to update the 
communal statute. Communal authorities agreed with the auxiliary secretaries to 
visit each settlement to discuss the content of the communal statue. For the 
meeting to discuss the statute in Benito Juarez, only 18 out of the 70 comuneros 
attended. Despite the low numbers, the communal authorities who travelled to the 
settlement acknowledged that this was one of the most participative localities in 
the community. The comisariado did not attend, probably so the meeting could be 
totally focussed on the statute instead of diverting to the pending issues in the 
community. The president of the vigilance committee, a man with a well-
established moral authority in the community, acknowledged that Benito Juarez 
and San Antonio still have the community structure that has been lost in the 
central part of San Miguel. Since urbanised areas do not attend to the communal 
authorities anymore, communal authorities identified this process as an 
opportunity to rescue the community structure by developing a communal set of 
rules and enforcing them. On this regard, people from Benito Juarez attending to 
the meeting were critical about the use of the conservation discourse and the lack 
of compliance of local agreements about logging, cattle management and use of 




“It is good to have regulations and to enforce them. We talk too much 
about conservation and the land use planning but, is it true what we are 
saying? ... We still have a long way to bring the communal statute to 
reality” (DS, San Miguel, December 22nd , 2011). 
During the meeting, communal authorities explained the process to renovate the 
communal statute, which regulates co-existence in the community. Once more, the 
economic incentives were used in the authorities’ discourse, this time to promote 
self-organisation through the communal statute, as the following statement 
shows:  
“…natural resources protection gives us a basis to develop a communal 
statute and to attract government investments through community 
organisation” (RA, Benito Juarez, December 22nd, 2010) 
This statute, according to the authorities, should also be applied to visitors for 
natural resources use and protection, to defend from invasions and to clearly 
establish the attributions of different government levels. The document should 
define the spaces for local participation in the community as well as the spaces for 
intervention of external agencies. It should also establish the responsibilities and 
sanctions that the lack of compliance and the impacts over the land could have. 
Attendants agreed that one of the main problems was the lack of enforcement: 
“…the statute has hunting ban seasons, but there is a lack of application 
of the written document…We need clarity on the regulations and justice 
in their enforcement as well as an equitable distribution of rights and 
obligations” (SB, San Miguel, December 22nd, 2010). 
People from San Antonio and Benito Juarez also had their own expectations on 
what priorities should be regulated by the communal statute. Since the forest fires 
in 1998, institutional presence had been more constant in the area and it is locally 
acknowledged that the incidence of large forest fires has been reduced. However, 
people still perceives the control of the fire used for renewing the grass for 
livestock as a priority. Along with the land tenure conflict and deforestation, the 
increase on the amount of cattle and the use of fire to open grazing spaces in 
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previously forested areas were recognised as the two main reasons for local 
environmental degradation around El Reten by local informants:  
“Since the communal authorities and the agencies have not paid any 
attention to us, we said let’s do it in whatever way. [The result is that] 
twenty years ago, there were trails of puma and deer everywhere, which 
are over now” (BS, San Miguel, November 28th, 2010).  
Community members also acknowledged that clear boundaries and regulations 
are needed in the community. For local people, the statute and its enforcement 
represent an opportunity to start recovering and restoring environmental 
resources and services that have been affected by the lack of rule of law as pointed 
out by a comunero during the meeting: 
“We need help establishing the boundaries of the community... Another 
issue we need to discuss is the plundering of timber, and the cattle 
ranching by the ejido from Chiapas” (DS, December 22nd, 2010) 
Thus, different members of the community acknowledge the need to regulate and 
respect the land use agreements and to incorporate aspects of the land use 
planning exercise to start applying it, especially as a way to exclude the use of the 
land from people from the ejidos, and even neighbouring settlements where 
peasants are extending out of their land due to population growth and land 
shortage. Nevertheless, the faculty to establish clear boundaries between the 
ejidos and the community goes beyond the communal authorities or the local 
statute. It requires the effective intervention of the Agrarian Reform Secretary and 
the Supreme Justice Court of the Nation, adding more scales to the process of 
definition of clear boundaries and land and resource access use rights. 
Finally, the communal statute represents a window of opportunity not only for 
local people, but also to the external agencies working in place. During interviews 
and informal talks with representatives of government agencies and NGOs, they 
referred to the instability in the community and the length of the processes as 
their main concern for the achievement of conservation agreements and their 
enforcement. As mentioned before, communal committee members are due to 
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change every three years, and each communal committee also gets to the position 
with different perspectives and political agreements set up, making continuity of 
projects extremely uncertain. The representative from CONANP, working in the 
region for more than nine years, commented on this regard: 
 “The constant changes of comisariado bring incertitude to us as 
planners. Negotiation is constant and situations grow stale” (SC2, 
Juchitan, August 25th, 2010). 
Similarly to the implementation within state managed protected areas, the lack of 
continuity and formal structures makes the negotiations at the community level to 
rely on personal connections, since the institutional structures in place are not 
suited to cope with the transitions (AI, Juchitan, July 7th, 2010). Hence, decisions 
and alliances between communal authorities and external agencies are mainly 
managed on a political manner with bonds of trust constantly being created and 
diluting, according to the circumstances and the interests at stake. As shown in 
previous chapters, members for the operational committee have developed strong 
relationship with the current communal committee president. Thus, the 
expectations of the members of the operational committee from the establishment 
of a communal statute were not necessarily related to the setting of more 
autonomous processes or stronger assemblies, but to have more certainty and 
clarity on the structures to continue with the conservation processes. In their 
view, once the local structures are locally appropriated, such structures would be 
relatively independent from the dynamics of the communal authorities,, but 
dependent of the external funding and capacities. The fact that conservation 
related regulations were included into the communal statute would constitute a 
great achievement, as one of the agency representatives stated:  
“You create the habit, and they make it law” (MJ, Juchitan, July 7th, 
2010). 
The development of the communal statute holds the potential not only to regulate 
land and resources use and conservation. It also represents the possibility to bring 
back the power to communal structures to clearly determine their role and 
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faculties within the multi-scalar governance structure in place. However, on the 
other hand, by being promoted by external agencies through communal 
authorities it could also enhance the capacity of the operational committee to 
control individuals, circumstances or resources through a process of 
legitimisation of the strict conservation discourses (Rabinow 1991; Weber 2005: 
43). Ironically, the process for the communal statute was stopped due to the 
increased intensity of the conflict between San Antonio and Benito Juarez and the 
ejidos from Chiapas. Therefore, externally designed regulatory frameworks 
continued to be the reference for the implementation of El Reten. On the one hand, 
such regulatory structures provide an impersonal platform that allows their 
implementation with lesser risks of personal retaliation in the community. 
Nevertheless, the lack of communal statutes in practice means that the 
conservation process is likely to keep heavily relying on external agencies for 
monitoring and enforcement, providing a justification for the state and external 
agencies to keep discretionary powers regarding the VCA (Ribot et al. 2010). This 
reliance on external structures, agencies and regulations is likely to have a toll on 
the already weakened community governance structures, undermining the 
possibility to really develop a community-led conservation approach, increasing 
paternalism (Pimbert and Pretty, 1995). Through the situations related in this 
chapter, it becomes evident that the implementation of a multi-scale governance 
arrangement for conservation is of great support for the implementation of 
conservation efforts, but by no means can such arrangements substitute the 
strength of communal governance structures. Ultimately, local struggles for rights 
and natural resource access continue to determine the sustainability and 
performance of the overall governance arrangement, regardless of the economic 
resources invested. 
 
7.4 Closing section: Fuelling the tragedy of the common in multi-
scalar governance arrangements. 
The last empirical data chapter has presented the issues encountered in the cost-
benefit sharing resulted from the implementation of El Reten. These issues relate 
to aspects of equity identified by Brown and Corbera (2003), namely, the benefit 
distribution mechanisms and management decisions have not been determined by 
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the local governance structures and the perceived fairness of the cost-benefit 
sharing. Furthermore, regarding the devolution of “bundles of powers”, in the case 
of El Reten, the community has limited rights to access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion, alienation and authority (Corbera et al. 2007). Therefore, while this top-
down approach portrayed as community-led has not been effective to devolve 
rights or power back to the local community, it has been effective in the expansion 
of an arrangement where the state and members of the operational committee 
other than the local community remain strong power containers and political 
regulators (Gaventa 2003; Arts 2004). The practices applied in this VCA are in fact 
expanding the presence and regulatory powers of the state; this is consistent with 
other cases in southern Mexico (Bray et al. 2012; Durand et al. 2014; Martin et al. 
2011). These conditions continue to undermine local links of trust and reciprocity, 
affecting the local structures for organisation, collective action and natural 
resource use regulations (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Moreover, by overlooking the 
regional dynamics and struggles and providing alternative sources of income, 
these conservation efforts have increased the intensity of the conflicts within the 
community and between the community and the ejidos of Chiapas. Thus, while the 
image of VCAs has gained recognition for working in areas that had been reluctant 
to other protected areas categories (Doane 2007) and increasing the surface 
under some kind of protection at the national level, these multi-scalar efforts are 
bound to be unsustainable both, socially and environmentally. 
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SECTION IV. Discussion and 
Conclusion  
Chapter 8. Discussion 
This dissertation has explored the legal framework that regulates the 
establishment and the actual implementation of protected areas in Mexico 
providing a close look at the operational challenges that those in charge of 
protected area management have to face in terms of legal, human, technical and 
infrastructure limited capacities to carry out management and enforcement duties 
(Wells and McShane 2004). Chapter 4 has explored the pitfalls that top-down 
conservation has had in the Southern-Isthmus region regarding expropriation, 
displacement, exclusion and restriction of traditional and vital natural resource 
uses, leading to disempowerment, cultural erosion, human rights infringements 
and contravention of international laws, just as many researchers have pointed 
out in Mexico and around the world (Andrew-Essien and Bisong 2009; Armitage 
et al. 2012; Bishop et al. 1995; Brockington and Igoe 2006; Brockington et al. 
2008: 93; Colchester 2004; Dowie 2005; Duffy 2005; Fairhead and Leach 1996; 
Pimbert and Pretty 1995; Pujadas and Castillo 2007; West et al. 2006). The legal 
alternatives for protected areas establishment in the country as well as the 
importance of multi-scalar governance arrangements to make protected areas 
management feasible have been presented.  
Even though participatory approaches for conservation are common language for 
protected area managers, NGOs and funding bodies in the Southern-Isthmus 
region of Mexico, in practice, decision-making for protected area management 
remains dominated by the state and funding agencies who determine 
conservation priorities, management strategies and evaluation standards. This 
participatory rhetoric, naïvely overlooks the power relations implied (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001) and available spaces for local participation avoid positions that go 
against the interest of powerful groups (Mansuri and Rao 2004), perpetuating the 
incentives for natural resources over-exploitation and paternalism (Fischer et al. 
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2007; Durand et al. 2014). Operationally, current protected areas management 
involve a wider range of scales through the technical advisory boards, where 
academics, NGOs, municipal authorities and funding bodies can define the 
planning, management and evaluation of conservation in a given protected area. 
Nevertheless, the participation spaces for local institutions remain limited to 
legitimisation of pre-defined priorities and conditioned funding through a classic 
‘take it or leave it' approach (Rahnema 2010). The prevailing use of local 
participation rhetoric is seen by protected area managers as a means to get local 
and funding support (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
However, there are only a few cases where participatory processes have reached 
the development of local capacities for natural resource management and these 
achievements, ironically, have been reached by communal structures 
strengthened through the fights to claim their rights for natural resource access to 
state and parastatal agencies (Bray et al. 2003; Merino-Perez 2001; Mitchell 
2006). 
VCAs have been developed as a legal alternative to top-down conservation and 
their voluntary nature and implied power devolution to landowners make them 
compatible the IUCN category of ICCAs, at least in principle. Chapter 6 has 
elaborated on the establishment of the VCA El Reten, in San Miguel Chimalapa. The 
process leading to the establishment of El Reten as a VCA has involved a 
multiplicity of actors, scales and funding programmes preceding the current 
multi-scalar governance arrangement for conservation. The implementation of the 
VCA despite all the efforts has yet to clearly define right-holders and resource 
boundaries. It also faces challenges regarding decision-making, representation, 
monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution, making difficult to enhance 
collective action (Ostrom 1990, referenced by Abrams et al. 2003). The 
regulations for natural resource management in El Reten lack of coordination 
amongst those involved in the actual implementation. Moreover, there is not a 
clear distribution of responsibilities, clear means for enforcement and sanctioning 
(Ostrom 2002). Furthermore, by avoiding political sensitive issues such as general 
assembly management and land tenure conflicts, external agencies neglect the 
system of incentives underneath, such as conflicting or contradictory rules by 
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SEMARNAT, helping to consolidate the pattern of over-exploitation of natural 
resources rather than providing a solution (Fischer et al. 2007). 
The early implementation of El Reten illustrates the challenges that ‘community-
driven’ conservation projects have in terms of attracting external actors with their 
funds and time frameworks and the implications for decision-making, 
representation and legitimacy (Adger et al. 2003; Corbera et al. 2007). While the 
establishment of the inter-institutional operational team has defined a new 
political space for interaction where the state and each non-state actor has its own 
role and influence over the structure (Buizer et al. 2011; Bulkeley 2005), this 
decentralisation has involved the evident elite capture by the operational 
committee determining priorities, strategies and time frameworks. Furthermore, 
at the local settlement level, the implementation of the VCA approach tends to 
homogenise inequities and differences within the community (McDermott and 
Schreckenberg 2009), undermining its social and environmental performance.  
 
8.1 Common Pool Resource Theory and the implementation of El 
Reten 
“Rules and their effectiveness at the local level are critical to the sustainability of 
complex biological resources” (Becker and Ostrom 1995). The implementation of El 
Reten is thus evaluated through the light of the common-pool resource theory in 
order to identify if VCAs as participatory and community-led conservation 
alternatives are consequent with the principles of common property regimes that 
enhance collective action for sustainability. The principles for sustainable 
common resource management have been classified in two big realms: 1) those 
dealing with access, group and resource boundaries and, 2) those dealing with 
decision making for joint use, including issues of representation, monitoring, 




Realm CPR Principle Local situation in El Reten 




º In San Miguel, the ill-defined border between Chiapas and Oaxaca and the consequent lack of clear 
boundaries for natural resource access is source of constant disputes between ejidos and community 
members. This is further complicated by different state institutions which hold the power to 
acknowledge communities and ejidos, to establish protected areas and to allow natural resource 
extraction or infrastructure activities such as logging permits and roads overlooking local conflicts. 
 
º The lack of clarity about the regulations and the limited capacities for enforcement in relation to El 
Reten is also reflected at different scales of government agencies such as SEMARNAT. This government 
agency holds the greatest enforcement power of the externally designed regulations; however, the 
mismatch between the state (Chiapas and Oaxaca), the regional (the Chimalapas priority region for 
conservation) and the national offices of the same agency increases the possibility of violent conflict 
between San Miguel and the ejidos from Chiapas. The provision of permits for timber extraction to the 
ejidos on the conflict area by the national office of CONANP after the regional office denied the permits 
to the community provides little incentives to local inhabitants to comply with self-regulation 






º The local and general assembly constitute the biggest features for collective choice in rural Mexico. Yet, 
limited deliberation capacities and local power asymmetries make them time-consuming and delicate 
processes. This is the case of San Miguel, where communal authorities have opted for not calling to 
general assembly ever when important matters for the community are being discussed. This has been 
supported and even enhanced by the operational committee, which constitutes an illegal practice. 
Even though these decision-making procedures are considered legitimate by the operational 
committee, they lack of moral authority to be locally validated (Weber 2007:67). 
 
º Implementation of cross-scale approaches in conservation remains largely depending on personal 
relationships and interactions between those in charge of implementation and the local community 
203 
 
(section 5.3). The size of the area of San Miguel, the control over the agreements set by different 
settlements has been difficult to track through time. Therefore, the dynamics between local 
settlements and external agencies create a differentiated treatment that makes consistent 
implementation difficult (section 6.4). 
 
º The arrival of the VCA certification and PES to the community brings into play other scales and 
different state agencies regulating natural resource use and protection, decreasing local control in 
exchange of economic resources.  Moreover, the setting-up of an external operational committee and 
its increasing involvement in the communal decision-making process in what is portrayed as a 
community-led conservation initiative is consistent with the critiques to the expansion of the state 
through conservation/development projects (Li 2002; Durand et al. 2014). 
 
º The involvement of the operational committee in the expenditure of the resources from PES enhanced 
transparency by leaving the local people affected by the decisions, the eastern settlements, out of the 
decision-making process, and providing distorted information to keep the current elite capture 







º The spending powers within the governance arrangement for El Reten have been gradually claimed by 
the operational committee (Section 7.4). The bulk of economic resources do not arrive to the 
settlements where the most of the responsibility about the VCA is located. In the same way, those 
settlements holding the most of responsibility have little room to influence the decision about the 
expenditure of the resources arriving through El Reten. The multi-scalar nature of the El Reten as a 
VCA, with the domination of a group illustrates a form of elite capture by external and funding 
agencies (Platteau and Gaspart 2003). 
 
º There is a mismatch in the allocation of responsibilities and revenue-generating powers, providing 
benefits to people who hold no direct responsibility towards the VCA.  
 
Decision- Monitoring º Local settlements and the communal committee relied completely on GADES for the accountability and 
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making reports to the operational committee, CONAFOR and SEMARNAT. Simultaneously, the operational 
committee relied on GADES to persuade the communal authorities and the eastern settlements during 
the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly. These issues of legitimacy and inclusion in management decisions 
where power tends to be accumulated by project brokers (often NGOs) rather than on local people are 






º The main local regulation is the communal statute, which in San Miguel has no legitimacy amongst 
local people and thus, natural resource use faces and open access situation. Yet, once the VCA was 
established and PES arrived to San Miguel, externally designed legal frameworks of LGEEPA and other 
operational regulations of the PES that regulated natural resource use according of the national 
legislation but neglecting local institutions such as tequio added complexity to use regulations. 
 
º In El Reten, the power of enforcement relies on local settlement’s authorities and assemblies and on 
their capacity to sanction rule-breakers. The enforcement of the regulations on logging is limited by 
the conflict created by the logging permits SEMARNAT provided to the ejidos. Hence, in the current 
governance arrangement, structures of enforcement are related to the conditioning of the continuity of 
PES to promote compliance. 
 
º Enforcement and sanctioning to rule-breakers are undermined by fear of retaliation; the lack of 
motivation due to the land tenure conflict, and the lack of the communal authorities’ support to 








º Local structures of conflict resolution lack of clear frameworks and agreements as well as means to 
solve conflicts (Sections 7.2-7.4). 
 
º In the case of the VCA of El Reten, CONANP faces the same challenges that the implementation of 
Biosphere Reserves represents to other protected area managers regarding bureaucratic 
incompetence (Durand et al. 2014). Power fragmentation within government agencies is reflected 
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limited capacities of CONANP, for example, to contribute to the solution of the land tenure conflict; the 
mismatches between the logging permit denied to the eastern settlements but allowed to the ejidos by 
SEMARNAT; the enforcement against illegal logging, or the implementation of the forest fire 






º According to the Agrarian Law, communal authorities of San Miguel are the bodies entitled to 
distribute rights for land use and access to natural resources; communal regulations are embodied in 
the communal statute. However, local communities do not have total control since they are nested in 
multiple layers of governance. 
 
º Regulatory and planning powers are shared by the state and NGOs in the operational committee. In 
these dynamics, there is not a retreat from the state but a re-definition of its role, while NGOs become 
the link between the state and the community, legitimising its discourses (Arts 2004; Rahnema 2010). 
 
º Economic benefits of PES and other subsidies represent the incentive to enforce external regulatory 
frameworks, which is consistent with practices in protected areas in Mexico (Durand et al. 2014). 
CONANP does not have a direct link to the communal governance structures but its participation in the 
operational committee determines what strategies are supported by the nation-state, remaining a 






º The resin harvest project in Benito Juarez and San Antonio, and the organisation in cooperatives were 
providing revenues that encouraged more local community members to get involved the alternative 
economic activity (Section 7.1.1). The cooperatives interact directly with the operational committee 
and SEMARNAT for the resin extraction permits. However, the accountability and technical feasibility 
of the project heavily relied on the external operational committee.  
 




8.1.1. The role of communication and access to information for 
decision-making 
 
Ostrom’s work has also emphasised the role of communication in three key points, 
namely: 1) coordination amongst those involved, 2) distribution of 
responsibilities and building trust, and 3) Enforcement and sanctioning (Ostrom 
2002). Mismatches in the communication process through different scales of the 
governance arrangement have been explored in section 6.4. Differences between 
institutional times and local deliberation times are further complicated by the 
distance between settlements and the fact that there are no general assemblies. 
The situation creates a dynamic where the information available for decision-
making at the local scale is often not enough to make informed decisions. In the 
assemblies observed, the operational committee representatives provided 
incomplete information, especially regarding regulations and commitments 
(Section 6.4.1). Consequently, emphasis is put on economic incentives in order to 
achieve consensus with the least debate and resistance possible (Durand et al. 
2014). Community members clearly expressed their concern about the fact that 
since the certification, the auxiliary secretaries’ assembly has established 
agreements without members of the local settlements assemblies having the full 
knowledge about the commitments and regulations. This situation has allowed 
advances in the creation and implementation of El Reten within institutional 
times. However, equity concerns emerge in terms of access to information 
(Corbera et al. 2007; Platteau et al. 2014), making the enforcement of illegitimate 
regulations difficult. Thus, the decision-making process developed by the external 
operational committee for the creation and implementation of El Reten unfolds 
issues on representation, equity, legitimacy, information-sharing and spaces 
available for deliberation. Keeping contentious information during the decision-
making process facilitates reaching agreements or validation but undermines local 
understanding and appropriation of the plans and actions (Platteau et al. 2014). 
The fact that there are not hard copies of the Master Plan; the Land Use Planning 
Exercise; the Better Management Practices Plan; The Management Plan of El 
Reten, and operational regulations of the PES program and the VCA in the 
community limits the knowledge that local people can have about the regulations 
they are subject to. The operational team has increased the efficiency of the 
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decision-making process within institutional times at the expense of transparency 
and legitimacy. Ultimately, internal community divisions due to political parties 
and the lack of strong local structures to keep transparency undermine trust links 
within the community and the performance of alternative income projects. This 
context, where information is incomplete, communication limited, access rules 
undefined and unenforced, represents the ideal situation for the tragedy of the 
commons (Becker and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2002) 
 
8.2 The actual devolution of ‘bundles of powers’ in VCAs 
Property is just one of many factors that shape institutional arrangements and 
strategies (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Natural resources management is defined by 
access understood as a “bundle of powers” embodied in and exercised through 
various means, relations and processes that give users the ability to benefit from 
natural resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Multi-scalar governance arrangements 
imply devolutionary processes throughout diversified networks (Lockwood 
2010). Effective devolution processes transfer “bundles of powers” to local 
representatives (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Ribot et al. 2010). However, in practice, 
devolution is developing uneven spaces and capacities for the state to act in 
complex matrices with multiple scales, actors, roles and dimensions (Armitage et 
al. 2012; Chapin III et al. 2010; Goodwin et al. 2005). The emergence of multi-
scalar governance arrangements has an increasing effect on previously self-
governed institutions for natural resource management. In the case of El Reten, 
empirical data has shown the actual powers that community members and 
representatives hold for natural resource management; these are summarised in 
Figure 8.1 (based on Brown and Corbera 2003 and Corbera et al. 2007). 
Power Local situation in El Reten 
Access Local community members hold access to communal natural 
resources and this access is defined through the general 
assembly. Due to current arrangements, the power of the 
assembly to define access through collective and legitimate 
choice as well as to enforce local regulations regarding natural 
resource access is limited. 
Withdraw Even though the VCA is a voluntary mechanism from which the 
community have the power to withdraw at any time, individual 
settlements or comuneros do not. This becomes particularly 
relevant given the perceived unfairness regarding the cost-
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benefit distribution in San Antonio and Benito Juarez. 
Management The VCA regulation has a double discourse. On the one hand, it 
states that local landowners have the power to define their own 
management strategies. On the other, such strategies have to be 
aligned to the national legislation and the areas become subject 
to the regulations of federal protected areas which have pre-
defined management categories and regulations. 
Throughout the process of El Reten, community members have 
had limited access to information and spaces for management 
decision-making. The management strategies have been 
externally designed and validated through processes that lack 
local legitimacy and legality. 
Exclusion In El Reten, due to the land tenure conflict and the lack of 
political will to solve it, the local community cannot exercise its 
power to exclude others from natural resource access in 
common lands. As has been explained, ejidos from Chiapas 
continue to access and benefit from the natural resources 
around and within El Reten under the auspice of regional and 
federal state entities such as SEMARNAT. 
Alienation Local agreements for transaction are allowed between 
community members. However, it is widely known that the rent 
of lands to third parties is a widespread practice in San Miguel, 
despite being illegal. 
The Agrarian Law and the legal frameworks for certification 
and PES define that the scale entitled to get into agreements 
regarding the land use and natural resources access is the 
general assembly of San Miguel Chimalapa. Thus, even when 
eastern settlements would like to establish their own VCA and 
to receive PES for it, they are not legally entitled to set that kind 
of agreements. 
Authority Sanctioning powers by the local and general assembly are 
limited despite recurrent faults and cases of corruption. 
Representation is also undermined by the fact that decisions 
are taken in auxiliary secretaries assemblies rather than on the 
general one. 
Table 8.2 Bundle of powers in the context of El Reten 
 
As shown above, while this top-down approach portrayed as community-led has 
not been effective to devolve powers back to the local community, it has been 
effective in the expansion of an arrangement where the state and members of the 
operational committee other than the local community remain strong power 
containers and political regulators (Gaventa 2003; Arts 2004). The practices 
applied in this VCA are in fact expanding the presence and regulatory powers of 
the state; this is consistent with other cases in southern Mexico (Bray et al. 2012; 
Durand et al. 2014; Martin et al. 2011). Local communities in the Chimalapas 
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region refused the establishment of a Biosphere Reserve in previous times in 
order to keep decision-making power and autonomy (Anaya and Alvarez 2004). 
VCAs have been portrayed as the alternative to state managed conserved areas for 
local community institutions to maintain the decision-making and implementation 
powers. However, as Chapter 5 has explored, CONANP as the representative of the 
nation state regarding protected areas, it clashes with other government agencies 
that have jurisdiction over different aspects of land use due to fragmentation of 
power between government institutions. Therefore, the powers that CONANP can 
actually delegate to local communities for protected area management are limited 
to the validation of externally designed priorities through previously designed 
strategies.  The different governance powers in the case of El Reten are mainly 
nested on the external operational committee and externally designed regulations 
and laws, further reducing the local authority to manage resources. This shows 
how limited devolution processes are in conservation policy and implementation 
in priority regions for conservation in Mexico. These results are consistent with 
the findings of Shackleton et al. (2002), which emphasise that devolution in 
conservation remains a rhetorical figure with little substantial changes in terms of 
power shifts. 
 
8.3 Payments for Environmental Services and VCAs 
PES and their distribution are two of the most controversial subjects in 
discussions regarding El Reten. VCAs as community-led conservation are often 
portrayed as closer to equity than other categories of protected areas, at the same 
time it argues to ensure the conservation of lands beyond the boundaries of state-
managed protected areas systems through the support of local empowered 
peoples (Brockington et al. 2008: 87). However, as the case of El Reten has 
illustrated, the implementation of VCAs in priority areas for conservation is also 
introducing inequities related to capitalism, market forces and masking social 
relations behind the production of environmental services, promoting power 
asymmetries (Brockington et al. 2008: 87; Kosoy and Corbera 2010). These 
welfare programmes substitute client-patron relationships with “scientifically-
based meritocracy” (Haenn et al. 2014). The challenge practitioners’ face to link 
PES to rural development programs (Muradian et al. 2010) is one of the 
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underlying causes for PES to be used as incentives promoting consensus and 
community agreements. Since decisions are promoted with limited information 
available to local people, it can be argued that efficiency is being more valued than 
equity and transparency, undermining the whole objective of the PES scheme to 
promote collective action (Muradian et al. 2010). The case-study here presented 
has also shown how in order to continue to be eligible for PES schemes, 
communities cede some of the control over the land and the decision-making 
process to the external operational committee and the federal state (McAfee and 
Shapiro 2010). As Kosoy and Corbera (2010) pointed out, the intermediaries for 
the allocation of PES are likely to become ‘dominant agents’ with increased effects 
over local institutions, such is the case in the Mexican context where PES are 
applied as public subsidies with externally defined regulatory means (McAfee and 
Shapiro 2010). However, statements from local people show their awareness of 
the fact that ecosystems services are co-produced by nature and local 
communities, challenging the dominant positions of the intermediaries. Moreover, 
landscapes in the eastern region are locally valued for services they provide 
locally and the communal identity rather than for their potential to sale to 
outsiders (McAfee and Shapiro 2010).  
The distributional implications of PES cannot be overlooked either since 
perceptions of fairness in the distribution define the performance of the programs 
(Muradian et al. 2010). Additional to the fact that this and other federal neoliberal 
programs have had little impact on the improvement of rural livelihoods (McAfee 
and Shapiro 2010), their distribution at the community level underlines once 
more issues of scale by failing to target the adequate local level.  Thus, even 
though PES have managed to persuade communities that once were completely 
reluctant to federal control over the lands, the implementation still faces the 
challenge to promote institutional settings and agreements to locally regulate 
natural resource access and enforcement (Muradian et al. 2010). This is 
particularly relevant for the long-term sustainability of efforts, since PES 
programs in Mexico last five years in most cases. The early implementation of El 
Reten has also shown that communal structures and local priorities in San Miguel 
can also challenge external impositions (Walker et al. 2007). However, with the 
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arrival of PES and other conservation-related projects, there is a trade-off of 
powers between local governance structures and the externally designed ones. 
Therefore, the implementation of the VCA through subsidies depends on the 
institutional choices influenced by national elites and donors (Ribot et al. 2008) 
and, thus, is not achieving the equity and legitimacy that VCAs portray as their 
advantage in comparison to top-down approaches to conservation (Adger et al. 
2003). 
 
8.4 Community, participation, multi-scalar governance of 
Indigenous Community Conserved Areas 
The implementation of the VCA El Reten does not differ greatly from previous 
conservation. However, it explores for the first time the practical implementation 
of such approach at the light of the characteristics of community-led conservation 
such ICCAs and the common-pool resource theory for environmental and social 
sustainability. The first challenge that approaches similar to the ICCA category are 
facing in Mexico relates to the prevailing assumption of what has been called the 
‘myth’ of community by the literature (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The underlying 
‘mythic’ assumptions about what a community is are reflected in the 
implementation of community-led conservation arrangements like the one 
presented in this dissertation. Such perceptions define community as (1) a small 
spatial unit; (2) a homogeneous social structure, and (3) shared interests and 
norms (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Opposite to approaches that portray people as 
an obstacle for conservation (Terborgh 1999), the image of community within 
literature and current policies advocating for community-conservation tends to 
portray people in balance with ecosystems affected by the intrusion of state and 
market forces (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kothari et al. 2012). However, if we 
compare the case of San Miguel with other successful examples of community 
conservation such as those presented from Sierra Norte and Sierra Juarez in 
section 5.4 (Mitchell 2006), the contrast emphasises the importance of underlying 
local governance structures that are coherent with the CPR theory for community 
conservation initiatives to succeed beyond external forces. Thus while simplified 
images of community have been useful to give political attention to the subject (Li 
2002), the ‘myth’ of community is preventing community-led conservation 
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initiatives to acknowledge the importance that local dynamics within and between 
communities and other external actors and politics have over natural resource 
management and conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Li 2002).  Moreover, 
the decision-making processes described show that the implementation of the 
VCA omits local heterogeneity in order to give way to homogenized dominant 
discourses and management practices legitimised by validation processes that are 
portrayed as community-driven, while local priorities remain neglected (Sachs 
2010).  
The challenges that the implementation of multi-scalar governance arrangements 
for community-led conservation result from  the fact that ‘communities’ are not 
simple or isolated actors but complex systems embedded in larger arrangements 
with cross-scale relationships (Berkes 2004). While landscape conservation 
approaches encourage processes at increasingly larger scales, sociological 
approaches call for ownership and stewardship of the local relevant scales 
(Wyborn and Bixler 2013). The focus at the community level, once more, 
illustrates the fact that the simplistic view of community as a small shared space 
can be misleading by preventing the analysis of sub-community dynamics for 
natural resource management in large areas with scattered populations (Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999). Furthermore, the “bundles of power” explored in these 
complex systems show that community institutions are only one of the many 
levels within weak institutional frameworks (Berkes 2004; Ribot and Peluso 
2003). Hence, there is a mismatch between the scale entitled to get into 
agreements, defining benefit-sharing and the scale in charge of enforcement. 
Protected area management theorists would argue that it is necessary to match 
the scales in order to allow the share of management power and responsibility 
amongst those directly related to the managed system (Berkes 2004). The need to 
devolve power to the appropriate scales has been highlighted within the context 
of Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE), in Zimbabwe. Murombedzi (1999) argues that devolution of rights 
over resources directly to the locals is more important than the distribution of 
revenues derived from resource use (or lack of it, in the case of PES) in order to 
develop local stewardship. However, for power to be devolved at the accurate 
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levels, first there must be political will to do so. In the Mexican case, the 
participation and devolution rhetoric has been used, yet again, in VCAs to 
legitimise imposed environmental agendas increasing the social vulnerability of 
rural populations and with little concern over rights and access (Fairhead and 
Leach, 1996; Li 2002). As it has been explored, the potential for radical social 
transformation of community-led conservation has been simplified as a means to 
achieve cost-effective objectives framed in hectares under some category of 
protection rather than on the local processes promoted (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
Meanwhile, the nation-state slows decentralization by limiting the kinds of 
powers to be transferred and enhancing local institutional arrangements that are 
likely to serve central interests (Ribot et al. 2006). Furthermore, accountability of 
natural resources management remains flowing from bottom to top while 
“downwardly” accountability is practically non-existent (Ribot et al. 2010). 
Although external alliances are a good first step to strengthen the institutional 
framework surrounding El Reten, Adger et al. (2005) warns about the fact that 
cross-scale interactions by powerful stakeholders, such as strong external 
alliances in the decision-making process of El Reten, is likely to undermine trust in 
resource management arrangements. The process can further disempower 
resource users when information and resources are not shared with stakeholders 
in what has been identified as elite capture by the operational committee and 
powerful people within the settlements (Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Platteau et al. 
2014). The case presented in this thesis is consistent with Brockington et al. 
(2008) in the sense that community conservation replicates a set of inequities 
present in other categories of protected areas in terms of decision-making and 
accountability, as well as manipulating local governance structures for the 
processes to fit external frameworks like those defined by the PES and other 
subsidy schemes. The trade-offs between institutional efficiency and legitimacy 
and equity in community-led processes (Corbera et al. 2007; Platteau and Gaspart 
2003). The latter is encouraged by the institutional and project cycles in which 
external institutional frameworks are embedded. Even though external alliances 
allow better coordination between otherwise competing governmental and non-
governmental agencies by clearly distributing operational responsibilities, these 
alliances sacrifice legitimacy and the right to prior informed consent in order to 
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adjust to institutional times of funders (Platteau et al. 2014). These alliances 
cannot be a substitute of local structures for accountability and transparency 
(Ostrom and Cox 2010). Furthermore, the replacement of local structures by 
external regulations may be easier to enforce but only increases the reliance on 
external subsidies and regulatory frameworks, undermining the potential of the 
process to become self-sustainable (Rahnema 2010). 
 
8.4.1 The role of NGOs 
 
The case study of El Reten presents a clear example of the current role of NGOs in 
multi-scalar governance arrangements. Even though NGOs and donors hold the 
potential to enhance the establishment of local democratic institutions, which are 
the basis of decentralization (Ribot et al. 2006), their usual role is that of project 
implementers, replacing bureaucratic state entities as the “experts”(Mansuri and 
Rao 2004).  NGOs in the latest history of El Reten have had have a role opening 
new political spaces for other governance scales than the state (Arts 2004). In the 
case of El Reten, the long relationship with external actors through projects and 
conflict-resolution processes has allowed them to develop the skills and elements 
to contest external impositions (Walker et al. 2007). However, the weakness of 
local governance structures makes San Miguel vulnerable to the imposition of 
external agendas.  
The operational committee has developed practices consistent with a process of 
elite capture through the selective distribution of limited knowledge in both ways: 
to donors and to beneficiaries (Platteau et al. 2014). Current NGOs do have a role 
legitimising dominant discourses defining the local needs and strategies of action 
(Li 2002). Moreover, NGOs often avoid working in communities where fast and 
evident results can be difficult to achieve (Mansuri and Rao 2004). The same 
counts for strong enough communities that oppose or challenge external agendas, 
competing with the state (Rahnema 2010), where support is quickly withdrawn in 
a classic “take it or leave it” approach. These misnamed non-governmental 
organisations are part of the range of parties contributing to measure, to govern 
and to improve societies around the globe (Li 2005). The latter is particularly if 
VCAs/ICCAs are implemented in societies that tend to internalise dominant 
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perceptions and values due to the marginalisation they have been subject to 
through time (Rahnema 2010).  
 
8.5 Power devolution to VCAs/ICCAs in Mexico 
 
ICCAs and their potential Mexican equivalent, VCAs represent a great possibility 
for the generation of protected areas governance arrangements that acknowledge 
the critical role that indigenous peoples and local communities play in the long-
term conservation of bio-culturally diverse systems (Kothari et al. 2012: 9). 
Currently, indigenous peoples or local communities are one of many members of 
governance arrangements for conservation (Berkes 2009). Such collaborative 
institutional arrangements for protected areas governance imply a process of 
cross-scale devolution from the state to other actors (Lockwood 2010). However, 
devolution processes rarely involve the transference of sufficient decision-making 
and economic powers for implementation, creating uneven spaces for 
participation and, ultimately, leaving the powers grounded in government 
agencies (Abrams et al. 2003; Berkes 2009; Goodwin et al. 2005: 421; Ribot et al. 
2010). The existence of communal land-tenure figures places Mexico in a 
privileged position for the formal recognition of ICCAs compared to other nations, 
where land belongs entirely to the state (Martin et al. 2010). The development of 
the legal figure of VCAs is a great achievement for the Mexican protected areas 
policy, advocacy groups and local and indigenous communities. It supposes 
advantages through decentralized adaptive management systems which are cross-
cutting themes of the CBD ecosystems approaches for conservation (Kothari et al. 
2012:40). Furthermore, in the case of El Reten, the constitution of the operational 
committee could represent an innovative approach for external institutions to 
develop coordinated actions for conservation. Consequently, funders have been 
attracted by the efforts and this has allowed the continuity of conservation efforts 
in the Chimalapas region since 2008. Nevertheless, as it has been shown in section 
8.1 and 8.2, power devolution is not flowing back to local communities through 
the implementation of the VCA, undermining its positive potential to support and 




Even though VCAs could be comparable to the ICCA definition, the legal 
frameworks that give the government the role of ‘certifying’ ICCAs pushes 
governance towards a co-management situation, a risk already identified by the 
analysis of VCAs in La Chinantla, Sierra Norte of Oaxaca by Martin et al. (2010). 
Co-management arrangements are not necessarily negative for local structures 
and there is a diversity of degrees of co-management present in most of ICCAs 
(Berkes 2009; Kothari et al. 2012: 16). However, the problem emerges when 
external structures for co-management take over the leading role in the decision-
making process and local governance structures are undermined instead of being 
enhanced. This is the case of El Reten, located in a community, which is in a 
threshold where communal structures and customary forms of organisation are 
not currently strong enough to guarantee effective local governance (Becker and 
Ostrom 1995). This is how members of the operational committee justify their 
excessive  intervention and elite capture (Kothari et al. 2012; Platteau and Gaspart 
203). Notwithstanding the advantages that the development of the VCA figure 
represents, this dissertation has illustrated that the implementation of the policies 
supporting “community-led” conservation in Mexico is far from operating for the 
strengthening of local governance structures.  
The case-study of the implementation of El Reten shows that this conservation 
effort is not consistent with the three key characteristics that define Indigenous 
Community Conserved Areas.  Regarding the first feature, related to the profound 
relationship between a well-defined community and a clearly-defined site, section 
7.1 has shown the complexities emerged from the recognition of a ‘community-
conserved area’ in a large area where only two settlements are directly related to 
it. Since the role of the locals defining the management rules is more important 
than the official recognition itself (Brockington et al. 2008: 68), the 
implementation of VCAs should make more emphasis on the feature of ICCAs 
related to the rooted institutions in communities. Furthermore, the spaces for 
local representatives to have an input in planning and management are limited by 
asymmetric power structures (Adams and Hutton 2007; Adger et al. 2005; Lebel 
et al. 2006). Local representatives are expected to defend their stakes in boards 
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that bring powerful actors such as NGOs and state agents with different discursive 
and inclusive capacities. The procedures in the VCA are efficient for external 
institutional times and operation but undermine the second key feature of ICCAs 
where people or community should hold a major role in the decision-making, 
implementation and enforcement for the management of the area. Regarding the 
third key feature, the only communities’ management decisions that were salient 
in this research were related to the forest fire control activities and the 
conservation of the area in order to protect watersheds. The mismatch between 
institutional times and community decision-making process undermines the local 
ability to engage in an informed, active and meaningful manner. Thus, even when 
processes are called participatory and even community-driven, in practice, 
decision-making is mainly limited to the operational committee and funding 
bodies deciding unanimously. This is consistent with Corbera et al. (2007) who 
argue that equity and legitimacy are compromised when decision-making powers 
are accumulated by the brokers. Consequently, the viability and sustainability of 
the conservation and natural resource management efforts are not consistent with 
the principles that the common pool resource theory defines in order  to avoid the 
tragedy of the commons and the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ that prevents any 
meaningful collective action (Becker and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2002). 
Therefore implementation of VCAs within the Mexican context fails to devolve 
governance powers at the diversity of scales involved, particularly to the local 
settlements one (Durand et al. 2014; Martin 2010). Even though institutional 
efforts have been invested to make conservation strategies compatible with legal 
requirements in terms of participation, such processes still raise issues related to 
the quality of participation, as well as to legitimacy and representation. Even 
though VCAs are being portrayed as community-led initiatives, the design and 
implementation of those conservation strategies are in fact, led by external 
institutions and locally validated in most cases. Furthermore, decision-making 
processes are inconsistent with the indigenous peoples’ right to prior informed 
consent and participation (ILO 1989) by promoting community members to get 
into agreements with limited information. The local understanding of agreements 
and operational regulations is further complicated by the limited spaces and local 
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capacities for an effective deliberative process. These procedures are failing to 
comply with the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
regarding indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination (Art. 3), to participate in 
decision-making (Art. 18) and the right to maintain control of their cultural 
heritage (Art. 31). These faults turn the implementation of VCAs into a case of 
inappropriate recognition (Kothari et al. 2012: 63). Moreover, there is an explicit 
expansion of the powers of the state over these areas in terms of regulations 
supervision and certification under externally defined standards. The latter is 
consistent with the literature on the expansion and building of the state through 
protected areas and development projects (Bray et al. 2012; Brockington et al. 
2008; Durand et al. 2014; Haenn et al. 2014; Li 2002)  
 
Finally, this dissertation explores the reasons for the lack of effective power 
devolution processes present in VCAs. From a management point of view, effective 
power devolution requires structural changes at different scales of the governance 
arrangement such as shifts in institutional times and communication flows that 
allow for local deliberation processes and informed decision-making. At the 
operational scale, there is a need for new institutional arrangements and 
operational procedures that help to recover and strengthen communal structures 
and capacities for decision-making, enforcement and self-regulation. Overall, an 
increased valuation of the importance of strong communal governance structures 
is particularly relevant for power devolution processes for ICCAs operation (Dietz 
et al. 2003; Berkes 2004; 2007; 2009). However, a closer look through the 
Sociology theorists who have worked around the concept of power allows us to 
improve our understanding as to why power devolution is so elusive (Ribot et al. 
2006). 
For Foucault, power is embodied and socialised in everyday life, being the reason 
why often, power struggles do not lead to a change in social order (Gaventa 2003). 
Power is manifested in each society through regimes of truth, which are the 
discourses that are accepted and functioning as the legitimate truth (Rabinow 
1991). “Regimes of truth” are a result of scientific discourse and institutions and 
are reinforced, negotiated and redefined through the educational system, the 
media and the social interactions, constituting a source of discipline and 
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conformity (Gaventa 2003). The “metapower” or “regime of truth” is constantly 
flowing and being negotiated in society through the accepted forms of knowledge 
constituting the term “power-knowledge”. Despite the potential for radical change 
of ICCAs, their implementation has not managed to challenge the current regimes 
of truth represented in current legislation and conservation agents’ practices. 
Actually, the opposite has happened, and the formal recognition of VCAs is 
replicating the “Regimes of truth” legitimising the discourses of the state and its 
regulatory frameworks in previously more autonomous communities. As the 
conservation discourse is assimilated and incorporated to the self-regulations, 
local ways of knowing, practices tend to be homogenised to the practices that are 
still influenced by the Western thought about pristine nature detached from 
human beings ((Andrade and Rhodes 2012; Sachs 2010). The latter is consistent 
with what Gramsci called hegemony, which is the complement to coercion in 
Gramsci’s arrangement of power. It is the consent of subordinate groups (civil 
society) to domination actively constructed by institutions, cultural practices, 
social interactions and different processes leading society to develop the 
ideologies consequent to what the dominant classes want (Kenway 1990).  
 
Hence, power is not located in a central apparatus; instead, there is a relationship 
between all the points of the social totality (Kenway 1990). As a result, power 
cannot be deliberately provided and received from one social actor to the other. 
This could represent a viable explanation for power devolution to remain an 
administrative aspiration. Furthermore, this understanding opens the possibility 
for the generation of a radical change which focuses on the reflection and 
generation of alternative ways of knowing, constituting the counter-hegemony 
(Gramsci 2007:168). As Weber has pointed out, culture is a place where 
individuals can also find partners and solidarity on which alternatives can be 
generated (Weber 1946:172). Without doubt, the most bio-culturally diverse 
region of Mexico has examples of such alternative ways of knowing. 
Anthropologists argue that the alternative cultural worlds, “located outside the 
state and in the margins of the Mexican society” have solutions to offer to 
environmental and governance problems (Haenn et al. 2014), but this requires to 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion: Fuelling the tragedy of the commons 
through ICCAs. 
This dissertation has presented the first evaluation of a VCA in terms of its multi-
scalar governance approach and its compatibility with the principles of the IUCN 
governance category of ICCAs. Through the exploration of the national legal 
frameworks, the conditions for local participation and the bureaucratic limitations for 
state protected areas management have been explored. The historical background for 
VCAs to become one of the state protected areas categories through a certification 
process has been detailed and the practical implications of the establishment of a VCA 
in a priority region for conservation in Southern Isthmus Mexico has been 
researched. Devolution processes in El Reten were analysed in terms of the bundles 
of rights or powers that local community holds for natural resource management 
after the certification of El Reten and during its early implementation. The research 
techniques applied to develop this research included: (1) document revision on 
national legislation for protected establishment and management; (2) forty four semi-
structured interviews with conservation practitioners at different administrative 
levels, as well as (3) 32 semi-structured and unstructured interviews and direct 
observations to conform an in-depth case study of the VCA of El Reten, in San Miguel 
Chimalapa. 
ICCAs are distinguished principally by the role of the local community as the main 
power-holder – the “major player” in decision-making and implementation –. The 
category is intended to provide a mechanism for external recognition and support for 
local community contributions to the global conservation project. In the context of 
developing countries, these approaches advocate for the devolution of decision-
making powers to indigenous and traditional communities over their lands and 
resources. The issues examined throughout this dissertation have explored for the 
first time who is entitled to “give” which powers back to local communities; the actual 
procedures that allow these approaches to be called community-driven when ICCAs 
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can only retain “power” by conforming to externally defined criteria, and finally, if 
devolution is happening, the way “bundles of rights” - or powers - (Ribot and Peluso 
2003) interact with external criteria for conservation. 
Mexico is considered one of the countries with the most developed legal frameworks 
to formally acknowledge ICCAs and has an extensive inventory of them (Martin et al. 
2010; 2011). As it has been shown through this research, the so-called participatory 
approaches to conservation, rather that representing alternatives, are replicating the 
hierarchical schemes and legitimizing state-nation discourses, ways to know and 
realities under new policy categories. The perceptions and experiences from 
conservation practitioners provide evidence of a failed state, with lack of inter-
institutional coordination and insufficient powers and capacities to develop their 
surveillance and enforcement activities. At a regional level, it has been possible to 
observe the human, technical and economic needs that have made multi-scalar 
governance approaches for protected area management a necessity more than an 
evolution towards more democratic processes. Still, the state remains central within 
this arrangements by keeping discretionary powers to decide who is invited to 
participate and how. Furthermore, the legal frameworks and regulations for 
protected areas and VCAs have been designed for a one-size-fits-all approach, 
overlooking local heterogeneity and undermining the local governance structures 
that, in many cases, have allowed the sustainability of natural resources management.   
The case study of El Reten provides a clear portrait of the implications that the 
formalisation of a VCA has for local governance structures. These decentralised 
approaches for conservation are also subject to elite captures (Platteau and Gaspart 
2003), not only by local elites but by the groups of self-proclaimed “experts” 
determining priorities, strategies and funding for the conservation of the VCA. The 
decision-making process hereby presented shows the “messiness of policy in practice” 
(Leach et al. 2007) and the trade-offs between the availability of economic resources 
and local autonomy, as well as between administrative efficiency and equity and 
legitimacy. The establishment and early implementation of El Reten exhibit common 
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practices in protected areas management and is an addition to the literature 
documenting other VCAs in Mexico (Bray et al. 2012; Durand et al. 2014; Fraga 2006; 
Martin et al. 2011; Mitchell 2006; Pujadas and Castillo 2007). These practices include 
the use of economic incentives and subsidies to face local resistance; decision-making 
processes that lack legitimacy and equity due to information manipulation and 
rushed by bureaucratic times, as well as the imposition of externally designed 
agendas and regulations that neglect local governance arrangements.  
Seen through the light of the CPR principles for institutional arrangements that 
enhance sustainability, the VCA in El Reten lacks of a clearly defined community and 
resource boundaries. This is further complicated by the ill-defined border between 
Chiapas and Oaxaca. The operational committee in El Reten in conjunction with 
communal authorities have modified the decision-making process in San Miguel in 
order to reach consent faster and to reduce the risk of conflict. Moreover, the 
information available for decision-making is limited and there are no downwardly 
accountability mechanisms in place, undermining trust locally and across scales. By 
basing strategies on simplified images of the community, the distribution of the cost 
and benefits of the management and protection of the VCA increases inequity in the 
community, enhancing internal conflicts. The monitoring strategies and evaluation 
criteria have been externally designed and enforced through conditioning to the 
regulations imposed by external sources of funding. Since regulations have been also 
externally designed, there is no clarity about the rules and neither local nor external 
agencies have clear sanctioning powers over rule-breakers. Finally, while 
communities have the legal right to organise and there are efforts to develop conflict-
resolution mechanisms and to develop nested enterprises through the resin harvest 
cooperatives, the excessive reliance on external agencies capacities, funding and 
regulatory mechanisms, make local governance fragile. These conditions project the 
perfect scenario for the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), where the 
establishment of a VCA, the arrival of economic incentives through PES, resin harvest 
and logging permits as well as the neglecting of the local political context by 
conservation agencies are fuelling the tragedy instead of alleviating it. 
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In Mexico, where institutional arrangements are usually related to a failed state 
(Haenn et al. 2014), there is a lack of conditions to enhance and promote the 
principles related to collective action towards sustainability through the 
formalisation of community-conservation efforts (Becker and Ostrom 1995). The 
findings of this dissertation in terms of the lack of institutional coordination, the role 
of participatory approaches for protected areas management as a tool for 
legitimisation of externally imposed regulations and discourses as well as the 
expansion of the state are well supported by the literature in development and 
conservation (Brockington et al. 2008; Li 1996; 2002; 2005). Issues on elite capture, 
inequity regarding access to information for decision-making, and the perceived 
unfairness of the cost-benefit sharing at local levels in protected areas are also a 
common thread in the Political Ecology literature (Adams and Hutton 2007; 
Brockington et al. 2008; McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009; Platteau and Gaspart 
2003) and ethnographies in protected areas (Trench 2008). Nevertheless, it is the 
first time that this has been explicitly shown in the context of the newly developed 
VCA category in Mexico.  
The trend of this new policy tool is that of the forestry sector, where communities are 
acknowledged as the owners of the forests but face several limitations to exercise 
that ownership through autonomous strategies (Merino-Perez 2001). The naivety or 
negligence of conservation agencies about the motivations and power struggles and 
their effect on how decisions are made and whose values prevail in conservation 
efforts tend to sustain inequalities and injustices, both local and global (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001; McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009). Nevertheless, power is 
constantly constructed through the interaction between all the points of the social 
totality (Kenway 1990). This opens the possibility for the generation of a radical 
change which focuses on the reflection, generation and strengthening of alternative 
ways of knowing able to constitute counter-hegemony (Gramsci 2007:168). Culture is 
a place where alternatives can be generated (Weber 1946:172). Without doubt, the 
most bio-culturally diverse region of Mexico still has many lessons to share about 
alternative ways of knowing and acting in response. Anthropologists argue that the 
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alternative cultural worlds, “located outside the state and in the margins of the 
Mexican society” have solutions to offer to environmental and governance problems 
(Haenn et al. 2014), but this requires to move away from the “one-size-fits-all” 
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Appendix I. SSI guide for the 
bureaucratic relationships between the 
State, practitioners and PA managers. 
 
The interview guides below provide a checklist of the topics to be covered during 
semi-structured interviews at two levels: 
(1) National and regional officials from the state protected areas authority 
CONANP and relevant NGOs 
(2) Managers of individual protected areas  
The topics refer to perceived strengths and weaknesses of the current mechanisms in 
terms of a) recognition and b) implementation of the different forms of protected 
area or ecological easement, with emphasis on: 
1.1 Bureaucratic requirements, local institutions and capacity of state and non-state actors to 
bridge the two 
1.2 Technical approaches to natural resource management versus traditional or local 
knowledge and practice 
1.3 Centralisation/decentralisation within the state system and the implications for the 
above; 
(1) National and regional officials from the state protected areas 
authority CONANP and relevant NGOs 
Introduction to the interview: 
This research is focused on the strengths and weaknesses that practitioners at 
different organizational levels find on the current mechanisms for recognition and 
implementation of different forms of protected areas and ecological easements. I’d 
like to ask you some questions on this respect. 
1.1 Bureaucratic requirements 
 Experiences regarding bureaucracy and institutional barriers related to the 
recognition and implementation of state-managed Pas/certified 
areas/ecological easements. 
 Systems of coordination, consultation and feedback from the PAs managers to 
the national level in place, if any. 
 Clarity,  accessibility and interpretations of the bureaucratic procedures for 
actors involved 
o Differences between what is stated by law and the conditions on the 
ground.  
o Effects on the interaction between the central offices and the PAs 
managers and the PA management itself. 
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1.2 Technical approaches versus traditional or local knowledge and 
practice 
 To what extent do you think current mechanisms and protocols are 
appropriate to incorporate local actor’s knowledge and practices in 
conservation efforts? 
o Clarity, accessibility and flexibility of the current procedures and 
requirements for PA recognition and management to local relevant 
actors. 
o Do benefits offered match local actors’ efforts? 
 Potentials and obstacles for facilitation and monitoring of local participation in 
conservation.  
o Perceived attitudes of local practitioners. What capacities need to be 
developed within agencies?  
o Some people suggest that there might be some issues regarding the role 
that NGOs acting as consultancies or intermediaries in the process, 
what is your view about it? Should and could it be regulated?  
1.3 Decentralisation 
 How has the decentralization process been reflected within PAs agencies and 
organisations?  
o Distribution of faculties, responsibilities and budgets to lower 
hierarchical levels. 
o Have any complexities resulted from this process? 
o How has it influenced the bureaucratic procedures of interest? 
 Which programs are likely to work better in a state-led way and which are 
likely to work better on a decentralised way? 
o Advantages/disadvantages to strong autonomy of authorities at lower 
hierarchical levels. 
1.4 Final 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
Thank you very much for your time and attention. 
Entrevistas en español 
1. Oficiales o representantes en oficinas centrales y regionales de la 
Comisión de Areas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP) y ONGs. 
Introducción a la entrevista: 
Esta investigación busca enfocarse en las fortalezas y debilidades que los 
profesionales en diferentes niveles organizacionales encuentran en los mecanismos 
actuales para el reconocimiento e implementación de ANPs. Las siguientes preguntas 
giran alrededor de este tema. 
1.1 Requerimientos burocráticos 
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 Experiencias con burocracia y barreras institucionales para el reconocimiento 
e implementación de ANPs. 
 Sistemas de coordinacio n, consulta y retroalimentacio n del personal a nivel 
operative hacia las oficinas generals y viceversa. 
o Claridad, accesibilidad e interpretaciones de los procedimientos 
burocra ticos para los diferentes actores involucrados. 
o Diferencias entre lo que esta  estipulado por ley y lo que sucede a nivel  
operativo.  
o Efectos en la interaccio n entre las oficinas centrales y los 
administradores de ANPs y el manejo en sí . 
1.2 Enfoques técnicos y conocimiento y practicas tradicionales o locales. 
 ¿Hasta que  punto cree que los mecanismos y protocolos actuales son 
apropiados o permiten  incorporar el conocimiento y pra cticas tradicionales o 
locales en los esfuerzos de conservacio n?  
o Claridad, accesibilidad y flexibilidad de los procedimientos y 
requerimientos para los actores locales. 
o ¿Los beneficios equiparan a los esfuerzos requeridos? 
 Potenciales y obsta culos para la facilitacio n y monitoreo de la participacio n de 
actores locales en conservacio n.  
o Percepcio n de actitudes de parte de otros profesionales. ‘Que  
capacidades necesitan ser desarrolladas?  
o ¿El papel de las ONGs, deberí a ser regulado? ¿En que  aspectos?  
1.3 Descentralización 
 ¿Co mo se ha visto el proceso de desconcentracio n o de descentralizacio n en 
esta organizacio n/dependencia?  
o Distribucio n de facultades, responsabilidades y presupuestos a niveles 
jera rquicos menores. 
o ¿Existen complicaciones que han resultado de este proceso? 
o ¿Co mo ha influenciado los procedimientos burocra ticos? 
 ¿Que  tipo de programas tienden a trabajar mejos de una manera centralizada y 
cua les de manera descentralizada? 
o Ventajas y desventajas de la autonomí a de niveles jera rquicos menores 
Final 
 ¿Hay algo ma s que desee an adir? 
Muchas gracias por su tiempo y atencio n. 
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Appendix II.  
 
List of interviewees and coding system  
Forty four semi-structured interviews were carried out with the following actors in 
order to explore different conservation practitioners’ perspectives:  
# Position Place of 
interview 
Date of interview ID code 
1 CONANP National office for VCA 
certification 
Mexico City May 20th, 2009 RM 
2 CONAFOR representative Oaxaca July 31st, 2010 SA 
3 Regional Director CONANP Tuxtla Gutierrez August 4th, 2010 JJ 
4 CONANP’s responsible for the 
Chimalapas Priority Region for 
Conservation  
Juchitan August 25th 2010 SC2 
5 Regional Technical Secretary Tuxtla Gutierrez  August 4th, 2010 GJ 
6 CONANP Regional office for VCA 
certification 
Tuxtla Gutierrez July 15th, 2010 TM 
7 Fire management CONANP Tuxtla Gutierrez August 4th, 2010 KA 
8 State agency for PA 
SEMAVIH 
Tuxtla Gutierrez October 5th, 2010 BH 
9 State agency for PA 
SEMAVIH 
Tuxtla Gutierrez October 5th, 2010 JO 
10 State agency for PA 
SEMAVIH 
Tuxtla Gutierrez October 5th, 2010 BB 
11 Yagul staff Oaxaca September 20th, 
2010 
SG 
12 Naha and Metzabok (APRN) staff Palenque June 16th, 2009 HJ 
13 REBISE staff Tuxtla Gutierrez August 9th, 2010 VA 




15 REBIMA staff Lacanja September 10th, 
2010 
RJ 
16 REBIMA staff Lacanja September 10th, 
2010 
RChan 





18 REBIMA staff Lacanja September 10th, 
2010 
POM 
19 REBIMA staff Lacanja September 10th, 
2010 
FCOR 
20 REBITRI staff Tuxtla Gutierrez August 9th, 2010 CC 
21 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 EA 
22 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 GO 
23 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 CL 
24 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 GN 
25 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 CN 
26 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 FLR 
27 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 COS 
28 REBIEN staff Acapetahua August 16th, 2010 PRO 
29 REBIVTA staff Cacahoatan August 6th, 2010 PLA 
30 REBIVTA staff Cacahoatan August 6th, 2010 HP 
31 REBISO staff Tuxtla Gutierrez August 9th, 2010 ER 
32 National Parks director in Chiapas  Tuxtla Gutierrez  August 7th, 2010 GE 
33 NGO representative Oaxaca May 25th, 2009 CDC 
34 NGO representative Xalapa May 20th, 2009 CIC 
35 NGO representative Mexico City May  26th, 2010 SA 
36 NGO representative Tuxtla Gutierrez June 11th, 2009 HA 
37 NGO representative Tuxtla Gutierrez November 5th, 
2010 
GP 
38 NGO representative San Cristobal de 
las Casas (SCLC) 
June 5th, 2010 MO 
39 NGO representative SCLC July 28th, 2010 AI 
40 NGO representative SCLC July 28th, 2010 RFE 
41 NGO representative SCLC  December 16th, 
2010 
GM 
42 Owner of private reserve Tuxtla Gutierrez August 2nd, 2010 MLE 





44 Owner of private reserve Tapachula August 6th, 2010 NEF 
Table I.  Protected area staff and conservation practitioners interviewed. 
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Qualitative data from in-depth case study 
# Place Date Identification code 
1 Juchitan and Oaxaca Juchitan, July 7th and 22nd, 2010 MJ 
2 Juchitan August 25th, 2010 SC2 
3 Juchitan August 25th, 2010 AI 
4 Oaxaca February 26th, 2011 OD 
5 SCLC December 16th, 2010 GM 
6 Zanatepec July 7th, 2010 PR 
7 San Miguel October 15th, 2010 UP 
8 San Miguel October 22nd, 2010 RS 
9 San Miguel October 23rd, 2010  DC 
10 San Miguel November 3rd, 2010 CyC 
11 San Miguel November 3rd, 2010 CA 
12 San Miguel November 6th, 2010 ES 
13 San Miguel November 17th, 2010 SMV 
14 San Miguel November 16th, 2010 GRR 
15 San Miguel November 18th, 2010 PR2 
16 San Miguel November 25th, 2011 MA 
17 San Miguel November 25th, 2010 SAD  
18 San Miguel November 26th, 2010 and May 
14th, 2012 
DS 
19 San Miguel  November 26th, 2010 AEM  
20 San Miguel November 27th, 2010 CJM 
21 San Miguel November 27th, 2010 GG 
22 San Miguel November 30th, 2010 RA 
23 San Miguel December 3rd, 2010 ST 
24 San Miguel December 8th, 2010 GM2 
25 San Miguel December 10th, 2010 SC 
26 San Miguel December 11th, 2010 SB 
27 San Miguel January 15th, 2011 SGU  
28 San Miguel March 16th, 2011 JIJ 
29 San Miguel March 17th, 2011 EAG 
30 San Miguel March 17th, 2011 LA 
31 San Miguel May 13th, 2012 GF  
32 San Miguel May 5th, 2012  QO  
Table II. Interviewees related to the case study in San Miguel Chimalapa. 
 


















Owners of 15 private 
reserves in Chiapas. 
Representatives of 

















for the use of 
PES, and the 
Representatives of 
CONANP(1), 
WWF(1), GADES (1), 
Fondo Mexicano para 
la Conservación (1), 






of a VCA in La 
Cristalina. 
and, later, the 
President Communal 





































Five directors of 
protected areas 







5 Meeting in a 
Settlement 
 







women from the 
settlement and three 
men. 
6 Meeting in a 
Settlement 
San Miguel November 
23rd, 2010 
Issues related 
to the resin 
harvest project.  














WWF, GADES and 
Pronatura Sur. 









authorities in charge 
of the communal 








The arrival of a 
complementary 










people from the 
commission in the 
eastern settlements, 
Representatives of 






















Campeche, Quintana  
Roo, Veracruz and 
Oaxaca. 
Table III. Meetings, workshops and assemblies attended during fieldwork. 
 
 
